glass house philosopher / notebook 2
Wednesday, 21st April 2004
Anatomy of error. The idea of a 'dialectic of illusion' is important to me (24th March, 26th March). But what exactly is an illusion? How does it differ from mere error?
I remember a snippet from the Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin, famous for method of precise analysis of 'ordinary language', where he talks about the common confusion between the words 'error' and 'mistake'.
Not all errors are mistakes. When you make a mistake, you erroneously take something to be something else. In his famous essay "Other Minds" (Philosophical Papers OUP) Austin gives the example of a bird watcher mistaking one species of bird for another. On the other hand, if I am an accountancy clerk adding up a long column of numbers and I get the addition wrong, there was nothing I 'mistook' for anything else. I just miscalculated. So, strictly speaking, I made an error but I did not make a 'mistake'. (Just try telling that to your boss.)
In philosophy, errors arise, not though mistakes or miscalculation but what one might term, 'flawed thinking'. Your thought process go awry. Sometimes the error is understandable, as in the rich variety of logical fallacy catalogued in text books of informal logic. On other occasions, one's only response is, How on earth did I think that? Not so much a case of flawed thinking but complete absence of thought. Your mind was somewhere else.
Surprising how often that happens.
(On second thoughts: "In philosophy, errors arise, not through mistakes...". Is that right? Can't you mistake one theory for another, as when you are half way through your critique of theory X when you discover that your critique applies, not to theory X but to theory Y?)
My students are tired of hearing me say, "Be prepared to consider the possibility that you might be wrong." It's not only possible, but likely. In fact, more than likely. When you think about it, probably certain. The biggest secret about philosophers is that we spend a large part of our time discovering we were wrong.
Like the gambler who fallaciously reasons that "I have lost so many times, this time I must win," you congratulate yourself when you have uncovered a piece of your own flawed thinking as if that were a certain sign that your thought processes are back on track. The reality is no more likely to be that than the opposite. You can have errors within errors within errors, like a series of dreams when you think you've woken up only to discover that you are still dreaming.
It is not just in arguments where a philosopher's thinking can go awry. You can take the wrong direction, choose the wrong project, spend your whole professional life 'barking up a gum tree' (I'd love to know where that expression comes from). When that happens, the most likely diagnosis is unwillingness to admit you were wrong some time in the past. (Yes, but you can also abandon a project for the wrong reasons, give up just when you were close to reaching your goal.)
"I could be wrong about everything." How helpful is that to me now? Could I go back? how far back would I have to go? Discounting my undergraduate years, it would have to be 1977 or 1978. That's when I took the decisive fork in the path that has led me here. It is pointless to speculate.
Do you always discover you were wrong, or sometimes just decide? ("I now realize that my enthusiasm for X was just infatuation," you say. In the field of personal relationships, we know how easy it is to deceive oneself about such things. We give ourselves permission to forget, to obliterate how real it was at the time, how much X mattered to us.)
This isn't what I'm interested in right now. One could write a book about the anatomy and genealogy of philosophical error. But I'm on the track of a very special kind of flawed philosophical thinking, which reveals not so much normal thought processes malfunctioning or breaking down in various ways but rather a systematic weakness or vulnerability which inevitably leads to error.
The ego and truth illusions belong to every person to whom the dialectic addresses itself, distinguished from mere error only by that universality; illusions of an ultimate reality of metaphysical facts beyond the reach of language, whose exposure as illusion simultaneously rejects the project of transcendent metaphysics. The motivation for this project, the attempt to take up a metaphysical attitude to a world viewed sub specie aeternitatis, ultimately translates into the antinomy of idealism and realism; an irresolvable conflict between two opposing conceptions of the nature of thought's representations; a transcendental ego versus a transcendent truth... But dialectic can claim no results, no established propositions; only at most a change in the inner state of the reader who has worked it through. Metaphysics indeed sets forever the same task, demanding completion but never finished.
Metaphysics of Meaning (D.Phil thesis 1982) Abstract
I have an acutely painful memory of typing and re-typing my one page Abstract using an old Smith Corona 7000 electric typewriter that my father had given me from his office. The very last task before sending the thesis off to the binders. Every time I typed the page out, I found something else wrong with it. A task that should have taken an hour took a whole day. At the end, I felt so disgusted I was ready to throw the whole thesis in the bin, give up my ambitions for a doctorate and get a job as a postman.
Maybe this was so wrong, so wrong-headed that some unconscious voice my better half? was shouting at me to stop in my tracks, give up this pointless line of inquiry.
Later, I realized that that was just the voice of self-doubt, nothing more. My clumsy fingers were tripping over themselves out of sheer anxiety and excitement that my long project was finally coming to fruition.
But that was then and this is now.
On balance, I think I was wrong.
Metaphysics is more than just a dialectic of illusion. You can't make a positive out of a bare negative. There must be more to say, even if only, "This is how reality looks when you take the illusion away."
On second thoughts, No, that's too superficial, to unsubtle, too easy!
How confident am I that there is a sharp conceptual dividing line between 'mere philosophical error' and 'metaphysical illusion'? Suppose the boundary between error and illusions turns out to be more or less fuzzy, what then? (I remember my old Prof, David Hamlyn remarking that "there are no statistical truths in philosophy".)
Here are two things I know:
If (as I believed then) metaphysics is the dialectic of metaphysical illusion, then the ultimate subject matter of metaphysics is the metaphysical attitude.
If (as I believed when I wrote Naive Metaphysics) metaphysics is nothing but the working through of the consequences of naive metaphysical wonder ("Why is there I?" "Why is there a world?") then the ultimate subject matter of metaphysics is the metaphysical attitude.
Either way, the investigator belongs in the frame.
There is something paradoxical about the idea that the subject matter of metaphysics is metaphysics.
Consider what one might say about science, or about history. There can be a science of science, a scientific investigation into the way science is conducted, for example, from the perspective of the science of psychology or the science of sociology. But that is necessarily a part (and a small part) not the whole of science. Similarly, there can be a history of history, a historical investigation into the different forms that historical investigation has taken at different times, or the historical development of the idea of history.
Aristotle, in the Metaphysics defines his investigation as the science of "Being qua Being". Aristotle would have said the same things about metaphysics that I have said about science and history. It has an object, a target, just as they have. Being is the target, not the investigator investigating Being. So an important point is being made when one denies that there is any external target, and affirms instead that metaphysics is its own target.
Metaphysics without an object...
Metaphysics of metaphysics...
I am trying these for size, but I don't altogether like them. A friend of mine who is an accountant once remarked about philosophers, "disappearing up their own whizz-holes". Not very poetic, but apt.
My sticking point. There is no transcendent metaphysics. There is no supernatural realm. If you take that proposition seriously, if you refuse to take a single step beyond the natural world then you must either regard the ultimate questions raised by naive metaphysics as meaningless or you have to go looking for some other, more subtle way to respond to those questions, which avoids appeal to non-natural entities, final causes, or any of the other exotic animals that have appeared down the ages in the pages of metaphysical treatises.
If we take in our hand any volume, of divinity or school metaphysics for instance; let us ask, "Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?" No. "Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?" No. commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
(David Hume Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section XII, Part III).
From Hume's perspective, metaphysics is just one big error, or one big illusion. A mad folly conceived in the brains of scholars who thought that they could use philosophy to find God. It would have been far better for all concerned if that fatal error that led to a branch of knowledge called 'metaphysics' had not been made in the first place.
Hume was wrong.
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