glass house philosopher / notebook 1
Wednesday, 30th January 2002
The Xenophanes Argument
1. Suppose there is one God, who knows and sees all.
2. Our best theories about the world around us cannot measure up to God's knowledge. Whereas God sees the fact which makes the theory true, we merely infer to the best explanation for given evidence.
3. Therefore, we don't know that our theory is true. It merely seems to us that our theory ought to be true, on the basis of our understanding of what counts as a good explanation.
4. Even if there is no God, the same conclusion follows, because we understand what it would be to have such godlike knowledge.
The Pyrrho Argument
1. About any subject matter you will find people with conflicting beliefs.
2. When two beliefs P and not-P conflict, the reasons given in support of P are just as persuasive to the person who believes that P, as the reasons given in support of not-P to the person who believes that not-P.
3. We cannot get outside our own subjective point of view: the reasons we find persuasive we call 'good reasons' and the reasons we are not persuaded by we call 'bad reasons'.
4. But reasons which are persuasive only because you occupy a particular point of view cannot be good reasons.
5. Therefore, no reasons are good reasons: we should try as much as possible to avoid believing things.
The Descartes Argument
1. Suppose there is an evil demon (evil scientist) who has the power to create experiences in my soul (brain).
2. There would be no way I could discover from my experience that this was so.
3. Nor could I argue that it was more probable that I was not being deceived by an evil demon, because judgements of probability are relative to evidence.
4. Therefore, I cannot know whether or not I am being deceived by an evil demon (evil scientist).
5. Therefore, the only knowledge I possess is knowledge of my own experiences.
The Gettier Argument
1. If we understand what it means to say, 'X knows that P', for any person X and empirical proposition P, then it should be possible to give a definition of the necessary and sufficient conditions for 'X knows that P'.
2. The following conditions for 'X knows that P' are not sufficient:
(a) P is true
(b) X believes that P
(c) X is able to justify X's belief that P
We can see that the three conditions are not sufficient by looking at the 'Gettier counterexamples' (Edmund Gettier 'Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?').
E.g. My belief that I am on the 8.27 train to St Pancras is true, and I am able to justify that belief (I asked at the ticket office, and checked the train platform indicator and both said it was platform 8). It turns out that the wrong information about the platform number was put on the video screen in the ticket office and also on the platform indicator. Both wrongly said '3' but because of a different malfunction in each case, the '3' looked like an '8'.
3. We can make the definition in 2. sufficient, by changing condition (c) to (c'):
(c') There are no breaks in the process of information transmission leading to X's belief that P. (Or, in Robert Nozick's formulation, X's belief that P 'tracks the truth': if it had not been the case that P, then X would not have believed that P.)
4. But according to (c'), X can never give adequate grounds for claiming that P, because the possibilities of breaks in the process of information transmission are endless. So even if X acquires information from more than once source, X is unable to rule out the possibility of errors cancelling one another out, as in the train example above.
5. Therefore, even if we do 'know' lots of things, according to this revised definition of knowledge, we have no right make a knowledge claim in any particular case.
My visit last Friday to London to give a talk at my old school U.C.S. Hampstead was a trip down Memory Lane.
I wrote about the trip before I went. What can I say, except that it all came true? Just about everything was as I pictured it would be. It was uncanny.
First stop, tea at Louis Patisserie in Hampstead. I remarked when I paid my bill that the place had not changed in thirty years. 'Thirty-eight years!' came the proud reply. No mug of milky water with a tea bag here. For your 2 Pounds you get a silver teapot, silver water jug and milk jug, elegant cup and saucer, sugar bowl and strainer, all on a round silver tray. Wonderful.
As the other customers read their newspapers, or gossiped about the latest setback for Tony Blair, I took a few minutes to go over the handout for my talk on 'Sceptical Arguments' (above). But my mind skittered over the page. I wasn't in the mood to think about philosophy.
The talk went well at least, I think it did. My brain finally clicked into gear. Good questions afterwards...It all went by in a dream.
Afterwards, John Older, my Chemistry teacher from 33 years ago showed me around the school. Seeing one another after a third of a century on was the biggest shock. But there were a couple of little surprises. After the fire that destroyed the school hall, it had been restored to its former glory, just as I'd described (Page 124). But the panelling wasn't oak but cleverly disguised fibreglass. It was impossible to tell the difference. Outside, John Older pointed out that the old redbrick Victorian building had grown an extra storey. He was right. How was that possible? I had no idea. With evident pleasure, John explained how the architects had lowered the playground, so that a new building could be slipped under the tennis courts. The basement of the old building was now the ground floor. That must have taken some digging.
Well, back to tonight.
I shall be discussing the four sceptical arguments with my WEA Philosophy class. They will be pleased with the handout they are the ones that helped write it! Then Tamla Motown, Irish folk music and ice cold lager beer at The Royal and the last bus back to Woodseats.
If I hurry, there's just time enough to have a bath and grab something for June and the girls from the local fish and chip shop.
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