glass house philosopher / notebook 1
Monday, 13th March 2000
Am I material? What follows, if I am? Or if I am not? How could I prove that I am? Or that I am not?
Describing the consequences of a philosophical theory is not the same as giving a proof of a philosophical theory. When it comes to the debate between physicalism and mind-body dualism, however, the distinction is harder to see. This was evident at last Friday's Departmental Seminar, where Robert Hanna from the University of Colorado offered us a paper on 'What Descartes Didn't See: A New Modal Argument against Physicalism'.
No-one was convinced by the argument. Hanna defended bravely against a barrage of hostile questions. My sympathies are always with the underdog on these occasions. But physicalists are a hardened lot. It is not easy to find a chink in their armour.
Physicalism is the view that all the things that happen in the universe are realized in physical processes. That includes the thoughts that I am thinking now, as well as the myriad experiences filtering into my consciousness, like the growl of the traffic outside, the whirring of my computer, the aroma of fresh coffee, the warm glow of my desk lamp against the grey metal of the sky.
Of all the things that make my subjectivity what it is, however, the most significant to my mind, but also the most controversial, is the feeling of having a will. I am not a spectator watching my life going by, like images on a cinema screen, a multi-coloured parade of experiences. I am in charge. I am the one making my life happen. My thoughts happen because I think them. My limbs move because I move them. Or so it seems.
When Descartes was writing, the cutting edge technology of the day created pocket time pieces, exquisite music boxes, and life-like clockwork birds twittering in gilded cages. The best explanation of animal behaviour was on the model of wind-up-and-go.
The English materialist Thomas Hobbes, a contemporary of Descartes, is notable for his controversial acceptance of the clockwork view of human action. He claimed that human decision making is just a complicated kind of physical 'motion'. For philosophical, as well as religious reasons, Descartes could not accept a view that made human beings equal to non-human animals. He believed that materialism is incapable of making sense of human agency. (According to his theory of mind-body interaction, the soul produces changes in the motions of 'animal spirits' in the brain, and is in turn affected by those motions. The soul, being non-physical, does not itself move.)
Today, philosophers argue over the adequacy of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) model of the human mind. The brain is just a highly complex computer running a program. For example, the 'Geoffrey Klempner' program. As I type these words, the program chugs away, processing thousands, or millions of instructions per second.
On the AI model, decision making is a piece of cake. Consider the chess computer. In choosing the best move, the program generates a set of possible outcomes, then tests each alternative by assigning a value. The values are determined by a set of fixed rules, like, 'A bishop is worth three pawns'. The program chooses the move that leads to the position most favourable for it, on the assumption that its opponent chooses its moves on the same basis. That view of human decision making is a lot more credible than the clockwork model, that's one thing that can be said for it.
Though modern computers do this with silicon chips and microcircuits, what I have described is essentially a mechanical process. 'Deeper Blue', the program that defeated Kasparov, could, in principle, run on Charles Babbage's original computational machine. (It would take millions of years to make one move.)
The most interesting claim Hanna made in his paper is that there are kinds of human experience where the computational model can introspectively be seen to be inadequate.
The experiences in question are those where we hesitate between different, equally attractive alternatives. In such cases we feel ourselves to be more than a mere process. To emphasize the point, Hanna quoted Descartes from the 'Fourth Meditation':
For the power of the will consists only in our being able to do a thing, or not to do it (that is to say, to affirm or deny, to pursue or to flee) or rather only, when affirming or denying, pursuing or fleeing the things our understanding proposes to us, in our acting in such a way that we are not conscious that any external force is constraining us. For, in order that I may be free, it is not necessary for me to be indifferent to the choice between one or other of two contraries; but rather, the more I lean towards one, either because I know clearly that the good and the true are in it, or because God so disposes my mind from within, the more freely do I make my choice and embrace it. And indeed divine grace and natural knowledge, far from diminishing my freedom, increases it rather, and strengthens it. So that the indifference I feel when I am not inclined to one side rather than to another by the weight of any reason, is the lowest degree of freedom...
F.E. Sutcliffe tr, Descartes Discourse on Method and Meditations Penguin Classics pp. 136-7.
(You'll need to read this at least twice as I did! to get the sense.)
According to Descartes, we are, paradoxically, most acutely conscious of the subjective feeling of freedom when we are least free. We are most free when we do not hesitate, but allow the best reason determine our actions. Our understanding 'proposes' a certain course of action as the best available to us, and we give our immediate assent. 'This is what I have to do.' What interests Hanna the most is what interests Descartes the least, those cases where there is no clear reason pointing either way.
Now it is worth noting that this can happen with the chess computer too. When the computer calculates that two or more moves satisfy the requirement of leading to the best possible position, then a randomizing device makes the choice for it. Arguably, that could not be the way things are for us. I might make the decision that the best thing to do in a particular case is spin a coin. But my deciding in favour of one course of action rather than another, equally attractive alternative does not feel like the outcome of a 'coin spinning' inside my head.
Then again, how would it feel if our decisions between equally attractive alternatives were made for us by such a hypothetical randomizing process in the brain?
Picture a sailing ship becalmed. In such a predicament (as I was reminded recently watching Gregory Peck in Moby Dick on daytime TV) all the sailors can do is go down to the rowing boats and row their hearts out until they find some wind. When it is we ourselves who cannot find a wind to blow us in one direction rather than another, it is as if all we have to do is blow into our own sails. When there is no reason to move us one way rather than another, we find the power to will ourselves into action.
That power, according to Descartes, is always there. It is just that we only become aware of it under certain circumstances.
Could that be an argument for dualism? It is certainly not Descartes' argument. It is older, and cruder than the argument Robert Hanna offered us, which used the fashionable. neo-scholastic terminology of metaphysical possibility and necessity to draw distinctions whose subtlety escaped just about everyone in the audience. In the past, I've been very sceptical, but I'm beginning to think that the cruder argument has a certain charm.
Here is the argument from the will, cut down to its bare bones:1. If physicalism is true, then decision making is a mechanical process.
2. If decision making is a mechanical process then the feeling of 'will' is an illusion.
3. I know that my feeling of 'will' is not an illusion, as surely as I know that I exist.
4. Therefore, I know just as surely that physicalism is not true.
5. Being the only credible alternative, dualism must be true.
You'll see how the argument neatly uses a consequence of physicalism to turn the tables against the physicalist, and so prove the dualist theory. But is the argument valid? What do you think?
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