glass house philosopher / notebook 2
Wednesday, 24th March 2004
It has begun...
I took my ring binders off the shelf, just to get a sense of the weight of the task. Not so bad, really. There's much I can skip. I'm determined to step lightly, not allow myself to succumb to the nausea.
In those volumes, I know there are many things I wrote with my mind closed, spinning words to no good purpose, shadow boxing. I won't condemn it. Some times you have to work through, hack through, the bad stuff in order to get back on course. Haven't you ever written rubbish and known you were writing rubbish at the time? But you had to do it anyway, you had no choice. That's how I felt on many occasions.
(Can't do that any more of course! I don't want to lose you, my dear reader!)
My thesis, The Metaphysics of Meaning is the key. I'm going to start with that, and work backwards and forwards from there.
This is taken from the last chapter:
The world in its totality cannot be made an object of thought. It is not an 'object', not something concerning which it makes sense to ask: 'Why does it exist?'. Yet that is not the 'reason' why the world exists, why there is 'something rather than nothing' as if one thought one could prove that the world 'necessarily exists' but only a rejection of the question. The world is open-ended, not a 'totality': One cannot stand back from the world; while within the world nothing could count as defining its 'limits'. Moreover, that 'open-endedness' is the reality of time: For the world does not stand still; it is the flow of action, a lived world. The thinking subject who 'comprehends' that world is an agent, a living person whose every action further strengthens the bonds of attachment. For those who take comfort in metaphysical visions, let that be their 'metaphysical vision'.
The Metaphysics of Meaning (D.Phil thesis 1982) Chapter 33, para 326
The aim of metaphysics, as I saw it back then, was the overcoming of an illusion which is wrongly identified with the metaphysical enterprise, the illusion of detachment.
In one sense, I had achieved my goal. I had demonstrated (or so I thought) how the temptation to view oneself as something other than the world leads to illusions concerning the 'transcendent' nature of the ego and of truth, as two ideal concepts within which the actual, lived world hangs suspended. But now I had to face the stark fact that refuting the illusions by means of philosophical argument didn't make them go away! So what was the point after all?
Metaphysics aims at complete clarity. That means discovering answers to one's questions which do not raise further, unanswerable questions; it also means whole-heartedly believing those 'answers' and not resigning oneself to a perpetual conflict between the results of the investigation and one's own 'intuitions'. This demand is not merely an ideal which we choose to set ourselves; for a 'metaphysics' which stops short of attempting to solve all the problems which present themselves in the course of its investigations simply risks reduplicating those very problems for which it claims a 'solution' in the form of an ineliminable residue of unanswered questions or unsatisfied intuitions.
(ibid. para 330)
You think you've got rid of that little devil of a problem. You've bashed it about, beaten it up quite throughly. You sit down, look around, there's no problem to be seen. Then, just as you're relaxing, the same darn problem pops up somewhere else where you were least expecting it!
We must now face the fact that the terms of reference of that task rule out the possibility of its being carried out. For the propositions of a 'system of metaphysics' can serve only to refute metaphysical illusion; once one departs from that negative function there is nothing upon which to base the development of the system except the appeal to an 'incorrigible metaphysical intuition'. But that is just what the task of 'identifying the source of the illusion' would require us to do...
The illusion is the illusion of detachment. But why does that illusion tempt us? Why, after going through all the arguments, all the 'dialectic', do we continue to think in ways (of course, I was basing this on my own thought processes maybe it was only me after all!) which imply transcendent notions of the ego and of truth? Doesn't that show that the illusion has not really been dealt with?
...So long as the dialectic is confined to its 'negative function' it can yield only 'illuminating redescriptions' of the illusion; we may cast those descriptions in ever more revealing forms, but the source of the illusion itself remains untouched. From the point of view of the dialectic, the fact that we remain unsatisfied with 'mere description', the fact that the illusion continues as a source of temptation are brute facts, beyond the scope of metaphysical inquiry.
(ibid. para 331)
Oh well! Back to the drawing board! Only I didn't draw that conclusion. I struggled bravely on. The next idea was a stroke of inspiration (or a sign of total desperation: you decide).Identifying the source of the illusion is indeed a necessary task; but it is not a task for metaphysical inquiry. For its necessity belongs, not to metaphysics but to psychology... If hypotheses concerning the nature of that source resulted from psychoanalytic investigation... the question 'why the source is of such-and-such a nature' would no longer arise; and at the same time the illusion would be eliminated from the subject's mental life...
(That reminds me of an old joke. Proud mother: 'My son is a doctor of philosophy?' Her friend replies: 'So what kind of disease is philosophy?!')
...And now we are forced to confront the following question: Might there have existed a race of intelligent beings who simply could not be brought to see the 'metaphysical illusions', to understand the meaning of 'metaphysics'?... While in the grip of the illusion, compelled by the 'necessity' of the metaphysical attitude, we find this impossible to conceive. Yet the conclusion is inescapable: The questions of metaphysics are not the discovery of 'reason itself' but reflect only the contingencies of a specifically human psychology.
(ibid. para 333)
And that's how it ended. Just like that. I was quite pleased that the final chapter 33 ended with paragraph 333. Just a coincidence, you understand...
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