glass house philosopher / notebook 2
Thursday, 19th February 2004
Twenty-one months have passed since my last notebook entry (30th May 2002). I am making a start just as I did the first time, in the spirit of an experiment, without any preconceived ideas. Let's see what unfolds.
I moved to my office in June 2003, in a house opposite a mosque. When I am out walking I sometimes pass by the faithful on their way to prayers. It is comforting yet also vaguely disturbing to think of all that mental and emotional energy directed skywards. How would these men feel about the presence of a sceptical philosopher in their midst? Or, for that matter, a Jew?
John Lennon famously sang, "Above us, only sky." I prefer to say that God is that unique object concerning which nothing can be said in the true Wittgensteinian sense. If forced to describe my attitude to ultimate things as either irreligious or religious, I would without blushing describe it as religious.
The last thing I wanted to talk about on page one of my new notebook is the 'G' word. The reason is that I have a reply to write for the forthcoming issue of Philosophy Pathways just three days away to David Robjant and Tony Flood's comments (Philosophy Pathways Issue 75, Issue 76) on a piece I wrote for Ask a Philosopher on 'God and I'.
In my reply to Father Montfils (Answers 24), I was concerned mainly to defend the right of philosophers to make assertions based on fallible human reason. It is in that spirit that I made the seemingly reckless claim for which the good Father called me to account that one thing that an omniscient deity cannot know is the I-ness of I.
The claim is based on my theory of subjective and objective worlds, as expounded in my book Naive Metaphysics. You might well wonder how such a claim can be made, if (according to me) nothing can be said about the object we refer to as 'God'. But there is no contradication. I am merely granting a premiss for argument's sake. If you believe that the attributes of the deity can be described, and if this description includes the attribute of omniscience, then such a claim cannot be true. There is at least one thing that a supposedly 'omniscient' being cannot know.
My theory offers a novel take on the attempt of the metaphysician to give a total description of reality a kind of ultimate outflanking manoeuvre. You can subscribe to materialism, idealism, dualism, pantheism, panpsychism, existentialism. Exactly the same problem arises for each of these theories, and any other theory which offers a total description of the universe. The problem is that in our enthusiasm to give a total description to include everything, just as philosophy demands of a theory of this level of generality one thing is inevitably left out: the unique subject that is I.
One philosopher who has seen this is Emmanuel Levinas, author of Totality and Infinity (Alphonso Lignis, tr. The Hague: Nijhoff 1979). Levinas uses the language of phenomenology, writing in an unique expressive style that many readers, including myself, find great difficulty in getting to grips with. A Lithuanian Jew, Levinas experienced first hand the horrors of the Holocaust. In response, he evolved a unique ethical philosophy. After the war, he settled in France, where he lectured in Paris. However, the importance of his work was only recognized in the 60's when Jaques Derrida wrote in praise of his philosophy of 'the Other' in his essay "Violence and Metaphysics: an essay on the thought of Emmanuel Levinas" (Writing and Difference Alan Bass tr. University of Chicago 1978).
My methods are less radical, more traditional. Trained as an analytic philosopher, I feel comfortable with the kind of philosophy which explains its terms, states a proposition, argues a case, defends against objections. I'm not saying Levinas doesn't do any of these things. But a lot of the time it is pretty hard to see where he does it.
In Chapter 14 of Naive Metaphysics I consider an objection to a theory which I call moderate nonegocentrism, the claim that "the totality of facts constitutes, in effect, the knowledge that would be possessed by a hypothetical ubiquitous intelligence; a subject that acquires over time information about the world as it presents itself to every possible point of view" or, equivalently, the claim that "every fact is capable of being stated in language and thus becoming common knowledge amongst subjects each of whom occupies a different point of view" (p. 195). In defending nonegocentrism against this objection, my aim is to clear the way for my arguments against the theory. With me so far?
Here is the objection, which I think you'll agree looks initially pretty plausible:Now it might seem at first that the intelligence's very ubiquity robs it of the knowledge of at least one vital fact: in knowing all that I know, in perceiving all that I perceive and feeling all that I feel, it still does not know what it is like to be me. For one of the things that characterizes what it is like to be me is the respect in which I necessarily lack knowledge of what others know, perceive and feel. What the ubiquitous intelligence knows is that I lack this knowledge; what it does not and could not know is what it is like to lack this knowledge, since it has never lacked that knowledge. It could only make up for this deficiency by ceasing to be what it is and becoming me (ibid.).
The phrase, "it might seem at first" gives the clue that I do not agree with this objection. Here is what I say in defence of the nonegocentrist:This objection, though initially plausible, falls down when one realizes that a parallel argument would establish that I cannot know now what it was like to have been sitting at my desk an hour ago; on the grounds that, for example, I did not know then what sentence I would now be writing. On the contrary, I remember perfectly well what it was like. In just the same way that in thinking myself back in time to what it was like to be sitting here an hour ago I compensate for the knowledge which I now possess but then lacked, so the ubiquitous intelligence compensates for its total knowledge of all that finite subjects know, perceive and feel when it considers what it is like to be me. In the sense, then, in which what one might call the 'I-ness of I' is understood merely as what it is like to be me, this is an uncontroversial fact which, though in its richness it might never be fully captured by any finite description, contains no elements that are in principle incapable of being communicated in language and thus becoming common knowledge. Exactly the same, of course, applies to the you-ness of you, the she-ness of she etc. (ibid.)
What is my objection, then, to the nonegocentric view? My objection is that:...the I-ness of I contains an additional element over and above the other examples. I may consider what it is like to be myself or any other person indifferently; but my sense of actually being the person I am, of the meaning that the proposition 'I exist' has for me, is unique and incommunicable: an appearance whose reality as appearance I cannot coherently deny.
Various versions of this objection occur sporadically in the pages of Naive Metaphysics. In another version of the objection, I ask the reader to consider a hypothetical universe just like the actual universe except for the fact that the 'I' who refers to himself as 'GK' is not I. In this alternative universe, I am nowhere. I do not exist. Yet there is no denying that what it is like to be GK in the alternative universe is exactly the same as what it is like to be GK in this universe. That is hardly surprising. To say what something is like is essentially to describe it in general terms. However, my existence is not general but particular.
This is naive metaphysics. Philosophers trained in the analytical school will not like it. But nor am I likely to win much sympathy from continental philosophers. The blurb on the back cover of Totality and Infinity attempts to distance Levinas's philosophy from mere "egoist protestation". Yet that is exactly the status of my argument. I protest that I am uniquely I, I utterly reject the idea that I am, ultimately, is merely one amongst many, or a part of a greater whole.
You can work out the rest. In knowing what it is like to be me, an omniscient deity knows something which is indistinguishable, in essence, from its knowledge of what it is like to be the other GK in the alternative reality where I do not exist. Therefore, an omniscient deity does not know I.
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