Richard asked:

More and more I keep hearing the phrase "perception is reality." On the surface this is an interesting thought. In a very shallow way it may even have some validity. I have argued that if this statement is true then a pencil really does bend when placed in a glass of water. I have noticed many of my students are starting to act as if this statement is valid. Would you offer some thoughts or ideas on to counter this statement.

Firstly, it seems that your students have very grand ideas of themselves if they think that the world consists of what they can perceive. Already Bishop Berkeley thought of this problem when he asked if a noise in a forest existed if there was no one there to here it. You could ask your students if they think that the world does not exist when they are asleep? Or if they don«t think anything beyond the horizon exists.

At another level there are ideal objects like the numbers. Take the number two for instance. How can any one perceive it? Sure we can look at two dogs or two houses, but where is the two itself? For some people with 'discalculi' this is a real problem. The same goes for objects like democracy or constitution. A really mind-boggling concept is the concept of "me". I am convinced it exists, but what is it?

Fredrik Robinson

A simple visual perception can't amount to knowledge, without tactile experience from which we come to know that a pencil is not made of the sort of stuff that bends in water. Our perceptions allow us to function in what we regard as the real physical world. Visual perception alone is not functionally sufficient for physical interaction with what seems to be external.

Even Berkeley, who thought that visual and tactile ideas were non-identical, wouldn't say that that is all that is needed for reality.

I wonder what sort of things your students are doing.

Rachel Browne

Brian asked:

If knowledge is based on experience, how can any living person have knowledge of death?

A living person can experience death in the world, other people die all the time. We can see the work of death, the misery it causes. Of course this is only death as experienced from the outside. What would it be to know death from the Inside? I guess this is what you are asking; What is death like for me, What can I know about death Itself?

The short answer is Nothing — death itself as you point out is a something 1 will never experience. At the most I can experience only the process of dying. But death itself is an Experiential blank. Even if we argue that knowledge is not based in experience only, but by rational inquiry also that doesn't help: death is the limit of thinking, a kind of border on reality that we push up against And that doesn't make any sense. You should probably take a look here at my (non) answer to Giles, in this set of answers — I'll wait 'till you get back.

Okay, If death is a true mystery, unthinkable in itself, what else can we say? (As philosophers we shouldn't give up when we find things getting a bit rough, this is the place that we should make our home.)

What is at stake in our attempts to push up against these borders we find? I have said in the past that what is at stake is our relation to the world, the kind of existence we are subject to, this is important, but death seems to turn this upside-down. How can something that we have no relation to make a difference to my understanding of my existence in the world?

I hinted in my answer to Giles that Heidegger and Levinas say interesting things at this point, but of course that takes us away from talking about death itself and on to talking about what death turns us towards in turning us away from itself. Of death itself we can only say that it is an enigma, an aporia, a stalling point in thinking.

Brian Tee

There are cases of people being clinically dead and claiming to have "experienced" dying before being resuscitated and although it might be said death is the absolute end and there can be no experience, in a survey it was held that more than half of the people experienced "positive emotions". What do we say? Deny that what doctor's call clinical death is what we mean by the concept of death as the end, and claim we know what death is regardless of the experiences of others? That is conceptual belief which is not based on experience and may turn out to be false.

Rachel Browne

Julian asked:

Is the mind physically real?

and Brandon asked:

If a non-physical entity, such as the wind and a solid object, a tree, interact, wouldn't this go against the criticism that the 'soul', being non-physical cannot interact with body?

Seizing on your tree example, lets try a thought experiment. The process of photosynthesis requires chlorophyll found in the leaves of trees in order to occur. A chemist can distil chlorophyll quite easily and put it in a test tube for tests. But ask a chemist to distil photosynthesis and he would just look at you blankly. Clearly one should not conclude from this that photosynthesis is non-physical however.

Most philosophers and scientists hold that the mind depends on physical processes in the brain in order for there to be thoughts. So there are causal relations between physical states and mental states, even if some physical state is not logically identical with some mental state. Just because minds (like photosynthesis) cannot be plucked out and isolated from their physical supports is not an argument for showing that minds (and photosynthesis) are non physical, and are thus separable from bodies. It just shows that we're asking the wrong kinds of questions.

Adam Gatward

I assume, Brandon, that you do know that the wind is physical, that is to say, that it is composed of material entities, molecules of oxygen, nitrogen etc. whose rapid movement accounts for the pressure that we feel when the wind blows in our face. (I might conceivably be wrong about this assumption. It is possible that you missed out on science in school. This is nothing to be ashamed about. The best remedy is go to a library or bookshop and learn up on some elementary physics.)

Given that you do know what wind is, I take it that what you are saying is, 'Why can't the soul be like the wind?' You cannot touch or catch the soul, just as you cannot touch or catch the wind, but it nevertheless is able to bring about effects on more massive objects such as trees or people.

This is a view which was apparently held by the Ancient Greek materialist, Democritus, who first proposed a version of the atomic theory:

Some say that the soul moves the body in which it is found in the same way as it moves itself, Democritus, for example, whose view is similar to what we find in Philippos the comic poet. He says that Daedalus made the wooden statue of Aphrodite move by pouring quicksilver into it. Democritus speaks similarly, since he says that moving spherical atoms, whose nature is never to stay still, draw the entire body along with them and move it. But we will ask if these same things also produce rest. How they will do so is difficult or impossible to state. In general, the soul does not appear to move the body in this way, but through choice of some kind and through thought.

Richard McKirahan Jr. Philosophy Before Socrates 1994 § 16.46, p.330.

Aristotle's sneering criticism of Democritus which McKirahan quotes seems less than convincing. Granted that the soul moves the body 'through thought and choice', the question is whether thought and choice might be, in their underlying nature, perpetually moving atoms. Nor are we convinced by the argument that moving atoms could not bring about a state of rest. A glider can hover, motionless, on an updraft of air.

However, this completely misses the target so far as the mind-body interactionism of Descartes is concerned. Descartes made it quite clear in the Meditations that the soul as he understood it was not 'a wind or vapour'. The essence of the soul is completely different from the essence of matter. The soul has no material properties: no mass, no size, no location in space. I have discussed elsewhere on these pages how Descartes attempted to account for mind-body interaction. The example of the wind and the tree is not one that he would have found helpful.

Geoffrey Klempner

Jacob asked:

If it is true that we have a body — that is proven — then have we not based our whole society, reality, and economy around material things? Would it not be possible to base all of these things around a metaphysical nature?

A society based on metaphysics? — we tried that and look where it got us: right up the creek.

A society with the idea of a soul or spiritual world at its base won't work, in fact the same problems would arise, selfishness, greed etc., for example, each person would be interested in gaining their own spiritual enlightenment or a place in heaven, if this means helping others, that's good but helping others is not primary, it is a means to an end. Just as for example helping others may be beneficial for fame and fortune in this world. One could be spiritually greedy, monopolising all opportunities to help others, so that no one else gets the chance. you would be the only saint amongst the sinners.

Okay, that may seem a little cynical, but that doesn't mean I have no hope in the possibility of a good society. I just think that we need a different basis for it, an Ethical basis, where what I do, I do fundamentally for the other person.

Brian Tee

Osama asked:

What is earth ? By earth I mean all the things which are included between the skies and down to the all levels of earth surface.

Earth is that place whereby the experience of being-in-and-on-the earth is engaged in, in a vast exciting, adventurous project called human existence. Earth is the locus for involvement in every aspect of human living: cultural, intellectual, social, religious, creative etc. It becomes the place for development and growth, for coming to understand, if not the meaning of life, then at least the joy, hurts, happiness and pain of life. Earth is our environment for engaging in the movement towards coming to understand their splendour of all life. And it is this life arena which, unfortunately, has so often become the arena for so much death and destruction.

Fr Seamus Mulholland OFM

Gary asked:

Is there such a thing as animal suffering?

If there is, could animals be evil like humans?

If we judge that an animal suffers based on its behaviour, then perhaps the answer is yes. They can shudder and cry out. But this could be a purely physical reaction to external circumstances or damage to the body. We can't be sure that there is an internal conscious phenomenon such as a pain. How could we even come to think this when we shape our beliefs so strongly on perceived cause and effect? The cold makes a biological organism shudder, but that doesn't mean that the organism feels anything unpleasant. Even on the supposition that the animal is at a least a conscious being, animals can't say "I am in pain", so can we be sure they suffer on the basis of behaviour? Could we be really sure even if they could speak? Perhaps the animal would just be seeking better treatment. — This is the philosophical problem of scepticism about other minds. Analytical philosophers question whether we can know whether other people are in pain on the basis of both behaviour and speech, since there is always the possibility of pretending in any particular case. We have no criteria by means of which to pick a case in which we can really know that someone is suffering.

Since we disregard this philosophical problem for all practical purposes in regard to humans, I can see no reason why we shouldn't do so for animals. But where do we draw the line? For practical purposes, I never treat spiders as if they suffer. They are horrible alien evil looking things. Either we regard an animal as having the ability to suffer when we perceive it as like us, or we think it suffers because it is conscious. I go for the former. Spiders may be conscious.

I don't think that evil is determined by an ability to suffer, but by the ability to be deliberately destructive where this is due to psychological imbalance. I'm inclined to believe that evil should be equated with insanity — an idea that might be extended to the animal world. When animals are destructive, this could also be because there is a normatively determined correct way of being from which they deviate. Perhaps their behaviour doesn't cohere with genetically programmed behaviour with the function of procuring the survival of a species. So sometimes animals act according to behaviour which is evolutionary natural for them and we needn't say they are evil. But if a dog, which is naturally a pack animal, behaves viciously to another dog, we could say it was evil.

However, this doesn't ring true.

There is something extremely frightening about evil specifically related to our thoughts about the state of mind of someone who performs an evil deed. It is shocking that a human being could do certain things. We also have the concept of evil embodied in our idea of demons and the devil. Perhaps demons and the devil are anthropomorphic even if we have pictures of the devil looking like an animal. The concept of malignant beings could have originated in fear of dangerous animals but could have its root in our experience of the evil side of man's nature. Whatever the origin, it may be that man has the capacity to know what he is doing under a moral description. A person who performs an evil deed may know he is killing, for example, but would not see it as "evil" or "malignant" and what is frightening is a person's failure to see what a psychologically balanced person sees.

Rachel Browne

To answer yes in the case of your first question does not entail yes to your second. The fact that a thing can suffer does not mean it is a moral agent. In The Brothers Karamazov, someone tells a story about a group of children who push pins into pieces of bread and feed the bread to a dog. This causes the dog immense suffering because it inflicts pain on the dog. Now suppose the dog turned round on them and attacked them. Would the dog be responsible for the children's suffering in the way that the children are responsible for cruelty? I should say not, because a dog cannot reason. The actions of the children are actions appropriate for moral evaluation because torture was something they chose to do. The reaction of the dog, or the predatory instincts of lions for that matter, are not appropriate for moral evaluation because it makes no sense to ascribe duties and responsibilities to animals. The fact that some animals exhibit an appearance of 'care' towards their young should not be confused with a moral quality in the sense of an obligation.

Human beings are moral agents because they can reason and therefore take responsibility for actions. I think it follows that animals have rights — even if they do not have responsibilities — because it makes sense for us to talk about having duties towards animals. Since we can reason that pain is bad, we have a duty not to inflict pain on other things.

Adam Gatward

Patsy asked:

"Discuss the claim that Human existence is a mystery."

So far I've looked at the question in a subjective way. My existence is not a mystery — I know I was conceived, and am living (this is a bit Darwinian). Can we know why we exist? Is there an answer? Do we look to a religious interpretation or go the rational route?

I think that from your suggestions there is a confusion between two questions; One, "the claim that Human existence is a mystery" and two, the additional problem, the weirdness of my own existence, the fact that I exist, rather than someone else existing in my place.

As to the first one we can partially answer it with appeal to scientific theories, evolution, cosmology.. The Anthropic principle even tells us that we shouldn't be surprised that something like us exists — given the state of the universe it was bound to happen. Of course we are still a long way off from answering the question of why the universe exits at all rather than not existing, perhaps a religious answer can help here (although see answers to Stephen's question about 'the why').

Regardless of the answer to these questions, they do not touch on the second question we have asked; Why do I exist? the problem can arise in two ways:

First, we can ask Why was it ME that was conceived, rather someone just like me? Surely it is possible that my parents could have conceived a different pair of cells, that could have developed, my parents could even called this child Brian — but it might not have this Brian, Me. What is it that explains why I am me rather than someone else? Second we have to play the odds, Given the extremely unlikely event that my parents actually each other, let alone got on with one another enough to have a kid and then the unlikely event that their parents met and their parents parents met and so on, my grasp on existence is tenuous at best. If anything went astray somewhere along the line I would not be here — even though some one like me may be.

Youssouf asked:

"Tell a man that there are 300 billion stars in the universe and he'll believe you. Tell him a bench has wet paint on it and he'll have to touch to be sure."

What does this suggest about the way different types of knowledge are justified?

What is it to believe that there are 300 billion stars in the universe? What's the difference between merely considering the proposition, or supposing that there might be 300 billion stars in the universe and really believing it? This is a question which has been intriguing me.

Your two examples involve a particular aspect of knowledge/ belief, where we acquire our beliefs via testimony. A vast amount of the beliefs we acquire about the world arise from testimony, from what others have told us, from what we learned in school, or from what we have read, or seen on TV etc.

It could be said that the wet paint example is a special one, because of the simple fact that paint dries. Paint that was wet 30 minutes ago, might not be wet now. This is a piece of empirical knowledge coming under the heading of 'stuff we know but we can't remember where we first learned it'. Suppose instead that we were told that the bench was liable to collapse, or that it had a sign on it saying, 'Warning: unstable'. You might take it on trust that this was the case without testing first — especially since the only way to really test the claim is to put your full weight on the bench!

However, it remains the fact that some of the beliefs we acquire via testimony are directly testable while others are not.

We put a great deal of faith in 'experts', but in many cases even they cannot claim to have provided the definitive 'test' of a claim, but only given the best explanation for given data. So, for example, if an astronomer reports the discovery of a new kind of star, it is understood that this is merely intended as the simplest, most economical explanation of the data from observation of the heavens. You can't test the claim by going over to the star to touch it.

However, the belief that there are billions of stars is not like that. The evidence is so overwhelming that you would have to be a crackpot to believe otherwise. The same is true of the belief that the earth is round. If you did seriously doubt that there were billions of stars or that the Earth was round rather than flat then there would be no way to persuade you otherwise.

And this takes us to the issue that interests me. Since ancient times, the threat of scepticism has been seen as a philosophical problem. Suppose an individual who doubts all the things that we accept without question — for, example, my belief that I am awake and not being caused to 'dream' that I am sitting at a desk, looking out of the window etc. — how could we prove that the sceptic's hypothesis is false? The answer is, we can't. In that case, how can we justify our claim to knowledge?

It is possible to believe that the earth is flat. I once knew someone who not only sincerely believed that the earth was flat, but had all sorts of explanations of how it is that 'the scientists' are able to pull the wool over our eyes. What is interesting about this case is that in order to disbelieve the claim that the earth is round, you have to believe all sorts of other things (conspiracy theories and the like). Whereas the philosophical sceptic seriously questions whether any belief is justified.

Geoffrey Klempner

Glenn asked:

How is it possible for George Berkeley to be a subjective idealist yet be considered one of the great British Empiricists? How can you be both an Empiricist and idealist at the same time? Or, how can an idealist be an Empiricist?

Several kinds of Idealism are distinguished in philosophy. Idealism, very basically, is a belief that the world we see around us is somehow created by our mind.

Berkeleian Idealism (sometimes called Immaterialism) says that what we call a 'material object' is really just a collection of ideas (in a very broad, non-technical sense of the word 'idea'). Berkeley would not normally be called a subjective idealist, because he added that the ideas that make up 'material objects' exist permanently in the mind of God — which gives them an existence independent of perceiving subjects.

Berkeley was arguing against the notion of 'material substance' which John Locke made use of in his Essay concerning Human Understanding. Influenced by developments in science, Locke claimed that some qualities of objects (e.g. colour, smell) only exist when we observe them, but that other qualities (e.g. shape) are really part of the objects, whether anyone is observing them or not. Berkeley reacted to this by arguing that all qualities can equally be said to arise only when we perceive them. Things can only be described in terms of our perceptions of them — their texture, smell, sound, taste or appearance.

Two other kinds of Idealism are commonly distinguished:

1. Kant's Transcendental Idealism — the view that the things we perceive as existing in space and time are appearances shaped by the structure of our sense-organs and brain. This is called subjective idealism because the perceiving subject influences what is perceived. Kant also claimed there must be things 'as they are in themselves' (noumena), which are the source of our perceptions — even though we can never know anything about these.
2. Absolute or Objective Idealism — the view of Bradley and Hegel, among others, says that only one thing really exists; a kind of Universal Mind/ Spirit ('the Absolute').

As for Empiricism; along with Locke and Hume, Berkeley maintains that all our knowledge is ultimately derived from what we have taken in through our senses. This is true even though he talks so much about ideas: those 'ideas' include perceptions (sights, smells, sounds etc.)

Katharine Hunt

This is a good question. Empiricists think that all knowledge comes from sense experiences alone, experiences called 'ideas' according to Locke and Berkeley or 'impressions' according to Hume. This gave the empiricists a huge problem, believe it or not, concerning the existence of 'substance' or 'matter'. If all human knowledge proceeds from the 'ideas' received through the senses, then do we ever sense matter? Here is a postcard version of what Berkeley says in the Principles of Human Knowledge:

1. All we perceive are ideas.
2. We perceive objects.
3. Therefore, objects are ideas.

Berkeley thinks that the non-existence of material objects is consistent with what we are aware of, that matter itself would not explain our ideas without a causal account of how they act on our minds. So Berkeley thought that matter is 'unintelligible' for the reason that trying to imagine matter apart from the qualitiesthat it possesses (shape, colour, hardness etc) results in you thinking about nothing at all. Locke — certainly a materialist among the empiricists — held that substance is a 'know not what' support of the qualities we pick up through perception. Materialists think that matter lacks all visible qualities; so Berkeley, following ruthless logic, simply says that imagining matter is impossible, as invisible and propertyless stuff is just too austere and remote from the world of experience. Berkeley's position is motivated by epistemological considerations, and is surprisingly intended to defeat skepticism. A full version of his argument can be found in the Principles of Human Knowledge §18 ff.

1. How could you know matter exists?
2. It must be by sense or by reason.
3. Everyone agrees that it is not by sense, so it must be by reason.
4. It is conceivable that we should have the same ideas without the existence of matter.
5. Therefore there is no good argument of reason for the existence of matter.

The materialist response is that our ideas are best explained by supposing them to be cause by material objects. Berkeley replies by saying that materialists have no explanation of how bodies act on minds, so if there were bodies, it is impossible that we should know it.

This argument illustrates one of the skeptical conclusions of empiricism, that if all our knowledge is via the senses and there is no sensory impression of matter, it must be true that we know nothing about matter. It follows furthermore, that it must be imaginary that there is such a thing as matter, and it must also be superfluous when we try to make sense of the world. This is common sense, Berkeley argues. Why suppose that something you don't know anything about is the best explanation for way things seem. Berkeley's position, most interestingly of all, is an attempt to avoid the skepticism about the world in which the logic of empiricism results. Talking about that would be the answer to another question, but see if you can begin to think through why Berkeley claimed his position avoids the skeptical results of full throttled empiricism!

Adam Gatward

Sean asked:

Do I deny myself the rightful, pleasurable act of procreation just to prove a point? Do I suffer in my own anti-societal beliefs? Or do I give into my animal urges like every other trained monkey out there?

Well, let's start with the assumption that you're heterosexual (since you speak of "procreation", and Sean being primarily a masculine name). So, you're looking for a relationship with a woman, and you think that necessarily involves sex. Really? What gives you that idea? If, because you're sexually frustrated, you just go out and have sex, then, as you so accurately imply, what you get is a) "proving" the point that you can, and/or b) just being an animal, i.e, not having a relationship much beyond the physical, or c) not either of those, and simply suffering. You are implying that you want something other than those alternatives, from the tone of your questions. (After all, there are people, both men and women, who are satisfied with just physical relationships... and maybe for them that is enough and is moral; I certainly see no reason to say flatly that it is immoral, as long as everyone is honest about it — since we're doing the "ask a philosopher" thing here.)

Well, here's some advice, since that's what you're asking for. First, masturbation is just fine to take the edge off your frustration. Not ultimately satisfying (to most), but better than nothing, and contrary to myth, it's good for you. Second, you make friends with a woman. If you can't do that, at first, with a person with whom there is the possibility of sex, hang out with some lesbians and make friends, yes, real friends, with them. No possibility of sex there, just a straightforward relationship with another (female) person. Learn that women can be related to as friends, and how to do that. Then decide, slowly and carefully. what you want in a relationship. Look for that kind of woman. Make friends with her, and if you (or she) can't do that (and many women have the same problem in reverse, for a variety of reasons), start over, because believe me, 5—10 years down the road, you want a friend.

Does the above sound difficult? Unconventional? You're right. But I assume that given your rather unconventional approach in writing to this particular group, you want something a little different. The above is the best course of action I know; I took it myself and it worked, after many failures (for whatever that's worth).

Steven Ravett Brown

Robert asked:

Is there any reason to assume one religion is "correct," and others "incorrect"?

The Christian, Jew, Muslim, Hindu etc., would say 'Yes there is, ours.' Religion is that way of our being in the world whereby we seek to develop and come to the fulness of human growth through our involvement and encounter with our own concept and experience of the Divine.

But the concept and experience of the divine is also culturally and historically situated. That one religion claims a veracity of its own existence and doctrines is part of the experience of being a person who has a religious faith. With most religions go a value system, either a moral and ethical value system, or a value system linked to and depending on its doctrinal and dogmatic system.

It is such values systems derived from their initial religious belief which assists the believer in their way through the world and life. As a Christian I have a faith belief which I would claim demonstrates the truth of its own belief claim. Yet, there must be a mutual and tolerant respect for all faiths and all religions. In this way the value systems of any religious truth claim become not just claims, but lived realities. It is the living reality of a person's religious faith that is most important rather than the divisions or differences of doctrine, dogma, or faith.

I believe that Jesus is the Incarnate Word of God and Saviour of the world, others do not believe that. On the one hand that is a subjective belief for me because it is mine and it is personal, on the other it is also the belied of hundreds of millions of other people, so there is a community and corporate element to it which unites me to others. Yet such subjectivity and such unity is true for every other believer of every other faith.

So yes, there are reasons to assume that one religion is more 'correct' but only in so far as it is correct for that body of believers. What is not correct is the imposition of that belief on others and the methods used to impose that belief. This is what we learned, or at least, should have learned from the Crusades; unfortunately as Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and other parts of the world too tragically testify, it seems that we have learned nothing — and most certainly not from our God(s).

Fr Seamus Mulholland OFM

Nina asked:

Are women always associated with passivity in philosophy? I have checked your previous questions page and there are questions on why there are few women philosophers but not on their role in philosophy.

I don't know where women are associated with passivity in philosophy. In feminist ethics, women are described as loving, nurturing and supportive. This is the ideal of woman as mother, but it isn't necessarily passive, since part of the mother's role is to be protective, a concept not especially associated with passivity. If the ideal of woman is based on her sexual nature, rather than on her role as mother, passivity might come from the nature of woman as receiving.

There is such a thing as feminist metaphysics, which you might be interested in. My feeling was that passivity based on sexuality can have very little to do with metaphysics, so I was driven by your question to find out a bit about it and it turns out that women are and always have been oppressed and subordinated, which might be what you mean. Because there have been so few women philosophers in the history of the subject, philosophical concepts and theories have been shaped and dominated by men. This means that fear of rape and unwanted pregnancies have had little impact on epistemology, or our consciousness of ourselves. Hence feminist theorists, who are normally characterised as "active" rather than passive, seek to redress the balance. A woman's role in philosophy is to approach metaphysics and epistemology from a non-gender-oriented stance so that our theories of knowledge and the world can be freed from male-biased ways of thinking. However, given the long history of suppression and gender-determination by society, which is basically by men, it is unclear whether women are yet able to think properly and because all our social and philosophical concepts have been developed by men there will be a struggle to be understood.

The role of women who are not feminists is the same as that of men.

Rachel Browne

I'm having a hard time understanding your question. "Associated" how? What do you mean by "passivity"? Usually, passivity means a lack of action; a passive person is one who either does not act or one who just reacts to things without initiating actions themselves. Now, how does this relate to women as "associated" with philosophy? Do you mean women philosophers? Well, they're definitely not passive. Women, as written about by philosophers? It's certainly true that when some, indeed most, male philosophers from cultures which regard (or have regarded) women as inferior or the "weaker" sex have written about women, they have portrayed women in that manner. And some (few) haven't. If that's what you mean by "associated" with passivity, you're pretty much right. Until the last, roughly, 50—75 years or so, until women have been allowed, and been educated that they can, start participating more in academia, they have not, by and large, been taken seriously as philosophers.

Lately, however, this is not true. There are now many women philosophers, some quite well-known, for example, Martha Nussbaum, to just pick a name out of the air. So as far as that goes, what one finds is that philosophers do not, by and large (with some exceptions), succeed in overcoming their various personal and cultural biases. Sad but true. And I'm talking quite generally about any gender (since we're talking about gender, but you can use any category you want) of philosophers here, just pick your biases to fit.

As for their "role" in philosophy, again, I'm not sure I understand your question. Women philosophers are just philosophers, concerned, usually, with the issues that any philosopher is concerned with. They teach, write, edit journals, and so forth. However, perhaps you are referring to a number of women (and some men) who are attempting to create a field termed "gender studies". This field, as far as I can tell (and I'm no expert) seems to be a blend of philosophical and sociological issues involving various interactions between men and women, varying in its emphasis from "pure" philosophy to "pure" sociology (scare quotes because no one can really define what "pure" anything is). If you want to know more about it, just do a web search for "gender studies".

Steven Ravett Brown

John asked:

Please give me a definition of a "right".

Please start the definition with: "A right is ......", and do not use the word "right" after the verb.

Some human rights are universal, and some are not. If one has a right solely by virtue of being human, then that right is universal: it applies universally, that is, to all members of the class of beings called "human." For example, one has the right to live unmolested by others just because one is a human being. It is a universal human right. We may also call it a "negative" right because having the right confers no benefit on the rights-bearer. Also, we meet our obligation to respect each other's universal human rights at no cost to ourselves.

There are some rights, however, which one subset of human beings has while other subsets do not. They are rights particular to those subsets. For example, the right to cast one's vote for a candidate for the Presidency of the United States (or any elected office of any country) is a particular human right. Being human is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of having the right to vote: there are other conditions that one must also satisfy (e.g., being a citizen of a certain country, being of a certain age, legal status, etc.).

Another example is the right to receive payment for goods or services. When people voluntarily undertake to exchange certain goods or services (either for money or for other goods or services), each party gains rights in what the other offered in exchange. These particular rights may be called "positive" because they confer benefits on those who have them. Also, positive rights are honored at a cost, either voluntarily assumed (as in economic exchange, e.g., I owe you money and you owe me goods or services) or involuntarily imposed (as in a governmental electoral system that is paid for by taxes).

A right is not an observable property of the being that has it, but the correlative of a moral prohibition: "Do not do this to (or, do not refrain from doing this for) this being." A right is a moral boundary line. A physical boundary line either can or cannot be crossed. A moral boundary line, however, can but may not be crossed. Human (and other) beings are values that morally limit the kinds of actions that human beings, who are capable of appreciating those values, may take. Justifying this (or any other) theory of right, however, would require working out a general theory of value, which we obviously cannot do here.

Tony Flood

Rocio asked:

What are some of the common responses to the Utilitarian analysis of animal cruelty? (e.g. Peter Singer's classic Animal Liberation). If it is an undeniable fact that animals suffer, and eating animals is unnecessary (at least for developed nations) then why would anyone be justified ethically to eat meat?

As far as I understand them, Peter Singer's arguments against eating meat are based on the utilitarian principle that ethical actions are those which create the most utility (pleasure, happiness etc.). Since the wholesale slaughter of animals obviously does not increase the sum total of happiness in the world, then this practice is unethical. Singer may also be understood as working from a negative utilitarian position. In other words, the morally correct action is that which reduces the total amount of suffering in the world. Again, abolishing the slaughter of millions of animals would, from this perspective, seem like the moral course of action. Suffering and distress are real phenomena which all sentient beings are capable of experiencing. To claim that human suffering is more real or should be given more consideration in making moral decisions is, according to Singer, 'speciesist'.

The main challenges to Singer's ideas come from a variety of positions. Some are general arguments used by opponents of utilitarianism as an ethical theory, and some are specifically aimed at Singer's ideas. I will examine both types here:

General criticisms of utilitarianism as an ethical theory

Can utility be measured? One major problem with utilitarianism is that moral agents (those who carry out moral or immoral acts) are required to calculate the total amount of utility produced with each action. When we take into consideration just how difficult this calculation/ prediction really is, utilitarianism ceases to be a practical ethical approach. And now that Singer has made us aware that the sensations of non-human animals are to be included in this calculation, the job gets several times more complicated. Of course, Singer could respond by admitting that we can perhaps never calculate the exact amount of utility produced, but that it is also fairly obvious that the mass slaughter of animals does cause real distress of a scale that outweighs any happiness produced from the eating of the meat.

Could utilitarianism sanction "unjust" actions? A very common argument levelled against the utilitarian approach is that its insistence on looking only to the total amount of utility produced endorses all kinds of actions that seem intuitively to be unethical. For example, homeless people with no family or friends could be secretly snatched from the street, killed and their organs donated to save the lives of ten people who are in desperate need of new organs. On a strictly utilitarian basis this type of action is morally justified. The loss of one unit capable of experiencing happiness (the homeless person) is outweighed by the happiness gained by the ten ill people and their families as the spare organs become available. Our "common sense" morality tells us that there is something wrong with this type of action. Because of these unattractive possibilities, utilitarianism seems to be inadequate as a guide to morality. If this is the case, then Singer cannot use utilitarianism as a guide to our interaction with non-human animals.

What about rights and duties? The above criticism can be used to suggest that there are some other moral principles that are more acceptable than utilitarianism. Because of the problems with looking to the consequences and viewing utility as the only important consequence, other thinkers have argued that humans have duties towards each other (and perhaps the natural world) or that humans (and some animals) have rights. Such ideas have the advantage of avoiding the difficulties of utilitarianism. It would be possible to claim that humans have a duty to treat animals with respect and so claim that eating meat is morally wrong. It may also be claimed that animals have a right not to be eaten. The main problems that face these ideas are in the attempt to rationally justify them. Why should animals be treated with respect? Why should animals have rights? Which animals?

Specific criticisms of Singer's ideas

One specific criticism against Singer's ideas comes from what can be very loosely described as the "Deep Ecology" movement. This philosophical position is one that attempts to locate intrinsic value in nature. In other words, deep ecology wants to show that nature (including non-human animals) is morally valuable in its own right. A leopard is valuable not because humans find it very beautiful to look at, not because it is an endangered species, but simply because it is a leopard. Its value exists independently of any pleasure or benefit it provides to humans and, perhaps more controversially, its value exists even in the absence of a human to value it. This perspective sees Singer's utilitarianism as a philosophy that ignores the intrinsic value of animals. It only deals with those beings physically capable of suffering. All non-sentient creatures are disregarded. Non-human animals have a moral relevance only if they are capable of suffering. It is also worth noting that Singer's utilitarianism would sanction the suffering of a small number of non-human animals if the overall total of utility were increased. For deep ecologists, this is simply not good enough. They argue that Singer's utilitarianism, because of its failure to recognise the intrinsic value of non-human animals, perpetuates the very same human-centred worldview that encourages the exploitation and degradation of the non-human world.

The deep ecologists do have a point here. Singer's utilitarian approach, based on the assumption that suffering is to be avoided, doesn't necessarily have to lead to vegetarianism. Imagine a slaughterhouse where all the animals were unaware of their imminent death (and so were not distressed), and where death was completely pain free (assuming this could be proven). It would be very difficult for Singer to condemn this.

Some deep ecologists also question Singer's (and others) idea that animal liberation is a good idea. Most deep ecologists view the stability, diversity and beauty of the ecosystem as the goal of ethics. Humans ought to act in ways that promote this goal. Releasing all the captive farm animals and abolishing the practice of eating meat would almost certainly upset the fragile balance of an already damaged ecosystem. For these thinkers, mass animal liberation is unethical.

There is also an extreme position with the very impressive title of biocentric egalitarianism. This position states that anything that is alive should be treated with equal moral consideration. In its extreme and perhaps somewhat caricatured form, this position would argue that a blade of grass should be given the same moral consideration as a leopard or a human. From this perspective, Singer's ideas are not radical enough.

Simon Drew

Ross asked:

Sir, What do you think of The Book of Enoch? I am a Christian with many questions. I am wandering why it was left out of the Bible. Should it be read as a book of fact or a book fiction?

I think with religious writings it highly depends on the way of reading and comprehension, whether someone regards this work to be fact or fiction. For example to a logical positivist religious writing often is contradictory in itself and it's assertions are not empirically provable and therefore religious writing is worthless fiction. On the other hand to a truly believing person the same writing is fact, because it is inspired by if not directly the word of God.

Your other question, why the Book of Enoch was left out of the Bible, is easier to answer straightly: The Book of Enoch, also known as Ethiopic Enoch, fell into disfavour among powerful theologians because of its controversial descriptions of the nature and deeds of the fallen angels. That's why the Enochian writings (among many others) were omitted from the Bible.

But once he Book of Enoch was considered to be among the biblical apocryphal writings and was highly appreciated by the early church fathers, among them St. Augustine, and so there might be much more profane reasons for later banning writings like the Book of Enoch from the biblical canon.

Apocryphal is derived from the Greek and means "hidden" or "secret." Originally it had a positive meaning, and was applied to sacred books with contents considered to be too exalted to be made available to the general public.

Little by little the idea was accepted that such books were left to be read by the wise. Therefore, the term "apocrypha" began taking on a negative meaning to the orthodoxy, who felt being kept in the dark by not being told the teachings of these books. The clergy that was not admitted into these esoteric circles, because they were thought not to be enlightened, soon banned apocryphal material heretical, which meant: forbidden to read for all. As a result the book was lost for a thousand years. But the Book of Enoch eventually reappeared. It was brought to England by the explorer James Bruce, who found three copies of the Book of Enoch during an expedition to Ethiopia. Later it was translated by Dr. Richard Laurence, an Oxford Hebrew professor, that gave the modern world its first glimpse of the Enochian mysteries.

It might be interesting for you, that there is some proof that Christ Himself approved of the Book of Enoch. Over a hundred phrases in the New Testament find precedents in the Book of Enoch. Two of these phrase are in the Book of Jude: vs. 14 tells us that "Enoch, the seventh from Adam, prophesied..." Jude also, in vs. 15, makes a direct reference to the Book of Enoch (2:1), where he writes, "to execute judgment on all, to convict all who are ungodly..." The time difference between Enoch and Jude is approximately 3400 years. Therefore, Jude's reference to the Enochian prophesies shows, that these written prophecies were available to him at that time.

Simone Klein

Catherine asked:

What are the limitations of, and errors in the three doctrines of Gorgias?

In examining Gorgias summary of his book, On Being or On Nature, the reader is presented with only surviving fragments recorded by Sextus Empiricus. In these fragments, Gorgias presents his Rhetorical paradox. First, that nothing exists, second, that if anything exists it is incomprehensible, and third, that even if anything is comprehensive it is incommunicable.

Although these statements have been classified by some of his critics as satirical, the work of Tim Rohrer offers a more interesting interpretation. Given Gorgias's preoccupation with rhetoric, Rohrer states that Gorgias could be hinting that rhetoric is simply not all it is made up to be. It may not be the argument that should decide an argument — why not look at the process of inquiry. Whether Gorgias was a true Sophist or not, he displayed their attitude of doubting the possibility of discovering anything that was really true. If as the Sophists advocated, that knowledge is in the strict sense unattainable, then Gorgias may be suggesting that the individual must consider that reason itself and logic are but human ways of thinking. This demonstrates for Gorgias that the individual may or may not have any objective validity concerning reality. One can conclude that there is no valid way of discerning that rational is better or truer than irrational thinking in proving one's conclusion. It is experience, that which is derived by the sense, that organizes the principles of our minds.

This organization then is the result of our thinking experience. One needs to go beyond the boundaries placed by rhetoric and reason to the essence of the ideas of reality. That essence is revealed by the senses where there are no fixed conclusions, but only inquiry. Inquiry, which cannot decipher the externally existing objects by words or language. Since no one thinks the same as another, language cannot communicate to another. What Gorgias sees is a conflict between the limitations of words and the expression of reality. This position resembles the deconstructionism applied to literary criticism, that the work in question should not be considered for its objective worth, but for what it represents in human thought to the perceiver. Gorgias was dealing with Epistemic Rhetoric, which according to Covino, maintains that truth is not conveyed by either the text nor is it conveyed by the individual. Truth is born in the transaction between the mediums, whether this is the reader, speaker, writer or listener. In the final analysis, it is the communication that constructs the truth and therefore Knowledge. To bring this to fruition, the what and why of Knowledge must be known to the individuals. This knowledge is subjective, developed through the construction of knowledge through the interaction of the individuals in their use of language. In modern terms, this can lead to a deconstruction or complete subjectivism, leaving no way of assessing the truth except by the agreement of individuals in a given exchange of language. Yet even in this agreement, there is no way of confirming the validity of the statements.

The major flaw of the doctrines that one would need to address is, if nothing exists then why go to the length to set out a series of doctrines which have no meaning to begin with.

John Eberts

Maria asked:

I am writing a paper on the concept or relationship between Plato's theory of age and experience. Plato suggests that no one can become king until they have gone through a series of training. I need to find out what is the concept between age and experience? Is the concept suggesting that experience is more important than age or vice versa?

Socrates: There can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger?
Glaucon: Clearly.
Scorates: And that the best of these must rule?
Glaucon: That is also clear.

Plato, The Republic

The rulers of Plato's ideal city are to be chosen when they are over 50 years old, afterÊa long process of education and progressive selection — at the end of each stage of their education, only the best students are allowed to progress to the next stage.

Education of the people to produce good citizens and rulers is to start in childhood, when people are most easily influenced. Plato approves the use of a kind of censorship to ensure that the influences on children are good. They should be exposed only to beautiful and graceful sights and sounds (Republic, Book 3). Selected kinds of music and literature would then be taught, along with physical education. A balanced mixture of these is to be used, to avoid the danger of the student becoming either too aggressive (from too much physical education), or too soft and weak (from too much music and literature). The students are to be observed, to see which of them excel in all the things they have learnt so far, then, when they are 20 years old, the best students are to be selected and given further education, in which mathematics plays a large part. At 30 years old, a selection is to be made again, and the selected students taught 'dialectic' (the philosophical method of questioning and discussion). Plato mentions that students must not be taught dialectic any younger, or they will be inclined to argue just for fun, rather than discussing things in order to learn.

After a 5 year course in dialectic, students are to be required to do a job for 15 years, to gain experience of life, and they are to be monitored to see how they cope in difficult situations.

...and when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge...(make) philosophy their chief pursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good.

Republic Book 7

It seems to me that this long experience and education would be more important than age for Plato, when he selected his rulers. The only reason the rulers are to be over 50 is that it takes a long time to go through the education Plato prescribes, and gain the required experience of life. Plato would not allow a 50 year old without the required education and experience to become a ruler.

However, there is something else equally important to Plato that you haven't mentioned — the nature or character of those chosen to rule. Plato isn't going to waste this special education on just anybody!

Selection of those of good character can be regarded as beginning even before birth, for Plato suggests that only the best people should be allowed to have children. 'Inferior' babies are to be left exposed outdoors to dieÊ— not an unusual practice in Ancient Greece.

Plato has Socrates and Glaucon agree that the rulers of the ideal city will "require natural aptitude", and that they will have to try to select such people. (Republic, Book 2) Among the qualities they are looking for in potential rulers are bravery, ability to learn, and industriousness. To find out whether people have these qualities, Plato proposes putting them through various tests of character and seeing how they behave. Can they cope with hard work? Are they easily frightened?

And he who at every age, as boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the State...But him who fails, we must reject.

Republic Book 3

For Plato, a person must have a good character in the first place, to make it worth giving them a good education. (Republic Book 4).

To work out your own views on this, you might think about the following. Do you think experience, or age, or perhaps character, is most important in those who govern your city/ state /country? How about if you were choosing who should be in charge — do you agree with Plato's methods of selection and education?

Katharine Hunt

Mike asked:

Why do so many philosophers have such a problem with the existence of a God?

If we look back at the ancients, such as Plato, Aristotle and others, as well as those who come slightly later, Plotinus and move forward to the Enlightenment as look at people such as Descartes, we will see that they do no not have a problem with the existence of God.

Philosophy seeks to detect errors in thought, or at least to construct a methodology for a 'right way' of engaging with the great human problems. Some philosophers see the existence of God as part of the problem and not part of the solution. Others see God as being the source of philosophy in so far as they accept the notion that God creates at every level including the cognitively reflective, and the ability even to question the existence of God is a gift from God.

Philosophy further seeks to encounter and analyse that which can be demonstrated. God cannot be demonstrated empirically, and thus we must move into the realm of faith and belief. While this faith and belief can be supported philosophically, as well as theologically, some philosophers would question the first proposition of a philosophical approach to God in that they would wish the criteria 'God exists' to be demonstrated.

The famous 'ontological proofs' of Anselm, Aquinas, Scotus make certain metaphysical presumptions e.g. that there is such a thing as Being, that there is existence, that being and existence are co-terminus and from this certain conclusions can be made concerning the nature of being and existence inasmuch as all being takes its being from the primal source of Being as being-in-itself. Duns Scotus said that this was the primary object of metaphysics.

Philosophers who do have a problem with the existence of God do so because their ideas, thought, reflections have led them to that conclusion. At the same time, since the existence of God cannot be empirically demonstrated, the non-existence of God cannot be empirically demonstrated either. In the end we are all to a certain degree faced with which side of Pascal's Wager we take.

Fr Seamus Mulholland OFM

Bridget asked:

The WTC Attack in the US has shocked the world. I have a question: should US solve the problem by law OR by war ? How can Professor HLA Hart's system of rules and concept of punishment be analyzed in the WTC attack incident?

I don't know what Hart had to say, if anything, about war. Hart's principles that punishment should be a deterrent and rehabilitating are violated by the war response. Such a response may act as a deterrent, but it could be a provocation. Also, war doesn't have the aim of rehabilitating even if this is now going to be attempted. There is also the principle that punishment should only affect the offender, but in war the innocent get killed.

The attack can be treated as a crime if the US has laws against terrorism which have been violated. As a deterrent, punishment should discourage the offenders and others from repetition of the crime and need not be proportional to the offence, so killing terrorists may be acceptable. For sure, this will stop the offenders from repeating their offence. However, once again it is not rehabilitating.

Hart's principles don't support the way terrorists are treated.

Rachel Browne

Menschenfresser asked:

Granted that demons exist and that they do possess people, I am wondering, from the framework of what I assume to be a vast amount of literature that is out there on the subject, both religious and not, why would a demon want to possess a human being?

I admit, this may be a question better suited for the "Ask a Catholic Cardinal" site, but I can't seem to find its url.

Ok, this question does beg for the definition of what demons are, what they want, their motives, etc, but so what....let it beg. — Any ideas?

This question might be better directed to James Randi, the American skeptic who offers a million dollars to any individual that can prove something about the supernatural in a 'controlled setting'. I suppose this prize would go for demoniacs and exorcisms too. Since this is a philosophical site, I'm going to tell you what a philosopher might pick up on.

I take it that a demon is an evil spirit of some sort that would want to possess a human being to bring evil into the world or to steal their soul. I'm not sure I have demons in my ontology, as I have never found much evidence for demons in my everyday experiences of things. Demons are not a necessary postulate in order to make better sense of the world, or to live more coherently with the way the world appears — even when people appear to be possessed by demons! So attributing certain types of behaviour to demonic possession would be enormously question begging for a philosopher. It would violate the principle of Occam's Razor, which effectively states that simpler explanations are usually better. What this means is that even if some behaviour were difficult to explain. an explanation in terms of demonic possession would not be economical. It would require an enormous amount of extra work to be done in order to show that demons could be real and could possess people. A reasonable man would therefore choose a simpler explanation. In ancient writings such as the Bible, cases of demonic possession are generally explained as likely cases of epilepsy, which had not yet been diagnosed or understood (see Luke 4, 31ff and Mark 1, 21ff).

There is a school of thought in philosophy that 'inner' motives and desires in a mental theatre are not the type of thing one refers to in explaining actions or in attributing attitudes to people. This would apply to demons too. Rather, we apply mental concepts like desire and intention to others against a background of received practises, experiences and language. Since demons play no role in our everyday lives — and hence no part in our background experience and received practises — there is nothing we can really say to answer your question about what might motivate a demon. 'Pure evil' is as good a guess as any!

Adam Gatward

Alan asked:

What is the best way to argue for how we form concepts?

Is abstraction tenable at all according to the modern viewpoint?

As the question of how we form concepts has been a focal point of interest since Plato, and has been approached from several angles by some of the greatest minds in philosophy, including Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, Russell and Ayer, to decide on which is the best way leaves us spoilt for choice.

The term 'concept' is a development of the term 'idea' used by ancient Greek and early Western Philosophers. As ideas/ concepts have through the ages been linked with epistemology (theory of knowledge) based on a changing succession of paradigms and world views, you will appreciate the difficulty in answering your initial question.

I find a general consensus, though sometimes with significant variation, amongst philosophers, that sense data are at the foundation of our concepts. We take in information through the senses and, some philosophers would claim, we have the mental facility to work upon the sensory information and manipulate it into ideas/ concepts. Rationalists believe that our mental make-up has something to add to the sensory data, we not only have the facility to manipulate but there is also an 'inner world' from which we are able to contribute additional information.

I confess to being a Kantian, and if you have ventured to dip into his Critique of Pure Reason you will have noted that the first sentence in the Introduction claims "That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt." He goes on to say, "But, though all our knowledge begins with experience it by no means follows, that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself." Kant came to believe that a knowledge existed which was altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions, he called it a priori knowledge. This is knowledge which is intrinsic within us, which has not been supplied empirically, he actually called it "Pure knowledge a priori." This pure knowledge we ourselves contribute to the world. For example, ideas of absolute space and absolute time did not arrive throughÊour senses, we ourselves contribute knowledge like this to the world. We might say that these are concepts in the true sense of the word. The sense impressions received are manipulated, categorized and eventually presented to ourselves within the bounds of these great intrinsic concepts, i.e. we fit things within our awareness of space and time. From this manipulation of sensory data within our intrinsic a priori knowledge arise our basic concepts/ideas.

So far as I can make out, G E Moore seems to accept intrinsic concepts, he refers to them as objectively real and necessary for combining propositions to form the only things that are real. Two of these major concepts he accepts are existence and truth.

A J Ayer talks about receiving sensations from objects, these sensations he calls 'effects,' our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole conception of the object.

Along with the change in terminology from idea to concept has become an awareness that the latter is more intimately bound up with language. Innumerable concepts lie quite beyond the attainment of a languageless creature. A J Ayer points out that language is in addition to our underlying abilities, notably those of a broadly recognitional or discriminatory character, which give substance to the use of words.

Using the structure of our native languages we set out to dissect nature, the world is presented to us in a startling complexity of impressions which has to be organized by our minds, and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds, we cut nature up and organize it into concepts.

With regard to your question on abstraction; in my humble opinion it has run its course and seems to have been demolished by the arguments of A J Ayer and P E Geach. The view of Geach (Mental Acts Routledge, London) is that abstractionism is wholly mistaken; that no concept at all is acquired by the supposed process of abstraction. He claims that the limitations of abstractionism .are fully exposed when considering logical concepts, particularly the concept of negation. How do we come to the concept 'not red' ? This has to be derived not from abstracted particulars but from the prior concept of 'red' and an awareness of the concept of 'negation,' to say nothing of the concept 'colour.' We cannot learn any one of our concepts without calling another network of concepts into play.

The idea of abstraction seems very shallow, perhaps exposed by a child repeating names of colours and shapes without any understanding of the use of the words. Also, we can hardly associate mathematical concepts with abstraction. The evidence points to the abstractionist having to be selective, forced into admission that certain concepts lie outside the notion of abstraction the case is destroyed.

John Brandon

Rob asked:

Giles asked:

'When you are dead, you are dead!' This is a question on the spirit. I would be very grateful for a response.

"When you are dead, you are dead" I would agree with that. But as ever, its a bit more complicated.

Just what does it mean to die? is it the separation of the spirit from the body? if so you are not dead. you are the spirit. It is the body that is dead. you have just swapped an earthly existence for a spiritual one.

Perhaps then, one day your spirit gets ill and fails to work properly so God decides to wipe out your spirit and move you into another one. are you dead then? No, it seems that swapping spirits is logically equivalent to swapping one body for another or swapping a body for a spirit. So this is not a question about the spirit.

What then is the question about?

"When your dead your dead". Its a question about my subjectivity. What is it for there no longer to be Me in the world? How is it possible for me to die. (I will own up now, This question boarders on the impenetrable for me, it is hard even to make sense of this issue) There is one immediate problem that gets me here, namely that even though there will be a time when I will no longer be around, when exactly will this time be?

Lying on my deathbed, I can await death coming, even up to the very second of my death , but when it gets here, when I die I am gone, I never experience death, it is not something that belongs to me, death is not mine. So when does My death happen how does it come about that I don't experience my death? Does it make sense to say that I die Before I die? AAHH.

Epicurus writes "Where death is not I am, where death is I am not", I agree with this too but Epicurus wanted to show us that we should not fear death. For me it has the opposite effect; it shows me how utterly mysterious death is, death is always over the horizon of my understanding.Always beyond understanding.

Just what is going on with My death? What does it mean for me to die? Heidegger though it meant the end of the world my death is the end of all my projects all my possibilities all my relations with others. Levinas on the other hand thought that death was the opening up of the world, an enigma that provides a way out of solipsism, a way to be connected with other people. My death shows me that there is something other than my subjectivity.

That's all okay because we need to know that stuff, but death itself, is something that cannot be understood, even if it points us to the understanding other things.

What does it mean for me to die? I don't know but I know a lot rests on the answer.

Brian Tee

Suzanne asked:

In the Crito, it looks as though Plato and King disagree (Martin Luther King From Birmingham Jail). I would like to know if there is a theory that explains the root cause of their disagreement. What basic principle do they differ upon? Any insight you can offer will be of great help.

I certainly agree that Plato (or Socrates, for Plato is supposed to be reporting Socrates' view) and Martin Luther King disagree. Socrates is offered the chance to escape from the death sentence — a sentence that he and his friends all think has been legally passed but is morally wrong. Socrates argues that respect for the law and for the good of society requires that we obey the law even if it is morally wrong. Martin Luther King, on the other hand, argues that it is our moral duty to disobey the law if it is morally wrong.

For Socrates/Plato, the law is binding on all those in a society. We can argue against it, but we cannot (morally) break it. The clergymen to whom Martin Luther King is writing from Birmingham Jail have also argued in an identical manner. King however says that there is a higher law — for him, the moral law of god — which we must obey first.

This is certainly an important philosophical point, for on it rests the legitimacy of civil disobedience and resistance. If, like Plato and King, you believe that there is an objective morality (the Form of the Good, and God's Law respectively), then the possibility of disobeying the law for a higher good is obviously open to you. If you don't believe in an objective morality, this becomes much harder to argue (although not impossible). It is, in fact, related to the questions about the status of human rights that Vangelis and Cleo ask elsewhere on this page.

Tim Sprod

Carl asked:

What do philosophers call the process of reversing the order of priority of metaphysics and epistemology?

I'm going to write something here out of a kind of perversity. I keep looking at this question and wondering what it means. I'm certainly not an expert on the history of philosophy, but I've never heard of the "priority" of metaphysics over epistemology, and so I don't have the slightest idea of what reversing it could mean... but I'll make something up for you. Here we go: if metaphysics is concerned with the most fundamental questions of existence, then, because of that term "most", we might accord it "priority" over epistemology, which is "merely" concerned with how we know. Usually, we have some sort of metaphysics worked out before we do epistemology, since in the latter we are asking questions like how we know we've arrived at truth or meaning, and in the former we ask how we know there are such things, or why we even bother, anyway. Or who the "we" is that's bothering. Or the whatever of whatever.

Now let's try reversing that... first we determine how we know, then we think about what it is we know, or why bother? Well, that does seem a little strange, doesn't it. On the other hand, we can just say that we're not too interested in metaphysics, and let's just get on with the important questions, like how to do science, or the difference between science and religion. I suppose that would be something like the positivist stance or a kind of pragmatist position. So maybe that's what philosophers call reversing that order: being pragmatic. But Dewey actually did do some metaphysics... as did James, at least in his later stuff (Radical Empiricism)... so I'm not really sure that anyone actually has done this reversal, except maybe the positivists... who did actually do some metaphysics, if only to get it out of the way. And Russell, for example, certainly did metaphysics. So all in all, I'm not sure that anyone, really, has reversed that order. And I do not know what that reversal is called (if it actually is called something).

Steven Ravett Brown

Vangelis asked:

Are Human Rights universal? What is the philosophical approach to this question?

and Cleo asked:

Are human rights the rights that human beings have because they are human beings?

If human rights are universal, then there has to be a universal justification for them — they have to be equally valid no matter which society you come from. What is this justification? John Locke, who is largely responsible for human rights talk, thought that they came from god. The writers of the American Constitution agreed with him. [It has been argued that we still accept universal human rights even though we have done away with the theological underpinning for them and have not found a replacement for it.]

Immanuel Kant thought that they come from Reason, via the Categorical Imperative. It is common nowadays to claim (as Cleo indicates) that they come from the nature of a human being, though the details of how they so arise differ between many authors. Is it merely the concept of a human (or more commonly, a person) — and if so, which features of that concept? Is it our rationality (cf Kant), our special status granted by god (cf Locke), our immersion in community, our ability to empathise, our ability to have moral views, or some thing else?

If you believe that morality is relative — that what's right for me (or for us) may not be right for you, then it is difficult to see how you can support universal human rights at all. One account of rights is that they are granted by governments or rulers. If this is the case, then they differ from one society to another, and cannot then be universal.

Tim Sprod

Vasu asked:

How are 'post-modernism' and 'post-structuralism' different from 'modernism' and 'structuralism'?

I'm not sure how clear-cut this can be made to be, but basically, structuralism was started by Saussure who developed a theory of codes in language, taking it as an independent system. The idea of an independent rule-governed system was extended to other areas of study such as sociology and anthropology. Explanation and analysis of phenomena in terms of an independent system identified by its structure constituted an alternative to previous historical explanations. It also contrasts with phenomenology and existentialism which also have a stronghold in continental philosophy, since structuralist analysis identifies rules and structures which are taken to be facts, or objective, in contrast to the subjectivity which is essential to existentialism and phenomenology.

Post-structuralism is a return to subjectivity and a movement away from determinate explanations in terms of structures. Likewise, post-modernists reject logic and truth in favour of multiple interpretations.

Modernism refers to modern philosophy especially anglo-saxon philosophy, whereas structuralism was more sociological and the primary structuralists were continental. However, like structuralism, modernism was ruled by the application of reason and logic and sought foundations for knowledge, explanations of truth and presupposed the determinacy of meaning. Post-modernism, on the other hand, is a rejection, systems of knowledge, rules, principles, and structures, so it is also post-structuralist.

Rachel Browne

Laura asked:

What would an existentialist believe about cloning? Obviously, there would be no religious objection. But how would an existentialist view the concept morally, socially, or metaphysically?

I'm not sure it is so obvious that an existentialist would not have religious objections. Although Sartre was an atheistic existentialist, not all existentialists are atheist. See, for example, Kierkegaard. As for the other questions, I am not sure — it depends on their version of existentialism, I suspect, or their other intellectual commitments. I cannot see any obvious way existentialism in general would come down in this case.

Tim Sprod

Nathan asked:

Are we all hedonistic at heart? I tend to agree with Pascal but would like some input regarding the following questions:

According to Pascal, all humans seek happiness, this is without exception. He wrote that even the one who commits suicide does so for the end result of finding happiness. This would then include those who have no belief or concept of an afterlife. Having fallen into this category, even though they have no expectation, the assumption of their actions is that whatever lies ahead must be better than the present situation. Hence, the desire to find any way out of the situation. If this were not the case, the question that it seems should be asked is, "Why would a person desire to change their present situation if it were not to better it in some manner?" Do we ever act consciously in a manner that will assure us to be ultimately in a state or place that is worse than the one in which we presently exist? If so, please give an example?

This is almost an irrefutable position, because it is so vague. Pascal is not the only one to argue this way; there is a whole branch of ethics based on this premise. How do you refute it? I don't know if it can be done purely rationally. That is, one can always think up some reason, however indirect, that any action is based, ultimately, on seeking happiness, to the point, in my opinion, of complete absurdity. So how do we get out of this rational dilemma, where we are able always to find or create some connection to any action and happiness (and remember, that term, "happiness", is also vague, so we can stretch it to just about whatever we want).

In order to investigate this claim, we can go to the animal kingdom, where we find creatures that a) cannot rationalize, b) may not even be able to feel happiness or anything else, for that matter, and ask whether we find behavior which in a human being would indicate altruism, in the sense of acting for another creature (to the point of sacrificing life) without expectation of personal return. Do we find this in nature? Well, the answer seems to be that we do. In social insects, individuals will sacrifice themselves for others with greater likelihood depending on their degree of genetic relationship to those others. The more closely related genetically, the more likely an insect like a bee or ant will sacrifice itself for another bee or ant (and thus for the colony as a whole). Now here we have an example of a creature which, as far as I know, cannot even feel emotion, much less pleasure, much less happiness (a step beyond pleasure), much less reflect on those feelings, if it had them. Yet it behaves "altruistically". Why? Surely it is clear that if a worker ant sacrifices itself for the good of the colony, first, the colony will be more likely to survive, and second, that ant's genes will continue to be propagated (since the queen is being protected). This is, roughly, Dawkins' position, and the origin (in part) of the catch-phrase, "the selfish gene". But genes do not feel pleasure (or anything else), they're just strings of DNA.

So if we can find this kind of example, although we can still argue that in humans, altruism is hedonistic, I think that argument is weakened to the point that it is now the burden of the hedonists to show decisively that their viewpoint is the most likely one. We do not know that we act out of "instinct" in some cases of altruistic behavior, but we do know that humans have instincts, and that in the animal realm (which we are a part of) there are animals that do so act (and there are other examples I could give, in higher animals). In addition, we can always find examples of mothers sacrificing themselves, etc., and now we have a concrete reason for giving an alternate answer to the hedonistic one for such actions.

Steven Ravett Brown

Cord asked:

I have to write an essay which counts a considerable amount of my final mark on "A belief is what you think is the truth".

Unfortunately I have not only problems with the English language but also with this question as I have no idea how to tackle it. I would be extremely grateful if you could help me with giving me some basics/ initial ideas.

I'm guessing that you are a Theory of Knowledge student in the International Baccalaureate (I teach ToK). I also have problems with this question, I have to admit. It isn't obvious to me how to go about writing a good answer, though I guess I could have a stab if I had to. If you are an IB student, then since you have a list of ten topics to choose from, why not choose one that you like better?

Tim Sprod

I will have a go at answering the question.

A belief is something which has content. What that means is that to have a belief is always to believe that so-and-so. The content of a belief is given by a sentence which can be true or false, depending on how things are. For example, the content of John's belief that it is dark now, is given by the sentence, 'It is dark now.' His belief can be true or it can be false, depending on whether or not it is, in fact, dark.

I am using the words 'true' and 'false' in the ordinary sense. Someone says something you agree with, and you say, 'That's true.' Someone says something you disagree with, and you say, 'that's false'. In other words, truth with a small 't'.

Another point about usage: In ordinary conversation, 'think' is used in two ways. You can say 'I think...' where you have definitely made up your mind. But you can also use 'I think...' to imply that you are not sure. 'Is it true what I heard on the radio, that the match is cancelled?' 'I think it is true.' To convey the sense of our question, it would be better to say, 'A belief is what you hold to be the truth,' or, 'A belief is what you hold to be true.' I will take the question in this sense.

Not all attitudes with content are what you hold to be true. Hope is another example of an attitude with content. Mary's hope that it is sunny in Perth has the content, 'It is sunny in Perth'. The sentence, 'It is sunny in Perth' can be true or false, just like the sentence, 'It is dark now.' But the sentence, 'It is sunny in Perth,' is not something that Mary holds to be true. As Mary looks out on the Sheffield night sky, she doesn't have any idea whether it is sunny in Perth or not. She hopes that it is, for her friends who are on holiday there.

A third group of attitudes with content are used when you know that the sentence which gives the content is definitely false. For example, if Mary wishes that she was in Perth, this implies that she is not in Perth. Wishing is not always like this. You can wish for things in the future, and then it is like hoping. In wishing that I will win the National Lottery, I don't know whether the sentence, 'I will win the National Lottery' will turn out to be true, or not.

So what? What follows from that?

There are several things that follow from this, but one issue stands out. One often hears people say, 'Everyone is entitled to their own belief. In expressing my belief, I don't mean to imply that your belief is false. My belief is true for me, yours is true for you. Let's agree to differ.' — Of course, people who are unable to resolve their argument have to agree to differ. No-one is disputing that. But one thing the logic of belief forces you to say is that if John believes that XYZ, and Mary believes that not XYZ, then Mary must believe that John's belief is false, otherwise she is contradicting herself, and John must believe that Mary's belief is false, otherwise he is contradicting himself. There can be differing beliefs, but what they aim at is one and the same truth.

Geoffrey Klempner

Stephen asked:

What is your response to the ultimate 'Why?' question?

(I mean the question, Why is there something rather than nothing? the fundamental question of metaphysics — M. Heidegger.)

My personal answer is that it is just a brute fact. I don't think there is an answer to that question. There might just as well be nothing (though in a strange way, there actually being nothing is an idea which seems impossible to comprehend).

Tim Sprod

The word "something" needs clarification. We ordinarily use "something" to refer to an unidentified particular in a general way (e.g., "I just heard something; what was that?"). The question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?," however, seems to ask in a general way about the totality of things.

The grammatical form of a question can be misleading. "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is grammatically similar to "Why is there salt in the soup rather than pepper?" or "Why are there swallows in Capistrano rather than bald eagles?," but they are logically quite different from our question. The other questions can be answered by investigating other parts of the world (culinary practice and the nature of certain birds, respectively). The explanation in each case lies outside the thing to be explained. But the question, "Why is there everything ['something'] rather than nothing at all?," logically does not permit any such investigation. There is nothing "outside" everything that could yield an explanation.

In The Mystery of Existence (which I highly recommend) Milton K. Munitz argues that, unlike "Why is there something rather than nothing?," the question "Why does the observed world exist?" is well-framed, but unanswerable. (A genuine mystery, according to Munitz, is a question that can be neither dismissed nor answered.) He rejects the theistic answer, i.e., the observed world exists because God created it, but that rejection does not affect what we have said above. The mystery of existence is neutral with respect to theism. Whether or not God exists, there is nothing outside the totality of existing things (including or excluding a God) and therefore nothing that can yield an explanation for its existence. That is, whether the totality equals "just the observed world" or "God plus the observed world," there is — there can be — nothing outside that totality which explains it. Even when, according to theism, God was all that existed, there was no explanation for that fact, for there were no other facts than his existence to which possible explanatory appeal could be made.

As Paul Edwards put it in his (also highly recommended) essay, "Why?," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ". . . the word 'why' loses its meaning when it becomes logically impossible to go beyond what one is trying to explain. This is a matter on which there need not be any disagreement between atheists and theists or between rationalists and empiricists."

Tony Flood

Heidegger's particular way (denkweg) of asking becomes hymnal (dankweg) as it returns to the primal wonder of the beings for whom Being is an issue, to Being itself: that there is. We see in his later lectures his thinking become thanking or thanksgiving. He has come under the sway of language itself, he would say, as revealed in acts of language ie. the poems of Holderlin, Trakl and Rilke (we shouldn't underestimate the influence of the latter because Heidegger is less than complimentary to him). The 'philosophy' of Rilke is crucial to Heidegger I would argue, his Holderlin is Rilkean. But the result, in any case, is that Heidegger has become wondrous before Being. Wonderful for him, but perhaps for us, somewhat Germanly romantic.

As for my response, I must hide it behind the wonder of Levinas — but his response is worth hearing. He says in his winter 1975 lecture course at the Sorbonne that Heidegger follows the Aristotelian interpretation of wonder as the recognition of ignorance by itself "thereby making knowledge (savoir) proceed from the love of knowledge (savoir). In so doing he denies to knowledge any origin in the practical difficulties of life, in the difficulties of people who do not manage to communicate with one another. The origin of knowledge is not in need but in knowledge itself." Hence Heidegger's originary question: why are there things that are rather than nothing? But for Levinas this question is predetermined by the Aristotelian interpretation of wonder, which Heidegger's originary question makes unquestionable.

Nathan asked:

In this present age, is there one overall philosophic project being undertaken that can be traced through contemporary philosophy? And if so, what is it?

In many ways, I think the answer to your question is 'No, there isn't'. Philosophy at the moment seems to be pursuing a huge diversity of areas.

And yet, perhaps I'll stick my neck out and say that, given the presumed death of metaphysics (or at least, the grave difficulties in which even the possibility of metaphysics finds itself), then a key question running through much contemporary philosophy concerns the possibilities of knowledge. To me, epistemology has become the central problem of philosophy, replacing metaphysics. You can see worries about this question shot through present day ethics, logic, aesthetics and so on. I stand prepared to be shot down in flames on this one by my fellow answerers, however.

Tim Sprod

Martin asked:

My name is Martin Benderson. I am a student from Sweden. At present I am working on a project concerning novelty seekers. At the moment I am trying to gather different opinions from various groups of people about the subject. I would be very pleased if you could help me to answer some questions.

1. Why do you think we have a need to escape from reality?
2. Do you think the civilised society increases our need to escape from reality?
3. Do you think people find hope by escaping from reality?

1. I don't think we need or want to escape from reality entirely unless we are trying to lose consciousness. We seek to escape particular aspects of reality that we don't like or can't cope with. Any sort of heavy involvement with something, such as being a workaholic, is an escape. But then simply reading a novel or a magazine can be an escape from the moment or surrounding state of affairs. In the case of novelty seekers, are you sure they seeking to escape something? Avoiding boredom, or seeking thrills seems more positive than anything implied by the notion of escape. Avoidance of boredom is different from trying to escape aspects of reality. Boredom is a psychological state and while real it is not an aspect of external reality.

2. Probably. We live in very rational and easy times which may give rise to feelings of boredom. But, as I said, we don't always seek to escape from external reality. So do we seek to escape "civilisation"? In some ways, sometimes. But novelty seekers don't essentially seek to escape civilisation. Presumably some novelties are high-tech and/or social.

3. Hope, I suppose, is optimism about the future. So, no. It would be better to try to change aspects of life you don't like than try to escape from them if hope is to be well-founded: This applies to the person who escapes through drink, drugs or over-work. If the novelty seeker wants to avoid boredom he will constantly need to find new novelties which might be frustrating rather than giving rise to hope.

— Thinking of novelty-seekers brings to mind travellers who are really trying to get away from themselves, but won't be able to do so by moving on. Moving on provides short-term hope. So with novelty seekers, possibly. They are not trying to escape external reality or civilisation, but something within themselves like boredom, but activity isn't the answer. I think the drive is internal rather than to do with the way the world is and so internal change would need to be made.

Rachel Browne

Jody asked:

I am doing my mid-term paper on the origins of philosophy. Could you please help me get started.

Two possibilities present themselves to me.

1. Get a good dictionary of philosophy and look up the pre-Socratics. That should give you something to get started with.

2. Start from Aristotle's remark (Plato said something very similar) that 'philosophy begins in wonder'. Then look at what it is that people wonder about. Why do people wonder? What are the different sorts of questions that can be wondered about? How can we deal with the situation when there seem to be several plausible answers to our wonders, but we cannot see any clear way to be certain about which is right? That, for me, is the source of philosophy.

Tim Sprod

Jana asked:

What were the various functions of the State in Marxist-Leninism?

I think it would be very wise from the outset to make a distinction between the "Marxist-Leninism" of the so-called former communist countries and the political theory and revolutionary strategy advocated by Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. What I will do here is focus on the ideas of Lenin and explain how he perceived the state and how his understanding of the function of the state guided the political practice of the Bolshevik Party. With an understanding of these ideas, you can then offer your own interpretation/explanation for the failings of the Communist system in Russia and elsewhere.

The way I understand Lenin is as a thinker and political activist who attempted to implement the revolutionary ideas of Karl Marx in the Russia of the 20th Century. It was Marx who theorised about the antagonistic relationship between that class which owns the means of production (factories, land, machines etc.) — the ruling class or bourgeoisie, and that class which owns nothing other than its ability to sell its labour power (its ability to work) to the ruling class — namely the working class or proletariat. It was Marx who believed that the conflict between these classes was an integral feature of all capitalist societies. It was Marx who believed that this conflict would intensify as capitalism developed, and it was Marx who hoped that a victory by the working class in this conflict with the ruling class would lead to a radically different society i.e. a communist one.

It is within this context of the antagonistic relation between these two classes, a relationship where the ruling class exploits the working class and imprisons its members in a perpetual cycle of poverty, that Lenin theorised about the state. The state, first and foremost, comprises all those institutions that perpetuate the dominance of the ruling class over the working class. There are two ways in which the state can maintain this dominance. Firstly, it can, if it must, dominate the working class through physical force- this is what the army and police force do. Secondly, it can maintain this dominance through ideological means — through the education system, through the judicial system and, to an extent, through the Church. The important point that Lenin grasped was that the state's primary purpose was (and still is according to modern Marxists) to ensure that the ruling class could continue its exploitation of the working class. The state is an instrument of class rule. It is not, as some theorists claim, a "neutral" arbiter between the two classes. It's apparent neutrality, its presentation of itself as a body outside of class relations is an ideological smokescreen that conceals its true nature.

Because the purpose of the state is to maintain the dominance of one class over another, it would be redundant in any future classless (communist) society. The state exists primarily as instrument of class domination. Take away the class domination and there is simply no need for a state.

Back to political strategy. Marx had envisaged a situation when the oppressed working class, finally conscious of itself as a class, rose up against the ruling class, overthrowing both them and their capitalist economic system and established a communist society. Lenin realised that before a truly communist society was established the working class would have to become the physically dominant class. They would have to physically seize the means of production from the ruling class and be prepared to defend their gains from attack. Lenin, quite correctly, predicted that the ruling class would not give up their wealth/factories etc. without a fight. Whilst the risk of a counter attack from the ruling class exists, the working class will effectively have to function as a dominant class. It will, in the interests of the survival of the revolution, have to ruthlessly defend its gains from those members of the ruling class and their representatives who refuse to accept their loss. The working class will have to use every means at its disposal to defend the revolution.

Now, because the state is an extremely effective tool of class domination (that's its primary function after all), it would make sense for the working class to take over the state and use its apparatus to dominate the old ruling class. So long as the threat from the ruling class exists, there will be a need for the working class to use the repressive state apparatus to defend the gains of the revolution. The state, once the instrument for subduing the working class becomes, in the hands of the working class, the tool by which the old ruling class are prevented from organising a counter-revolution and are finally defeated.

It is in this context that the working class political party (the Bolsheviks for Lenin) takes control of the state. Not, as some anarchist and right wing commentators believe, because they are power crazed or dictatorial, but to defend the hard won gains of the revolution from those who wish to destroy it. Theoretically, once the threat of counter-revolution has subsided there should be no need for the state to exist.

Of course, this is not what happened in practice. The Bolshevik Party retained control of the state and used it for its own ultimately repressive ends. Various thinkers and historians have offered their explanations of this failure. A very common sense idea is that power simply corrupts and the Bolsheviks, once in control of state power, simply didn't want to let it go. This argument has the appeal of seeming intuitively correct but there are other explanations. Perhaps the danger of counter-revolution was always present and the repressive state was necessary to protect the revolution. These are two very simple explanations and there are many others. Perhaps the best person to read on the failure of this system is Leon Trotsky and there is, of course, always Lenin's classic, State and Revolution, available online at:

Zoe asked:

My question is how is it possible to be objective about the world we live in, in relation to philosophical and scientific approaches to human understanding? This is one which has puzzled me — I would be interested in your response.

How to understand 'objective' — that is the really difficult part. If you mean 'the view from nowhere' (as Thomas Nagel puts it), I don't think it is possible. Nietzsche argued (in as much as Nietzsche actually argues for any of his views) that we always see things from a perspective. There seems to be truth in this — we cannot escape our situatedness.

However, this does not imply that we must always have a view that is radically different from anybody else's. Because we come to be a person in a community, and because we continue to communicate as we learn, we can (indeed, must) build intersubjectivity — more objective than individual subjectivity, but not free of connection and positioning in the world.

Tim Sprod

Richard asked:

My question is not a new one by any means. I just turned 56 and I am very aware of the fact even with good health and a brain and bladder that continue to function the most I can hope for is another good fifteen to twenty years of life. Can you recommend readings or books that would be a general guide on how to best use these last few years in the most beneficial way? I realize that the final answer to this question is one that no one can answer for me. I would find it very helpful to have some guidance on what or who to read on this subject.

I think the answer depends quite a bit on your present beliefs and commitments. You might find anything I recommend so at odds with these that you would not get anything out of it. Having said that, I would recommend reading Peter Singer. It's not that I agree with him — I think that his philosophical basis in utilitarianism is quite flawed,