glass house philosopher / notebook 1
Monday, 20th March 2000
Looking through my in-tray, I came across a question for Ask a Philosopher which had been lying there for ten days, three days past the official deadline. I'd picked the sheet of paper up several times and put it down, and finally slipped it into the bottom of the pile:Synnott says: 'The body is not only a biological phenomenon, it is also a social creation of immense complexity.' To what extent is this true?
Who is Synnott, anyway?
Ignorance is no excuse. Besides which, it's the statement I should be thinking about, not the person who said it. The phrase has been going round and round my head, 'The body is a complex social creation, the body is a complex social creation.' I tried looking at my face in the mirror as I said it. I pinched my arm.
What could Synnott have meant?
Then this morning I was climbing up the long hill to Woodseats after walking the kids to school (I'll explain why in a moment) when the answer came to me. At least, a fragment of the answer. There's a negative claim, and a positive claim. The negative claim I find easier to grasp.
A month ago, I lost part of my body. Let me explain. It was Saturday morning. I'd just collected Judi her piano lesson. Two minutes from home, my Ford Capri ran into the back of a BMW. I mean, I did it, I was driving. The result was a minor dent and a broken tail light for the BMW. The Capri went to the scrap yard. The front wing was crushed like a tin can. The front bumper, headlights, indicator light all needed replacement. The total repair bill would added up to more than I paid for the car.
I lost my wheels.
There's a great scene at the end of the film Aliens where Sigourney Weaver straps herself into a giant hydraulically powered exo-skeleton to do battle with the Queen Alien. Wham! Ripley whacks that darn Alien right in the kisser.
I'm talking about the blurred boundary between what is a tool, like a hammer, or a pen, or an AppleMac, and a prosthetic device which literally becomes part of our own body. The wheels of the Capri were my wheels. It's brakes were my brakes. (I just wish I'd applied them sooner.) And, yes, like many fans of the Alien series, I've dreamed about the things I could do with a giant hydraulically powered exo-skeleton.
Technology has brought the stuff of legends and folk lore to life. Our frail bodies, encased in their shells of plastic and metal, are transformed into creatures of immense power, that can fly at thousands of miles an hour, or reduce mountains to rubble.
What is there, here, that is relevant to philosophy? I think that there is a very real philosophical problem with a case like the following. Turning a steering wheel is no different, in principle, from operating a remote control device. Twelve floors up, equipped with my remote, and a suitable video camera link up, I could 'drive' my car out of the car park to meet me outside the front door of the Sheffield Arts Tower. If I feel in the mood for a drive in the country, but too lazy to leave my desk, I can watch the hills roll by on my desk top as my empty car negotiates the narrow winding roads of the Peak National Park.
That is how I propose human beings could travel to Mars. A lot safer, don't you think?
Now, someone might object, 'But the people operating the remote controls wouldn't actually be there. They would be back on Earth, watching the Martian landscape roll by on their computer screens.' What is it to be in a place? In a memorable thought experiment, the US philosopher Daniel Dennett imagines a scenario where a subject's brain is connected to their body by a radio link up. As I type these words, sitting at my desk, watching the cars and buses beneath my study window, I can imagine that this experiment has been done to me. At this very moment, my brain, with wires sticking out everywhere, is floating in a vat in one of the basement research labs at Sheffield University, thinking these thoughts, performing these actions. Am I here, or there? Or both places at once? I agree with Dennett that there is no determinate answer to that kind of question.
All I have said so far concerns Synnott's negative claim, 'The body is not only a biological phenomenon.' It is quite likely that these kinds of science fiction case would not interest Synnott at all. In all events, it takes something more to establish the positive claim that the body is a 'social creation of immense complexity'.
When I look in the mirror, I see my face. What is it that I am looking at? What is it that I see?
Considered as a biological phenomenon, the human face performs a number of important functions. The mouth, nose, eyes and ears are all ideally placed to do the jobs they are designed to do. Yet imagine those same functions performed by organs of a different shape and configuration, and you have a monster, an 'Alien'. We read significance, not only into a person's actions but in their facial expressions and bodily movements. 'The human body,' Wittgenstein said, 'is the best picture of the human soul' (Philosophical Investigations p. 178).
Yes, I can believe that there is an immense field of inquiry there for the social theorist. That is outside my field of expertise. I'll do a web search for 'Synnott' and see what I can find out. What I feel confident in asserting is that the task for philosophical reflection is to clear away the vulgar prejudice that stands in the way of recognizing the existence of this foundational aspect of the human world.
Thanks, Farah, for your question!
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