Jean asked:

I am a social psychologist preparing an assessment of the popularly proposed program of torture interrogation of terrorists to present to the Joint [Military] Services Conference on Professional Ethics. Advocates of torture interrogation usually run a utilitarian argument starting from the "ticking bomb" scenario. I want to say that unintended effects of a program may be morally acceptable when reasoning from something like virtue ethics or duty, but a utilitarian argument must also attempt to account for all foreseeable effects in its cost-benefits analysis.

My questions: (1) What is the proper philosophical language for making this assertion? (2) Is the principle of double effect relevant when the intended good effect is clearly dwarfed by unintended disastrous effects?

From the perspective of policy studies, I then describe the necessary institutional effects of implementation of an official program of torture interrogation of terrorist suspects. The social breakdown of institutions and the difficulty of social repair then constitute something of a counterargument, I believe, to the simple utilitarian argument based on the "ticking bomb" scenario. However, these unintended effects, e.g., loss of citizen trust of government and compromise of the judiciary, will be minimized if the program operates under a pretense of decency or is chiefly covert. For example, during the dirty war in Argentina military police had a policy of submitting only unimportant interrogees to regular judicial procedures.

My questions: (3) Can utilitarians responsibly argue for a secret or deceptive course of action? That is: "publicly I argue for program X, intending all the while to create program Y under the authorization for X so as to minimize unintended effects." (4) Further, how much exploration of consequences can the utilitarian be required to make? (5) And is it fair to hold utilitarians responsible for a plan of repair or restitution for unavoidable bad effects of the proposed utilitarian program? (6) Or must a better alternative be proposed?

Thank you for helping me out of this muddle. I could send you a draft of my paper, "Torture Interrogation of Terrorists — An Impractical Program," but this is probably more than you want to read.

The obvious utilitarian objection to torture is that once you allow it as a practice it is very unlikely that it will be confined to the very small number of cases where it might be justified and that it will become a more or less standard practice — human nature, and especially official nature, being what it is, and given how much brutality there is when it's supposedly illegal. This is apart from intrinsic objections, of course. Ought a decent person to get involved in this at all? Also, do we have any evidence that it's effective as a reliable method of interrogation?

Harry Lesser

I would like to answer Jean Maria Arrigo's question with a question. Why should we automatically assume that the only utilitarian benefit gained from torturing a "ticking bomb" terrorist is the short-term avoidance of a particular terror attack, and that all of the long-term societal consequences will be bad? I don't think that is true in all societies and historical situations. Here's an extreme example: Suppose the police catch a well-known terrorist who proudly announces his knowledge of impending terror attacks that will kill hundreds of people. Let us say that the person in question has been found guilty of managing a terrorist organization by a properly conducted court of law, and that a democratically elected legislature has already passed a law that specifically allows for the supervised use of torture as a method of interrogation in precisely such circumstances. Would the use of torture in such a case really lead to "social breakdown of institutions"? It might be argued that in such circumstances, a refusal to torture would lead to a crisis of legitimacy for the government involved — especially if many citizens were to die in preventable attacks. Angry citizens would demand to know why the state hadn't done everything in its power to protect them. Wouldn't such a government need to torture the terrorist in order to protect the institutions of society (as well as in order to thwart terror attacks)?

Berel Dov Lerner

I realise you asked people to respond to this question on the appropriate website, but reading the question I think it points to all that is wrong with moral theory and the attempt to apply moral theory. Would anyone with any feeling/ compassion for humanity, seriously bother to defend the torture of another human being, regardless of who they were and what names e.g. 'terrorist' we assigned to them? Do people really care if torture can be justified under a virtue ethics rather than utilitarianism etc? Doesn't this just all miss the point of human cruelty and anthropocentrism? Well, it does to me.

Eccy de Jonge

I found it difficult to answer what could have been a straightforward question about the ethical status of torture. I attribute my difficulty and Mr. Arrigo's "muddle" to the complex political and sociological context within which he chose to frame his questions. As a philosopher, I cannot take seriously the pretensions to ethical concern expressed by either the contemporary statesman or his terroristic alter ego. I simply cannot work up interest in how a given policy of interrogation may adversely affect the mystique of a modern state (its "legitimacy" in the popular mind). Modern governments and terrorist organizations are fatefully (and perhaps fatally) linked to each other; leaders of both types of organization seem to have few qualms about sacrificing innocents for "the greater good" as they see it. What qualms they may have about any bloody business are limited to the public relations downside of a misstep. Events in Moscow during the last weekend in October illustrated that rather neatly. ("If the terrorists blow up the theater, everybody dies; but if we gas the theater before storming it, maybe we cut that number in half." "Well, then, obviously we gas the theater!" "Not so fast, tovarisch. Theoretically, we can pull out of Chechnya, you know. After all, we've been oppressing Chechens for two centuries, and for what? Why not cut our losses?" "Because then the terrorists will have won, you idiot!")

As for utilitarianism and torture, we need to distinguish. According to act utilitarianism, an act of harming one or more individuals by torturing them may be morally acceptable if that act benefits more people than it harms, and cannot if it doesn't. According to rule utilitarianism, the act must be brought under a rule: an act of harming one or more individuals by torturing them may be morally acceptable only if we know that, as a rule, torturing leads to a greater number of beneficial than harmful consequences.

The problem with either form is that it presupposes the commensurability of interpersonal benefits and harms. That is, it presupposes that benefits and harms to a great number of persons are translatable into a common unit of measurement (much the way international currencies can be translated into American dollars or Euros). The advertised benefit of this translation is that we can then reckon whether a proposed course of action is likely to result in more of one kind of "stuff" than another (i.e., either more benefits than harms, or more harms than benefits). This fallaciously aggregates benefits and harms while ignoring the concrete persons to whom they accrue. Utilitarianism's inability to tote up all consequences of a proposed course of action (or to non-arbitrarily demarcate a cut-off point for considering further consequences) are side issues compared with utilitarianism's basic fallacy. The principle of double effect stipulates that the undesirable consequences are not intended (not just left unmentioned), not the means to the desired consequences, and not more evil than the intended effect is good. So, for instance, an airline representative has the right to evict a stowaway from one of its passenger planes, but not eject him at 30,000 feet, even if his certain death is not the intended consequence.

Mr. Arrigo asks: "Can utilitarians responsibly argue for a secret or deceptive course of action? That is: 'publicly I argue for program X, intending all the while to create program Y under the authorization for X so as to minimize unintended effects.'" I don't see how such subterfuge minimizes unintended effects, although it might minimize their accurate attribution. Where is even the slightest trace of moral justification?

Mr. Arrigo's question reminds me of another widespread pretext concocted to rationalize the inflicting of harm, namely, the invocation of the principle of double effect to justify abortion. Now, please note, some abortions are not homicides (no homines are at mortal risk in the very early stages of pregnancy). Furthermore, some homicides are justifiable (I'm no pacifist). What is offensive to the moral point of view, however, is the deceptive language. A woman may state that she wishes only to end her state of pregnancy, suggesting that the death of her viable fetus (when it is viable) is a possible secondary effect to which she would be indifferent. The test of her veracity, of course, would be her reaction to the placement in her arms of her healthy baby after the successful abortion, that is, the termination of her pregnancy. Due to advances in medical knowledge and technology, the pregnant woman can be relieved of her unwanted pregnancy without prejudice to the fetus. But her claim that she does not also intend the death of her fetus, in addition to no longer being pregnant, is simply not credible. To use Mr. Arrigo's formula, she is publicly invoking the right to control her body while privately intending also to destroy the living body of another. It may be that she has the right to do the latter. She should make the case. Lying only discredits any case she might have.

As for Arrigo's fifth question, a person is reasonably held responsible for what his freely undertaken actions cause, with his state of mind (e.g., coerced, depressed, etc.) being a possibly a mitigating factor. Whether or not he is a utilitarian or a Kantian is irrelevant to the issue of assigning accountability.

Deliberately to inflict excruciating suffering on a human being in the hope (it is by no means a certainty) that he will prefer to reveal certain information than to continue to suffer is to aggravate the offense of utilitarianism. Instead of merely treating him as collateral damage on the way to securing a desirable end, the torturer degrades his captive, treating him as less than human, as an egg that must be broken if it is to yield an omelet. Even if the victim of torture himself would inflict suffering on innocents, he is still a person, a self-transcender and seeker after a good life, however criminally mistaken he may be. To torture in order to extract information is to create one unit of the very horror that the terrorist threatens, thereby rendering meaningless one's own anti-terrorism. How we treat him reflects well or poorly on our own handling of the task our natures have set for us, namely, to realize a great diversity of values regularly and harmoniously, that is, to create good lives for ourselves. There is no good life without respect for persons as such. That drive to actualize the good life is a priori, if you will, prior to, underpinning, and penetrating any particular good we may seek. It is the source of duty, which ultimately is justified by certain consequences: lives worth living, but not reducible or restricted to a particular consequence or type of consequence. The prospect of the good life, however explicitly or implicitly grasped, is the intelligible unity of all our different desires that we must sort out, rank, and attempt to achieve. It is the standard by which we do those things. The achievement of any other values, however, is a function of the appreciation of the value of truth. Only he who can deceive himself about the nature of another human being can implement a policy of torture.

Tony Flood

Around 1974—5 during my penultimate year as an undergraduate at Birkbeck College, London University, I had the honour, as President of the Philosophical Society, of entertaining the philosopher H.J. McCloskey who had been invited to read a paper to the assembled staff and students. McCloskey, author of John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study is well known as a writer on utilitarianism.

Over dinner at a local Italian restaurant, McCloskey told me that he had recently completed a lecture tour in Chile, one of few academic philosophers — or possibly the only academic philosopher — to be invited during the reign of the military Junta. Surprised at first by the invitation, he was disquieted to learn during his visit that the Junta were keenly interested in the question whether utilitarian moral theory could be used to justify torture.

Not long before this meeting, I had seen a film about Chile, which included the brief image of an electrode being applied to a woman's nipple. The film makers knew their craft. To this day, whenever I think of torture, that image irresistibly obtrudes.

On that memorable evening, as my guest and I twirled our spaghetti, I pictured McCloskey sitting round a dinner table with the Chilean Generals and their clinking medals, smoking cigars and drinking fine wine. 'A toast to John Stuart Mill!'

I would like to ask who are going to be the torturers. Is it going to be like the doctors trained in the correct surgical procedures for removing the hand, as prescribed by Islamic Law as a punishment for theft? The charge on the electrode is to be 2000 volts, not a volt more. Enough to produce excruciating pain, but not enough to cause permanent injury. Perhaps scientific research will lead to new, ever more efficient methods of torture which effect the mind, but not the body. Suitably chastened, but in the best of physical health, the terrorist (or criminal) can return to a worthwhile job and be a productive member of society.

Geoffrey Klempner

It seems as though the questions asked by the author of this letter strike at some of the classic objections to Utilitarianism:

2)How can we be sure that the "effects" we observe are effects of one particular act or another?

3)Consider the classic example, a man who acts from a desire to kill a religious leader misfires his rifle, and instead strikes oil (an unlikely example, but one used in objection to Utilitarianism); whereas a man who intends no evil misfires his rifle and wounds or kills a religious leader. In the first case, the man clearly intended evil, but good resulted from his action. In the second case, the man intended no evil, but--nevertheless evil did result. Can we fail to hold the first man responsible for his actions? May we condemn the second man? Clearly (some have argued) our intentions figure into the normative status of our actions.

I would also like to ask whether the author of the original letter is asking about act or rule Utilitarianism, or both. This, it seems to me, would alter a possible response.

Gerald Marsh

To begin with a game-theoretical scenario, we have two parties fighting for some conflicting goals. Then the natural question for each party will be, if the means it uses are effective and where to stop if the costs become unbearable.

The terrorist is no lamb. Even if we concede that his aims are just (as he claims always of course), he is bringing much suffering on the victims of his "ticking bomb". If he is faced with torture he has a choice. He could tell how to find and de-activate the bomb. If he decides not to, this is his decision for killing other people for his cause. In this respect a suicide-terrorist is at least honest setting value against value. From this derives a right of the offended to use torture as a means for defence. It's a game.

War is war and terrorism is war of a special sort but not principally different. From a philosophical point of view most if not all arguments to justify war are invalid. But the churches always have up to this day justified war, e.g. on communism or on islam. I will not enter this extended discussion now, since it is not asked for. I only mention it.

The admonition of Jesus to love your enemy, and the conclusion of Socrates 400 years before that suffering injustice is better than committing it, are meant for personal conduct, not for policy. Even Socrates was an active soldier when required to be one by the laws of Athens. Jesus nowhere condemned the soldier as such.

One main question of the questioner is, if procedures of torture interrogation cause bad side-effects to the defender itself. Argentina under the junta in the 70s is cited here. But I remember another example : There was a fascinating film (of 1971) that showed protesters against the Vietnam war in the USA fighting against "upright citizens" that found the war against communism justified and took the "peace people" as traitors to a just cause. The film was made by a protester and presented the supporters of the war as being either neurotics or uninformed or mislead or as misleading fascists. But the "upright citizens" had an argument : The presidents leading the USA into the Vietnam war were no Hitlers or Saddams but they were the Democrats Kennedy and Johnson elected by due democratic procedures — which not even the opposition ever denied. Thus to follow up and supporting the war could justly be seen as a patriotic duty as long as there were no proven lies and hidden interests showing up.

Everybody has a right to oppose, but opposing an evidently undemocratic regime as that of Videla in Argentina or of Castro in Cuba or of Saddam in Iraq is not the same as opposing a democratic regime as that of the USA today — at least as long as you cannot prove a misuse of power or to be lied to. Thus one has to request democratic procedures and the functioning of the institutions of "checks and balance", but one cannot request from a democratically installed and controlled government to lay open all its measures to everybody. You cannot top a democratic process and order by some super-democratic process and order of your own choice. Where will you stop then? There will always be different opinions on any topic. Democracy is a compromise. Even if Colin Powell or Kofi Annan or Nelson Mandela were presidents of the USA today, there would be some people around to hate them or to call them stupids and madmen. Thus is the nature of the world.

Thus my verdict: As long as results come up and strict and controlled procedures are observed, and freedom of the press and the judiciary is not endangered, there may be torture interrogations. The danger that "loss of citizen trust of government and compromise of the judiciary" may ensue has to be seen in relation to the danger inherent in a fundamental distrust against a government functioning by due process of law. Even the GW Bush Government is not a Hitler- or Videla- or Saddam-Government and should not be taken to be one without the greatest offence to the American voters and political institutions.

A final word on question Nr. 5 : "Is it fair to hold utilitarians responsible for a plan of repair or restitution for unavoidable bad effects of the proposed utilitarian program?"

How should that be? The whole American People had to bear the consequences of the Vietnam war, not only "the utilitarians". But as I said above : The Vietnam War was NOT brought about by some supervillains or madmen but by two Democratic Presidents correctly elected. We simply have to accept this unavoidable rest of tragedy in all human endeavors.

Hubertus Fremerey

The following remarks are meant as a backdrop against which to orient your ideas. The argument against torture is already half lost, in my view, because you argue your case on the opposition's grounds, that makes your case all the more hard to win.

To the question 'Can torture be justified?' the answer is yes — even with the best will in the world. We can exemplify this from history e.g. the Inquisition. The discussion needs to be carried on within the question of whether torture should be justified. And the answer is no. The reason being that torture is perverse. Justification for torture, therefore, in this context, is perverse, and as such, contrary to reason. If we abstract torture from this context, we are left with open-ended or closed arguments for or against torture, but the presupposition is the same on both sides, namely, that perversity (torture) can be a rational starting place for arguments (for or against it) or a rationally coherent object of thought; this latter assumes that torture, in itself, is no more or less perverse than our arguments contrive to make it. Your questions to Ask a Philosopher show you already subscribe to this in principle, if not in fact. Whether one is 'for' or 'against' the instrumental argument for torture, there is tacit agreement between both sides that torture is itself neutral, like an object in the natural world. The arguments then become tortured on both sides of the equation.

The death penalty may seem an analogous case, but it is not, because death in itself is natural, death is not something that happens to one person (the condemned) and no-one else. Death belongs to the human condition, and in the case of the death penalty, those conditions are severely straitened for a greater good (atonement for despicable crimes, safety of others, freedom from fear etc.). This is not to justify the death penalty, but to say that you cannot argue about torture as if the presuppositions are the same.

It may be objected that there are different kinds of torture — that imprisonment is a torture, that solitary confinement is. But convention rules that they are punishments in lieu of something worse (the death penalty, historically). Real torture in the context of common law and convention (of 'should', again) is a perverting of these things, and as we would say, of justice.

Lisa asked:

Should the Ticking Bomb terrorist be tortured?

Firstly, is torture ever just? By what rules am I making my judgement (strong, weak, none). If it is just, how are we to determine when and to what point we can establish that it's OK to torture? In other words, is it possible for man to establish a universal law stating an "it depends on the case" law about torture? Finally, what does Justice prevent us from doing if we allow torture? Does it prevent anything?

Arguably one response could be: To act justly is to maximise the benefit for the greatest possible number. The moral agent firstly decides to torture the terrorist in order to obtain the information that allows to disarm the ticking bomb, thus saving thousands of people. Secondly the moral agent asks for a trial, pleads guilty to torture (and if the terrorist died also guilty of man-slaughter or murder depending on the circumstances ) and accepts the full punishment of the law for his case, thus saving the community from the idea that torture is acceptable.

Helene Dumitriu

Alex asked:

Does poverty diminish human dignity?

The short answer to your question is yes. Poverty has always been regarded by the public at large, and particularly the 'well-off', as a condition afflicting the lowly, the lazy, the careless, the uneducated, the undignified and the petty criminal. It has rarely been regarded that these conditions are the effects of poverty, but are usually considered to be the causes.

Although very young at the time I have retained vivid memories of what it was like to be poor throughout the 'slump period' of the 1930's. Although there were vain attempts to retain dignity, often by pretending that things were not as bad as they seemed, it was found that poverty was not a condition that could be successfully hidden, the facade was easily penetrated, particularly by the 'better-off'. Attempting toretain dignity was often carried to extremes, where some were willing to die rather than accept charity. A silly and futile sacrifice when the importance of dignity depended not on subjective feeling and emotion, but on objective perception by the public at large. Dignity is not an obvious attribute shown by someone standing in a long dole queue without overcoat in freezing cold or pouring rain. Neither is it plainly revealed by someone standing for hours in similar conditions outside a factory, hoping to be chosen to do a job for less than the going rate, and probably less than they would get on the dole. There was no great sense of dignity felt by children at school who stood with their backs to the wall in the playground, so that no-one would see the large patch or hole in the seat of their trousers. Down-at-heel shoes, or shoes that pinched because they were now too small, hardly allowed a dignified walk across a class room or a school stage.

However dignified the poor try to be their efforts are always under-mined by their perceived condition. Attempts to overcome this have usually been by way of cleanliness. In the 1930's, and indeed later, regular attention was devoted to scrubbing doorsteps and flags outside their homes, windows sparkled, there was a rigid adherence to the weekly wash day, if people dressed in rags they were proud to declare that they were clean rags. Homes, though sparsely furnished were often spotless and reeked of disinfectant. In contrast to this, however, there were those who had sunk so low with despair that they did not give a damn what their homes looked like or what they wore; these were the ones who usually found solace in the local pub and often became the stereotypes of the poverty stricken, having abandoned the futile effort to maintain a sense of dignity.

Whilst nations insist that capitalism is the utilitarian objective in this world then there will always be poverty, rich people gain their wealth at the expense of others, in a capitalist system there must always be an upper and a lower class, it could not work otherwise.

John Brandon

Gonzalo asked:

I would like to know if you find the following question interesting enough, or deserving enough of an answer. To what extent are human beings analytical in nature? Can we reduce, or explain, all aspects of human and non-human life through analytical explorations or analysis? What are or could be the limits (of what they can explain) of such analysis? Also, why is it so difficult for some of us to accept analysis final or absolute?

There are several questions her, but I get the impression that it would be appropriate to talk about how analysis might lead to 'Truth', or perhaps knowledge, or at least certainty.

You might first ask, 'What is analysis?'

I might set out with a definition of 'analysis' but I suppose this would be begging the question! There is no agreement about exactly what 'analysis' is, but there a few things you might consider, not least: is analysis about the clarification of complex terms or concepts? You might say that 'analysis' amounts to the rational and systematic approach to the contents of ones mind and one's experiences, and that this includes the reduction of complex ideas to simpler constituent parts. It might also involve an examination of the relation between parts and whole, or how ideas fit together, including assumptions or inferences that lie behind certain claims or inconsistencies in people's arguments.

Once you have some sense of what analysis is, you could ask what use is it and why do people do it? Of course, each of these are potentially huge topics, but you might want to think whether analysis as you understand it brings you closer to what you might regard as truth, or helps you recognise truth when confronted with it. Alternatively, assuming the absence of such a weighty standard, you might think of analysis as simply helping to achieve contingent and changeable goals and desires, however incomplete or incoherent such projects might be.

What is the value of analysis?

Some would say that analysis reveals to us some underlying order or structure to the world, something that is perhaps not obvious in our everyday existence or unexamined experiences. Scientific analysis is an example of this.

Or analysis could be presented as an activity with pragmatic value, even if not revealing truth as such

One thing that I think might be of interest to you, is the relationship between introspective analysis and certainty- a claim that knowledge is partly based on careful introspection of our internal states. This would be in contrast to, say, organised religion, where private introspection is considered feeble when measured against orthodox teachings. A lot of liberal ideas, influential in ethics and political philosophy, flow from this idea that an individual's careful consideration of his own states leads to a certainty that is almost foundational. If you're interested in this aspect of analysis you might want to read some of Charles Taylor's work. The Ethics of Authenticity is an easy start. Or try his Philosophical Arguments.

If analysis is this kind of thinking, is it inherent to human beings? What of a life without such analysis? If reading all this and reflecting on it is just wearing you out, you could look at how other traditions have addressed these issues, looking for the 'pure contemplation of truth, independent of written signs', as someone put it. This includes, for example, Indian accounts of the direct experience of reality.

The East Asian perspective, as presented by Zhuangzi in the 'Inner Chapters', suggests that rational analysis cannot be used to find truth. Zhuangzi makes some comical attacks on the idea of thinking and discussing one's way to solutions; he portrays the brain as just another organ of the body, and highlights conventions of language that limit such exchanges. His brand of Daoism is illustrated by a Butcher who carves up cows; the butcher develops from a thinking individual who takes much time to carve up the cow, to one whose work is unthinking, faster and more fluent. This intuitive doing, without the intermediate step of thinking, could be called 'following the Dao'.

Andy Lambert

Shirley asked:

In Phaedo what are Cebes' objections to Socrates' statements about death?

Together with Cebes, the Pythagorean philosopher, I say, "I will tell you":

One of the chief topics for discussion in the Phaedo is the immortality of the soul, proposed by Socrates. Cebes objects this immortality twice: in 69e-70c and in 86e-88b.

While Cebes is willing to admit that the soul is more lasting than the body, that "the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily form has been very ingeniously, and, as I may be allowed to say, quite sufficiently proven [86a], he objects the existence of the soul after death, which "is still, in my judgment, unproven.", as Cebes says.

The main point of Cebes' objection is, that the more lasting nature of the soul does not prove her immortality, for after having worn out many bodies in a single life, and many more in successive births and deaths, she may at last perish, or, as Socrates afterwards restates the objection, the very act of birth may be the beginning of her death, and her last body may survive her, just as the coat of an old weaver is left behind him after he is dead, although a man is more lasting than his coat. And he who would prove the immortality of the soul, must prove not only that the soul outlives one or many bodies, but that she outlives them all.

Jason asked:

I am a grad student and am having trouble with these questions:

1. At Theaetetus 147b Socrates leads Theaetetus to agree to the following: "Then a man who is ignorant of what knowledge is will not understand what cobbling is, or any other craft." At first blush this seems outrageous. Surely a person could know how to make shoes without ever having thought about the nature of knowledge. How can we interpret this passage so that it is plausible?

2. From Theaetetus 149a to 151c Socrates develops an analogy between his own practice as a teacher of philosophy and what midwives do. Explain the points of the analogy and how the analogy enlightens us about the nature of philosophy and of education.

Of course a person can make shoes without ever having thought about the nature of knowledge, but shoe making is a skill. The cobbler might say that he "knows how to make shoes" but he is not taking "knowledge" in the sense Socrates means, which is "knowing knowledge" and unless you know what knowledge is you cannot claim to know. Socrates thinks knowledge cannot be defined in terms of what it is "of". In the case of the cobbler all he has is the skill, or what knowledge is of, without any knowledge of what knowledge is. So this cannot be knowledge.

Socrates cannot define knowledge, but can illustrate learning, which he does throughout his dialogues, by getting people to think and helping them rid themselves of false beliefs, but the midwife metaphor is particularly related to bringing out the truth: it must be successful, not a miscarriage. A particular example of this is to be found in the Meno when Socrates draws geometrical knowledge from a slave-boy.

The idea of drawing the truth out of by people getting them to think is, or at least should be, a part of education. It cannot be all. In our education we need to acquire a lot of what Socrates would regard as opinion.

Rachel Browne

Karen asked:

I am writing a research paper on whether or not Buddhism should be considered a religion or philosophy of a lifestyle, I was wondering what you thought it was?

Is Dogen's Ts'ao-tung Zen a religion? Is Nagarjuna's Madhyamika school a religion? Is Tibetan Buddhism a philosophy of life style?

Again the division of Buddhism in several traditions, schools, and sects means that there could not be a single point of view. Personally I think that Gautama Siddharta's original teaching should be considered a philosophy (a philosophy of life style, if you prefer) and that Buddhism in general could be considered both a religion and a philosophy.

However, be careful in your research. There are voices who claim that philosophy and religion are only Western categories. That the Orient (when and where is not influenced by Western culture) speaks still in terms of "tradition". Have a look, all the same, at Ananda K. Coomaraswamy's Hindouism and Bouddhism.

Jean Nakos

Lindsay asked:

I am trying to find a case where the notion of truth arguably cannot be eliminated (and hence it would appear that there remains a "problem" of truth).

I'm not clear on your question. What does "arguably cannot be eliminated" mean? You might look at Kitcher's book The Advancement of Science, and also Bernard Williams' latest (and other) writings on truth. Both believe that there is truth to be found, and both approach it somewhat differently. As far as I'm concerned, when you try to fly by flapping your arms and cannot, or try to walk through a wall and cannot, you have had an encounter with truth which arguably cannot be ignored, at any rate. Is that what you mean? Also, what about mathematical truths? Given particular definitions of numbers and operations on numbers, it is true that 2+2=4. Is that a problem? Why?

Steven Ravett Brown

Your question is about a view which goes back to Frank Ramsay's 'Redundancy Theory' of truth. Truth is a 'redundant' concept, because when I say, 'It is true that it is raining', or '"It is raining" is true', my statement is equivalent to 'It is raining'. In other words, the phrases, 'It is true that...' and '...is true' can, in principle, be eliminated from language without any loss of power to express factual content, making it (apparently) unnecessary to ask the metaphysical question, 'What is truth?'. More recently, C.J.F. Williams (in his book Truth) and Paul Horwich (in a more recent book also entitled Truth) have argued for more sophisticated versions of Ramsay's view.

The eliminative strategy is no easy option. Suppose (I realize this is far fetched) you wanted to say all of the things that GK says on this page are true. That requires a lot less words than reporting every single thing that GK says on this page (assuming that one could agree on a way of counting how many separate statements GK has made) and then stating each assertion as something you agree with. E.g. GK said, 'The eliminative strategy is no easy option', and the eliminative strategy is no easy option, GK said, '...' and... etc.

But that's only the beginning. You might not remember any particular thing GK said, but only that you were convinced at the time. So you say, 'GK said something true'. You cannot remember a statement to quote. So you have to say instead:

There is a statement X that GK made, and X.

The technical term for this is 'propositional quantification'. This idea raises a number of difficult logical issues, including the one I just mentioned of deciding on a way to count statements. Another problem is that, unlike predicate calculus, which 'quantifies' over objects, the statements or 'propositions' which form the class or domain of things quantified over include propositions which themselves quantify over propositions. For example, remembering what you said about what GK said, a third person might say:

There is a statement Y that Lindsay made, and Y.

Amongst the propositions which the variable Y ranges over, is the statement, 'There is a statement X that GK made, and X.' A fourth person might want to report what the third person said, and so on, leading to a potentially infinite hierarchy of more and more complex statements/ propositions. This is a state of affairs ripe for generating logical paradoxes.

Is there any clear example where truth cannot be eliminated by propositional quantification? Consider the statement, 'England will win the football match with Slovenia tomorrow.' There are just two possibilities: Either England will win, or England will not win (i.e. Slovenia wins, or the match is a draw, or the match is cancelled or etc.). The Fatalist is not happy, however, with merely stating the obvious, 'Either England will win or not.' In terms of propositional quantification:

There is a proposition Z such that Z='England will win' or Z='England will not win', and Z.

The fatalist wants to say more. We are not merely describing different possible futures. One of these two alternatives is actually true. Here, arguably, is a case where 'truth' is used in a metaphysical sense which cannot be reduced to a mere logical/ grammatical convenience. (The proponent of the redundancy theory will, of course, say that this shows what is wrong with fatalism, and other similar metaphysical views about truth.)

Geoffrey Klempner

Becca asked:

Where does time "go"? Time seems to be a physical thing and yet many people turn it into a metaphysical concept, is it really metaphysical, or is it both?

Time is a thing that has intrigued philosophers for a long time. Kant for example thought that "time" is an a priori intuition, the "form" that our mind imposes on sense data. He thought it is empirically real (available to us i.e. multiple observers) but transcendentally ideal, by which he meant that since it is a way we experience things, we can never access "things-in-themselves" and can never grasp how they are (if at all) related to each other. One intriguing fact we know now is that matter "warps" space-time. The ability to interact suggests that space-time may in some way be a only a different "form" of mass-energy i.e. that matter is really mass-energy-space-time.

Helene Dumitriu

Susan asked:

What would you say if you were asked in an interview, 'What is your philosophy of automobile repairs?'

The philosophy of automobile repairs is really a methodology. It firstly involves ignoring the ethical virtues of sincerity and honesty. At the very beginning you must adopt a Socratic approach to automobile repairs and declare to as many people as possible that you know nothing about such things, whether this is true or not. But then you must switch to a non-Socratic stance and accept that there is someone who does know about them. You make friends with this person whether or not you like them and shift the responsibility for looking after your car on to them.

This is utilitarian. The person who comes to bear responsibility for the repair and maintenance of your car has a new friend and admirer, which will make him happy. You will never need to take your car garage because your friend will do it, and while this isn't really sufficient for happiness, it minimizes aggravation.

Rachel Browne

You know, at first this seemed a rather trivial question. But in fact, Neville Shute wrote a novel about, basically, this very subject, called Round the Bend. It's very good; I highly recommend it.

Steven Ravett Brown

Stephen asked:

What skills are necessary to be a good scientist?
What skills are necessary to be a good philosopher?
—And in what way do they differ?

I have often wondered about this. I have heard that philosophy is the best subject for training people to think — yet some philosophy students struggle with 'scientific' subjects.

I would also like to know how a student used to scientific subjects (as I am) can do good philosophy.

Could the rigorous way of thinking adopted in scientific studies be used to enhance a student's philosophy study (and perhaps help in finding more 'concrete' answers), or is this more likely to be a hindrance?

This question is not so much about whether philosophy could be made more "scientific", as to whether a so-called "scientific mind" could be an advantage in philosophy (in contrast to a typical mind of arts students), in areas other than pure formal logic at least.

For natural sciences (exact sciences) I would say the most important criteria are curiosity, imagination, accuracy, keeping an open mind and a sense of humour: You need to want to find out about things, to understand how things work (curiosity). You need to be able to form a hypothesis (a model, possible explanation) based on the facts available to you (imagination). You need to plan and execute and document your experiments carefully to avoid error and to allow others to duplicate and check your work (accuracy). You need to be open to facts that do not fit your hypothesis and alternative explanations (open mind). You must not fall too much in love with your hypothesis, if it after careful examination does not fit the facts, revise the hypothesis or chuck it out, do not throw out the facts (if they are facts) — do not take yourself to seriously (that's where the sense of humour comes in). Another way of putting it — you need an idea to start with but from there on it is lots of hard work. Also you need to know what others have worked out before to avoid making the same mistakes or re-inventing the wheel. And if you are truly a great scientist you definitely have to be able to think outside the box and be able to challenge traditionally accepted "truths".

In my view the same applies for philosophy.

The major difference is that natural sciences deals with the physical world only, whereas philosophy can deal with ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics etc. Historically one aspect after the other has "dropped" out of philosophy into "science", in my view it is only a question of time until there will be a "firm" basis for medicine, psychology and sociology.... so that gap is gradually diminishing. However every science has it's philosophy i.e. a theory about epistemology and methodology applicable in that science, this is a necessary and important part of science and will remain. (On average scientists that are not working on cutting edge topics in their field pretty much accept this stuff for granted and do not think about it a lot, but it is really important that someone does: Example: Why is infalsifiability a bad thing? (Popper — look it up). A difference is certainly that the philosopher does not conduct real experiments but "thought experiments", this means you have to be extra careful.

Just start with your own question i.e. what intrigues you. How do you define "skill"? What does it mean to have a skill? Is it a talent you are born with, an inclination enhanced by training, acquired? Is it knowledge? What does "good" mean? good for whom, in what respect? Why do you think some philosophy students struggle with science? (Why do some science students struggle with philosophy?) What is according to you "a typical mind of arts students"? What is it to be "a philosopher"?

Helene Dumitriu

Andree asked:

Is it possible to love your cat too much?

The cat can probably take an enormous amount of love. I recently met a woman who had adopted her sister's cat because the sister had been told by her doctor that for own good it would be better not to have a cat. She loved it to the point of obsession and it was ruining her life.

Rachel Browne

If you mean whether is it possible to love a cat very much, the answer should be, yes, of course. Another answer could be given in the form of a question: Why not?

Jean Nakos

Saab asked:

I am having problems finding arguments and enough information on the existence of a soul.

Hey, that's great! I've always had the same problem, myself. I certainly have never found any arguments supporting the existence of a soul, and that's not even addressing the question of what a soul is... just what is a soul, anyway? Lets see... we know from studies of brain traumas, lesions, etc., that we can eliminate memory by physical damage to the brain, so a soul can't have any memories, right? We know that we can eliminate intelligence, i.e., the ability to think and solve problems, with brain injury, right? So the soul can't have intelligence. We know that we can eliminate sensations the same way. And there are also emotional centers in the brain controlling pleasure, fear, anger... and so forth. So when the body dies, all these have to go away, since that's sort of the ultimate brain damage, isn't it. What else? How about consciousness? No... a simple blow to the head eliminates that, not to mention damage to the parietal lobes and/or reticular activating system. Whoops, what's left?

Well, let's have another go at it... suppose that there was a "soul" somewhere in another universe, broadcasting to our brain, like a radio station. Aside from the lack of any theories covering how that might occur, what would the effect of damage to the receiver, that is, the brain, be? Well, what if we damage a radio, what happens? The programs stay the same, right? They're just full of static, noise, whatever. But with brain damage, the programs do not stay the same. We can reduce intelligence with brain damage; it's not a matter of a damaged receiver trying to pick up the same program; the program is different when the brain changes, whether it's due to injury, drugs, or whatever. Well, so much for that theory. Perhaps you can think of another; I can't.

Steven Ravett Brown

James asked:

In philosophy we pose many questions that concern the existence of God. Why do we concern ourselves with such questions when it is clearly evident that they can never be answered?

Is it really the case that such questions can never be answered? Even if it was the case that such questions could not be answered to everyone's satisfaction, is it not an important question? Should we not attempt to answer important questions? Is this not why wepursue philosophy?

Perhaps the problem is that there are too many answers that are no longer convincing. What changes in these answers is theidea of God. As we gain greater knowledge of reality, and as our mental capacities improve, we should be able to arrive at a better answer.

Many of the answers that have been given about God have their origin in mythology. Aristotle proposed a rational answer, based on the contingency of reality, but then he could not connect his idea of God to that reality. The problem was that he did not have the categories of process available to use in his explanation. He did not understand the world as the result of a process that extended over billions of years.

We now know that the cosmos and time were initiated in the Big Bang. We can trace the process that led from the Big Bang to the present. What we see is the self-organization of matter that ultimately produces a life-friendly planet, Earth. Then life begins, with a DNA program that enables it to mutate to fill all available ecological niches. Homo sapiens evolves and begins to form cultures. Human cultures are processes of self-creation. People make cultures and cultures make people. Humans develop in their intellectual capacities, and begin to perceive the Platonic moral oughts, forming moral cultures. Humans develop in creativity and goodness, becoming more like some aspects of their concepts of God.

So there appears to be a quite complex process, that began with the Big Bang. It appears to be a process of ever increasing freedom, from the determinism of the laws of physics to the total freedom of humans in relation to the moral law, which commands but cannot compel, as Nicolai Hartmann noted. It is also a process of ever increasing complexity. The Big Bang did not just happen. It had to be caused. By whom and for what purpose? Consider the evidence. A self-existent entity, a God, could be the key to understanding what is going on.

Tony Kelly

Jean asked:

After Andy Lambert's answer to Jenny's question about fox hunting, I would like to ask the following:

Do human beings have the moral right to kill other living "non-human" beings only and merely for their pleasure and amusement?

Your question presupposes that there are "moral rights", you may want to think about that. Think about answering the questions: What is a "moral right"? What makes it so? Who decides what it is? Where would the authority come from? Who is bound by it? Why should people respect such rights? Only then you'd have a chance to tackle your question...

Helene Dumitriu

Zaxos asked:

What would be Nietzsche's philosophy like, if he was not raised in this abnormal environment all consisting of women in his house?

I didn't know this. Nietzsche might have recognised the Word of the Father if there had been a man in the house and have accepted the moral community as it is and the idea of moral principle. So without a dislike of the ethics of his day, he might not have become a philosopher at all.

Rachel Browne

Jayson asked:

Where and why do Eastern and Western schools of thought diverge?

Well I'm not sure what you mean by "schools of thought". Religion? Philosophy? Social thought? Politics? But let's take philosophy. Roughly speaking, in the West, the tradition, really from Socrates on (with some problems in the Middle Ages) has been to question pretty much everything. Socrates sacrificed his life to start that tradition, and it has more-or-less stuck. That is, the Western traditions of philosophy, leading to the scientific revolution, have fairly explicitly included the idea that one must not take any explanation, nor it's assumptions, for granted. Overthrowing schools of thought, replacing them with syntheses, with deeper analyses, or with simply radically different schools is, overtly at least, encouraged. One can claim that this is actually discouraged in the "academy", or that this is not done effectively, and so forth... but that is one of philosophy's basic tenets in the West, however successfully it is followed.

This, in the main, is not true in traditional Eastern thought. That latter is for the most part religiously motivated, in the following sense. While various schools of "philosophy" may elaborate greatly on some tradition, questioning the bases of that tradition is almost always forbidden. Thus one may work within a particular school of Buddhism, try to understand and elaborate on it, but to attempt to go to its roots with the idea of altering, improving, destroying, or in any way radically changing them is just not (traditionally) done. There is almost always a "dogma", a set of underlying assumptions, which practitioners of a particular school must follow, or they are cast out, apostate, and have to operate, if they can, as such. And that is why I put "philosophy" in quotes above. Since I follow the Western tradition, and indeed believe it is better, in that sense at least, I do not consider traditions which discourage that type of ultimate questioning as philosophy, but as dogmas, usually religious. Inasmuch as that is changing, and allowing that kind of questioning, as it is in many places, it is indeed philosophy. Now if you want the difference there between Eastern and Western thinking, I would be much harder put to characterize it, except to say that much of Eastern philosophy is heavily influenced by the religious roots it now questions. Thus, in Japan, for example, phenomenology is extremely popular, because of its natural fit with Zen practices and the Japanese meditative traditions. Inasmuch as it may question those traditions, it is philosophy. Inasmuch as it is adapted only to further those traditions, it is not, in my opinion, philosophy.

Steven Ravett Brown

Uninibile asked:

"The aim of education should be to maximize the welfare of individuals." Discuss.

You might start with the question "what is the welfare of an individual": In particular what is "welfare," what is "an individual", what is "welfare of an individual". Is that which is "welfare" for one individual maybe something bad for another individual? (Example: Some Christians believe it is a bad thing to teach evolution in school. Most people in the Western hemisphere think you'd deprive pupils if you did not tell them about evolution in school. Which attitude maximises the welfare of the children?)

Another avenue: Could there be cases where there is a difference between the welfare of the individual and that of the community/the state? — Another approach is to ask "what is education"? Can the aim of education really be the welfare of individuals? Many societies aimed education at producing "good citizens", "useful members of society", or teaching skills required in order that the individual could earn its living. Is that the same as welfare of the individual or not? — Another approach: Assume there is limited money and time for education: Which subjects should be taught to individuals? What if you had to decide between music and maths? Between sports and a foreign language and so on? What are the criteria you would use to make the decision? What choice should the individual have in the matter? Does the individual know what is good for it?

Helene Dumitriu

Denise asked:

What is a just distribution of resources, such as wealth, education, welfare and opportunities?

I don't think there is such a thing as a just distribution of resources. You can't have equal distribution because people aren't equal to begin with and they differ in capacities. We can't measure what extra help every individual might need. Surely you don't think that every individual in a community can be assessed for needs at particular intervals?

Some people don't care for wealth and opportunities, others do. It's the same with education. It is the general view that people ought to care about education, wealth and opportunities. But not everyone does. But what is it with "welfare"? If there were some kind of equality in the distribution of wealth and opportunities, why should need welfare?

You might want to compare John Rawls (Justice as Fairness) who believes in the possibility of distributive justice and Robert Nozick (Anarchy, State and Utopia) who upholds the rights of individuals against interference from the state.

Rachel Browne

David asked:

Does Kant's Critique of Judgment complete his "critical philosophy" as he claims it did?

Suppose you were in this situation: you have analyzed processes of thought to the extent that everything seems determined by rules, but you do not know how to relate those rules to truth; they are internal rules, rules of the mind. Yet you are faced with the undeniable fact that humans seem to be able to determine truth. Not only that, but humans seem to be able to find new truths. The world is unknowable, the mind works through knowable and deterministic rules, yet we find truths; indeed, we discover new truths about the world. Now what? All one can say, it seems, is that somehow, the occasional genius, because of some unanalyzable connection to reality, is able to grasp truth, and that grasping cannot be through those rules; indeed, if it is a new truth, it must alter some of them, at least some of the more superficial. Does that answer complete the Critical Philosophy? You tell me. Because that's Kant's answer in the Critique of Judgment.

Steven Ravett Brown

Aravis asked:

What would Descartes's opinion on cloning be?

Difficult question because obviously one can only speculate. I think actually that it would not present an explanatory problem for him (or mind-body dualism) at all. Descartes thought the body is only a kind of machine, so probably for him cloning would not be really different from, say, identical twins. The important thing would be to him that clones have different minds (souls). Maybe since Descartes was religious he might take issue with man creating life in a different way than God had intended. However he probably would reassure himself/us by saying that a) nothing is possible except God lets it happen, b) if God gives a soul to this being, this is in fact the important step in creation, the one step man cannot imitate.

Helene Dumitriu

Matthew asked:

Me and my mate came up with this idea that nothing is random and that the outcome of everything that happens is determined by some form of input. However many inputs are very small and there are many of them. Therefore it is not practically possible to predict the outcome of most of the things that happen around us. For example if you type =RAND() into Excel it will give you a random number. No, somewhere in the code for Excel there is a rule to how the computer calculated this number, therefore if you know this code and all the inputs that go into it you can predict the number that will come out at the end.

Is this idea published anywhere, if so where and by whom? Or am I talking a load rubbish?

You are not talking rubbish, but sense. You have arrived at Leibniz' "Principle of Sufficient Reason" that "nothing is without reason for its being, and for being as it is". Schopenhauer characterised the principle of sufficient reason as that which "authorises us everywhere to search for the why".

If everything has a reason, there is really no such thing as "random" or "chance", in the sense of "uncaused". Random or chance events areconcepts without reality, another way of saying that the cause or causesare not known.

Tony Kelly

Well, the idea that our fate is determined, that our life is determined by the stars, the local gods, the fates, the planets, etc. etc,is probably as old as humanity. Now if you're talking about "input", the question is, "towhat?" You mean, in the context of modern physics, can there be randomness? The answer to that seemed to be a resounding "yes". Remember Einstein's remark, "god does not play dice"? That's just what he was referring to, and to the results of quantum mechanics (QM), which indicated that there is indeed randomness at the heart of the physical world. (As far as computers go, it depends on how the random number table was arrived at. Some are calculated, in which case they are not strictly speaking random; some however are arrived at by charting the "output" of radioactive materials or thermal motion or what-have-you; as random as you can get.)

Now, getting back to randomness... the randomness which has been understood to underlie physicsis now not absolutely certain. The basics of QM, as it is now understood, are indeedin part random processes. However there have recently been some experiments, and theory, which seem to indicate that the experiments that supported randomness (i.e., the experiments supporting Bell's Theorem) hold only in particular conditions. If this is true, then some hypotheses employing what are termed "hidden variables" (which Einstein wanted, and which Bell's theorem said could not exist) may in many cases (indeed an infinite number of situations) be the case, and there are then processes "behind" or "beneath" the QM probability distributions. We do not as yet know whether this is true, but the possibility is now open.

So. In answer to your question. Up until 5-10 years ago, the answer would have been unambiguously that there are indeed random processes, and that they are fundamental to reality. Now, we know that we do not know this, and your question cannot be answered.

Steven Ravett Brown

Ajay asked:

Mark asked:

Why is God also called a rock?

In the Bible (Second Book of Samuel, 22.2,3) it is written: "And he (David) said, The LORD is my rock, and my fortress and my deliverer; The God, my rock; in his will I trust: he is my shield and the horn of my salvation, my high tower and my refuge, my saviour, thou savest me of violence."

In the above passage one observes that God is called a rock metaphorically. The believer considers him as a natural stronghold. A shelter solid like a rock.

Jean Nakos

Donald asked:

I am currently teaching myself philosophy, and I have a few questions I would like answered:

1) What is the difference between logic and clear thinking?
2) What is the difference between logic and clear-headed thought?
3) How can I develop philosophical thinking skills?
4) What books do you recommend for beginners like me (Metaphysics, Logic, Epistemology and Philosophical thinking?)
5) Also, what is the best way to unclutter my mind,so that I could get rid of the preconceptions, postconception to become a truly open-minded person?

I am 40 years of age and I just got interested in philosophy. (I'm a High School Graduate).

1 and 2: Clear-headed thought is the product of clear thinking. Thinking is a process of discovering answers to questions, while logic describes the process of proving your right to make a claim, based on a given set of premisses.

3: It is possible to teach yourself philosophy up to a point: the problem is that you have to be your own critic, and philosophy (as you will learn) is one of the most fallible of all human activities. The constant experience of a philosopher is discovering that one has been wrong — made a false assumption, or a false logical inference, or asked the wrong question etc.

A philosophy student needs to read and write. At some point, you will need to have your writings criticised by others.

Jenny asked:

Can you please help me to understand the subjective and objective views about fox hunting, whether it be for or against it?

Jenny, this is certainly a topical question!

Fox hunting is part of a wider question of human's treatment of animals, though it also seems to have some extra baggage; these relate to questions of tradition and the way of life of those in the countryside. Of course, whose lifestyle we are talking about is another matter; not everyone in the countryside has a tradition of foxhunting.

Taking the first question about human treatment of animals, we can link this to other similar questions that pop up on the TV or in the newspapers, issues like whether or not people wear leather or use rabbits for the testing of cosmetics.

We could start by talking about rights, since we hear a lot of talk about rights in the media, and it seems that people are prepared to go to extremes in the defence of certain rights, including so-called 'animal rights'. It's worth asking what is a right, where does it derive from, and do 'rights' apply only to humans or to animals as well?

What are rights based on?

This is an important question for those who make major decisions based on the 'right' of some group or people. Think how often you hear a group or individual lay claim to some right or other...the right to life, the right to choose, the right to clean water... The list is long.

One approach to this, but by no means the only one, comes from the tradition of philosophers like Immanuel Kant, and continued by John Rawls. This founds the idea of a right in the capacity of a person to reflect on and think about an issue, before making a choice. And on the basis of this rational capacity his or her choice is to be respected.

Well, if you accept this argument about rights for people based on their capacity to reflect on their situation and make a choice that is best for them, do you think it also applies to animals?

Do they also reflect and make choices in a similar manner? There are arguments that the higher primates show something like this kind of capacity.

Another way of looking at this question is to consider animals' and people's capacity to feel pain and to suffer. This is a separate tradition but one which has been hugely influential. It seems that in 'a nation of animal lovers', many people's attitude towards animals is based on their feelings of sympathy for them; that is, to treat them in such a way so as not to cause pain to them. Or, at least (for those who eat meat, for example), to treat them in a humane manner, presumably by giving them a comfortable life followed by a swift and painless death.

On this account, we can see why some people oppose fox hunting, since they allege it causes needless suffering.

Just from these two accounts of how people should regard animals, we can get two different accounts of how we should regard the fox. You could call these two views objective, because they identify main features of animals and people, rather than looking at individual cases. They suggest to us that reasoned debate, leading to a solution, is possible.

Now, just to focus a bit more on the particular problem of fox hunting....

Presumably drawing on some kind of argument that a fox itself doesn't have any great value (it's not like a person, etc), the pro-hunting lobby often present their case as one of freedom. That is, not so much a issue of the treatment of animals but one of having the freedom to do what one wants, as long as it doesn't interfere with other people.

Here, you could say that they are asking for the freedom to do what they want to do, just as many groups in society do. The issue becomes a political one, that of the issues of one group in society, rather than a question about cruelty to animals.

You also hear arguments based on tradition, that fox-hunting has a long history. But do you think that, just because you have done something in the past, you should be allowed to keep on doing it? It's easy to think of traditions that have died out and nobody wants to bring them back; having a monarch with absolute power would be one example. At the same time, some people would argue that we shouldn't be too quick to do away with our traditions, because of their educational value and formative role in our identity. After all, there's now a big market catering to those who want to define their 'Britishness'- just look at all the history programmes on TV!

There's also a practical argument made in favour of fox-hunting, that it kills 'vermin'. Unfortunately, I don't know much about this- I guess you'd have to ask a scientist to check whether this claim is true or not!

One last 'objective' approach to fox-hunting is to ask about the character, the personality, of someone who takes part in fox-hunting. If you think that the killing of foxes in this way is cruel, then does that make someone who enjoys the hunt cruel? If someone enjoys taking part in a practice that leads to the death of a fox, does that raise doubts about their attitude towards people? Are they more likely to be, simply, 'a mean person'?

To come back to your question about subjective views of fox-hunting....

Of course, you could say that none of the above abstract 'tools' for deciding whether fox hunting is reprehensible are as relevant to what you think and feel now. Despite the very eloquent development of the two opposing views outlined above, we don't seem to have solved the issue. No argument has been produced such that it wins over one side completely- we still don't have any consensus. Although we don't have agreement, we might soon have legislation prohibiting it. But that's another matter.

Andy Lambert

Sophia asked:

I have to make a digital movie for my philosophy class with a philosophical theme, and I have no idea what is or is not philosophical. So, if you could help me chose some themes?

I think there are two issues here; on one hand we can ask about the role movies play in dealing with philosophical themes and on the other hand we can ask about the role philosophy can play in shaping our view of the film medium.

Many movies have dealt with philosophical themes, such as freewill, the nature of consciousness, human beings place and role in the world. The best 'philosophical movie' is in my opinion 2001 A Space Odyssey. For a look at how philosophical concerns enter film narratives take a look at Mary Litch's Philosophy through Film and Christopher Falzon's Philosophy Goes to the Movies ( Routledge Press 2002). Of course at this narrative level film is part of a wider cultural milieu that also deals with philosophical themes, including literature, theater, poetry, and music.

What then is the distinguishing feature of film that sets it apart from other mediums? The obvious answer is that, more than merely telling a story, film deals with imagery. Or rather the image as such, the nature of the image, the fact that it can represent the real world, but also that it can and does play with that world, such that the image itself could become our reference point rather than what the image is of.

Film creates Image in a way that theater, or narratives do not, even in a way that photography does not. Why? Because in film we have a dynamic image which introduces considerations of time and space, Here Deleuze's Cinema 1: The Movement Image and Cinema 2: The Time Image are key references.

So the very fact that we make films, create these images, and what these images mean is itself a philosophical theme. If then I had to make a digital movie with a philosophical theme, I would make a movie about the philosophy of making movies about the nature and role of the image or perhaps the philosophical implications of digital technology

An excellent account of the role of digital imaging plays in destabilizing our access to the world and our assumptions about time, reality and appearances see Bernard Stiegler's essay "The Discrete Image" in Echographies of Television by Derrida and Stiegler 2002, Polity Press.

Stiegler compares digital images with 'analogue reproducibility'. That is, conventional photography and cinema. He claims that the former is immune from the so called 'objectivity of the lens', (it's the old saying 'the camera doesn't lie') and that it is able, in a way the latter is not able, to disrupt our trust in the past, our memories, our archives, our history. Such that the traditional link between the object and the image of that object is broken (in fact it's the essence of the digital camera to lie, what then becomes of the notion of the Truth when there is no longer the object of the Truth?). Stiegler concludes, with the suggestion that " Life is always already cinema". If that is calling out for Hollywood treatment I don't know what is.

Brian Tee

Cody asked:

Couldn't epistemological relativism simply be defined as a form of limited skepticism? What are the different aspects that separate the two?

This is a very good and original question. I'm going to assume that you are talking generally about "knowledge", and address post-modern criticisms of science. Those do indeed lead to a position best termed "epistemological relativism". Is it a form of skepticism? Yes, but in a funny kind of way. A true skeptic would deny even relativism, i.e., would deny that any position has justification. A relativist maintains that the justification of a position, moral or epistemological, has to do with current custom, beliefs, culture, or some such. And thus, in a sense, it seems to me that it is the mere possession of those beliefs that somehow justifies them. What that seems to me to amount to is a kind of emotional justification: if you feel good about something, believe it. I truly do not know that there is, ultimately, any deeper justification to relativist positions. There are, by definition, no intellectual justifications for beliefs to a relativist. If there were, they could not be relativists.

I do not agree with this position, but it is very difficult to argue against, in that the argument must be extremely wide-ranging. The best statement of this argument I know of is Philip Kitcher's in The Advancement of Science, and in order to do that he had to write a rather long and complex book, addressing various aspects of the skepticism underlying relativism, and many of the contemporary philosophers espousing relativism.

I would highly recommend you read Kuhn's book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, then Kitcher's. He was a student of Kuhn, and has found, I believe, the weaknesses in Kuhn's position.

Steven Ravett Brown

Stephen asked:

What is a human being? Are we no more than just clever animals?

Well, your first question is a big one, and I'm not going to try to answer it here. It is the second one that interests me. Why do you think that being a clever animal is such an insignificant thing that it can be dismissed with the phrase 'no more than just'? It seems to me that being an animal — even the simplest type — is an extraordinary thing in its own right. How is it that inanimate matter can evolve into a self-organizing, self-reproducing form? What an amazing achievement! And then, even more incredible, some of these animals then evolve into conscious, self-aware animals. While some important strides have been made in understanding all this, there is a lot more to find out. Finding out how we came to be a clever animal is quite enough of an exciting and invigorating quest for me.

Tim Sprod

Brent asked:

What is the difference between 'logical' and 'ontological' distinctness?

Rhoda asked:

I would just want to ask about enthusiasm...what it means and what are some reflections of philosophers about it?

This is actually a very interesting question to me. As far as reflections of philosophers on "enthusiasm" or "motivation", I do not really know of too many, except perhaps some of the Existentialists... I think you might get something out of Heidegger here, and probably you could relate the thesis of books like Nausea to this topic, i.e., boredom as the opposite of enthusiasm. Colin Wilson, actually, has written about the generation of enthusiasm or "intensity" in this regard.

But there is another aspect that is interesting, and that is the relationship between enthusiasm and motivation and learning. That is, given enough motivation, people can accomplish extraordinary things. But this degree of motivation is rare; why is that? In other words, why can we not just decide to be enthusiastic about something, the way we decide to walk in a certain direction? Of course, considered as an emotion, we have problems deciding to feel anything... one of the great and tragic human limitations. But I also would like to see motivation treated as "intelligence" is treated, i.e., as a characteristic that might very well be innate, and something that could be tested for, and that we could educate children to develop. We try to "motivate" children, but we do not try to educate children to motivate themselves. Why not? Because, mostly, we do not know how to motivate ourselves. So this should be studied, and as far as I know it has not been. You might also look at John Dewey on this topic.

Steven Ravett Brown

Becca asked:

Why ask why?

Funny question ! Why do YOU ask then? So one more why,"Why do you ask, 'why ask why?'?"

But think of situations : When do you ask why?

There are several typical situations. Some are concerning objects : Why do things fall down and never up?" Why are sun and moon spherical?" Why does the moon change his appearance regularly?" Today all three questions are simple to answer, but the first two have not been some 300 years back before Newton and the third is at least not trivial. But all these questions are simple" now in that they belong to the class of scientific explainable" questions. Many questions are of comparable nature but much more complicated if they require knowledge of atoms and subatomic particles or of fluids and solid bodies and genes and biological cells etc.. This whole class of simple" questions is on why does it work such and so?"

But if you ever lost a person or a pet very dear to you, then the question why?" has a totally different character. Or at least we don't know. Some people simply can't stand what they think is absurd". It at least comforts them to think that some God or some underlying meaningful" necessity like karma" or the stars" has caused the loss and not mere accident".

In both very different sets of examples by asking why" we want to know what is behind the appearances", we ask for ex-planation" like opening — making plane — a book or a wrapper.

But there is a second class of why-questions", comprising not causal explanations", not why is it as it is?" but but final explanations" — why should it be such and not otherwise?" And once more there are two subclasses of final explanations" — those of the artist and those of the ethicist. The artist has to decide what to do — what word in a poem, what note in a sonata, what colour in a painting, what movement in a dance to use at this moment etc.. The ethicist — or somebody deciding what to do here and now — has likewise to decide which of several possible ways to follow in doing the next step. In this art and ethics are closely related. There is a difference — but this is complicated and not to be explained in some sentences here. In this sense f.i. Kant's second and third critique — the Critique of Practical Reason" and The Critique of the Power of Judgement" are related. But they both are related to the first critique — The Critique of Pure Reason" — too, since to have a good judgement of what to do, you should have a good judgement of what is the case.

But then — as Hume showed — from what is the case there can be no way to what should be done. There is a gap then, a hiatus", the hiatus of freedom : At least in principle all the facts of the world neither can force nor hinder me to do what I want to do by free choice. This once more leads into a complicated set of questions concerning the free will, so I let it be for now.

But why ask a philosopher? Sit down and ask yourself what you are asking for if you ask (f.i.) : Should I go to the cinema or should I better prepare my exam — and why?" What is it that makes you decide for the one or the other option? The one philosopher would say its a value, and you are evaluating different possibilities". Another philosopher would say its a subconscious drive and you only try to rationalize and to come to terms with your conscience". There may be other explanations of why you decide such and not otherwise. Thus from a deterministic point of view a final why" could be reduced to a causal why" : Even your free decisions" are only consequences of hidden causes. This once more is a minefield and cause of much arguing.

This applies to a similar sort of hiatus — the hiatus of faith in the way Pascal and Kierkegaard saw it : There can be no proof that Jesus — if he ever was more than a myth — has been the son of God". Even if there were a detailed report of his behaviour and interviews and video-tapes, this would be no proof of more than his appearance and deeds. Then the question of why should I take him to be 'the son of God' and follow his steps?" could not be answered.

There is finally a third class of why"-questions — the metaphysical" ones : Why are we here?", Why does the world exist?" Those questions are meaningful and unavoidable, but one could doubt if they are fruitful. But then they were the origin of the idea of God or gods. Viewing all the temples and churches around the globe I think the metaphysical why" should be called a fruitful one. But some think it a misleading one. What do you think? Why?

Hubertus Fremerey

Stephen:

As a student of computer science, with an interest in philosophy, I have been wondering about the following question:

If philosophy can be regarded as the epitome of human higher reasoning capability, and yet philosophy is not reducible to mere logic — does this imply that computers, whose "brains" rely solely on logic-based processes, will never be able to think, or reason (or indeed, philosophize) as humans do?

Surely AI research would be pretty much a dead-end road if this were true, if the ultimate aim is to produce human-like intelligence (or beyond)?

I think that it is true, and that the project to make artificial intelligence through what is sometimes referred to as Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI) is a dead end. Read Bert Dreyfus' mid 70s book "Why Computers Can't Think" and his early 90s "Why Computers Still Can't Think" for an excellent exposition of why.

However, there are other ways to build computers, and it does not seem to me (or Dreyfus) that, in the final analysis, computers which use different means of processing, together with emotions and embodiment, will never be able to think. One further requirement, it seems to me, is that computers will need to have a 'childhood' — a developmental period when they learn to think, emote and act in a variety of specific situations surrounded by more able 'thinkers'.

Tim Sprod

Abel asked:

In comparing both Plato's and Aristotle's view on tyranny, Plato states that the bodyguards are chosen from slaves, whereas Aristotle feels that the bodyguards can be chosen from the citizens. Which argument is sound in comparing it to the tyrannical rule of Adolf Hitler and his appointment of the SA and the SS?

In my opinion the term "bodyguard", as used by Plato and Aristotle, today refers to the entirety of the security agencies and forces of a modern state.

I doubt that the case of Nazi Germany could tell us which argument is sound. The SA (Sturmabteilung = Assault Section) personnel were recruited from all classes of the German Society. Among them one could find noblemen such as Count Wolf Heinrich von Helldorf, commander SA of Berlin- Bradenburrg and chief of the Berlin Police, as well as members of the lower classes and convicts such as the SA Obergruppenfhrer (lieutenant general) Edmund Heines.

The recruitment of SS (Schutzstaffel = Defence Squad, created in 1925 within the SA, originally only as Hitler's bodyguard) was more complex.Their security and intelligence sensitive agencies and units were staffed with "pure Aryans", again from all strata of society. However the Waffen SS (SS Army) had also men from peoples who were considered as "inferior" and destined to be the slaves of the "Aryan" masters. There were Slavs, Indians, Turkic peoples etc. The 13th Waffen-Gebirgs Division Der SS "Handschar" was staffed with Bosnian Muslims. The 21st Waffen-Gebirgs Division Der SS "Skanderberg" with Albanians. There were also various ethnic "non-Aryan" brigades, regiments and battalions.

Jean Nakos

Vearnetta asked:

Who was the greatest Black Philosopher?
I have searched the web and have found "Moms Mabley."
Can you confirm for me if she is a philosopher?

Terry asked:

In reviewing your past questions and answers Miguel asked a question, "Can you prove that God exists or can't we prove it?" The answer stated that "it is harder to prove that God doesn't exist".

A later question from another person asked "I've been reading a lot about the theory of determinism and so far, no one has given me any good explanation on how it may not be true. Can you?" The answer was "Since you think this is true, what is your argument for it? After all, isn't it up to the determinist who is the one asserting determinism to argue for his view? After all, if you are the one who says determinism is true, isn't it up to you to argue for it?"

Those two questions where answered in contradicting ideals.

Isn't up to the person who believes in God to argue for it, just like it is up to the person who believes in determinism to argue for it?

I was the one who pointed out that it was the person who asserts (in this case, determinism) who has the burden of proof, not the person who does not believe determinism is true. And I certainly do agree with you that the same issue is true about the existence of God.

I want to add this, though. There is a big difference between not being able to prove God exists, and proving that God does not exist (which you appear to suggest are the same in your question) The person who says, "It is up to you, who is making the claim, to show that God exists (or that Determinism is true)" is, himself, making no claim, so he himself has nothing to prove. But, on the other hand, the person who says, "God does not exist" (or Determinism is not true)" is making a claim, and is under the obligation to support that claim. As is said, the absence of evidence is not at all the same as the evidence of absence.

Ken Stern