Emily asked:

I have been looking at the implications of various philosophical approaches for an understanding of the nature of education.

When thinking about an existential approach to education it seems to me that the emphasis must be on individual and personal understanding in learning, and education as a means to finding personal meaning and understanding. If this is the case, then I am finding it difficult to reconcile this idea with the possibility of the curriculum ever being prescribed in any way and not simply stemming from the individual interests of the learner. I guess my question therefore is what kinds of learning would follow from an existential perspective for education?

It seems to me that there are all sorts of problems lurking in the conclusions you are tempted to draw concerning the implications of "existential approach" for education. It is very difficult to know quite where to begin and quite how to understand your ideas about this.

In the first place, whether or not one takes an existentialist view of things, it is, in a sense, trivially true that education emphasises "individual and personal understanding in learning" because it is trivially individual persons that understand and/ or learn anything (or not, as the case may be). So I feel that you you must have something more significant in mind here, perhaps hinted at when you talk about education as a means to finding "personal meaning and understanding". But this is even more problematic. I have a feeling that meanings are generally fairly public sorts of things and I would have hoped that existentialism did not entail some sort of solipsistic conception of meaning/ understanding and if it does then I would take that as a prima facie case for rejecting existentialism in the first place even before considering whether it has anything useful to say about education.

The point is that I think you need to spell out in more detail what you take to be the significance of "personal" meaning and understanding. Why the epithet "personal"? What are you really setting it up in opposition to? "Public" meaning and understanding? If so, why? and what is wrong, from the allegedly existentialist point of view, with public meaning and understanding? or "interpersonal" meaning and understanding? or whatever else you have in mind?

But perhaps the nub of my concerns about what you say is that you seem to feel that the alleged existentialist notions of "finding personal meaning and understanding" (whatever this amounts to) are totally incompatible with a student's ever being challenged to confront and come to grips with something that does not happen to "stem from his individual interests". We need to explain a bit more fully why these are incompatible.

Presumably you take the student himself as the final arbiter of his own "personal interests"? So be it. That is, no doubt, a truism. And in that case "his individual interests" means "what he happens to find interesting at some particular time". Is he also the only judge of what "stems" from his personal interests? Even if that is the case it still needs to be considered whether the purpose of a state funded education system is to provide cash handouts to enable individuals to go seeking their "personal meanings and understandings".

The thought or possibility that I am asking you to consider here is a rather difficult one — but it amounts to this: Consider whether there might just be some things in life that are SO important that, for precisely that reason, they should not be set up as "objectives" of the education system at all! And I am beginning to think that your notion of "personal meaning and understanding" might be just such a thing!

Anyway, whether or not "personal meaning and understanding" is a sensible and meaningful objective for an education system to have, you still have at least two major problems:

(1) You have to argue more fully why it should be that ANY element (even partial) of prescription in a curriculum MUST inevitably preclude achieving "personal meaning and understanding" or MUST, at best, lead to learning and understanding that is somehow not "personal" or wrong or bad in some way ... and you will need to spell out exactly what that is, and why it is so.

[I suspect that lurking here are some partially digested existentialist notions of "authenticity" and "freedom". These will have to be spelt out properly. Also in this context it might be worth giving some consideration to the accusation that existentialism had managed to replace the hard notion of truth with the soft notion of authenticity.]

(2) Conversely you will need to explain why only engaging with what I personally find interesting, or deem to stem from what I personally find interesting, should lead to my finding ANY "personal meaning and understanding" at all let alone be the ONLY way to such an achievement.

My thought here is that, on the contrary, if this "finding personal meaning and understanding" is to be worth a fig then it needs to be built upon a person's ability to respond to whatever the world might throw at him. After all, if I am not mistaken, existentialists have had an awful lot to say about "facticity", human "thrown-ness" into a world one did not create, and "authentic engagement" with the world and others, and such like. The notion that I am only being authentic if I follow only my own "personal interests" (even if, and it is a very big if, these can be distinguished from navel-gazing, or other forms of self-indulgence) seems to me run counter to all these existentialist notions.

Sartre (and others) have had a lot to say about "viscosity" and "boredom" and such like (manifestations of the facticity of existence in the world) ... but I did not think that they conceived of simply pursuing one's "individual interests" as an "authentic" way of coming to terms with these and achieving "personal meaning and understanding"! — though I stand open to correction on this point — but if I am wrong then I think it behoves someone else to explain to me the difference between existentialism and hedonism.

So then, quite contrary to your interpretation, it might be the case that real authentic personal meaning and under- standing might ONLY be achieved or achievable via those encounters with the world and others where one HAS TO to face up to challenges precisely NOT of one's own making or choosing! And so an existentialist view of things might in fact demand that the education system present students with challenges over and above their own personal individual interests. That is to say, an existentialist philosophy might demand some measure at least, of prescription in the curriculum!

Now another approach I think it is important that you consider is this: try not to do all you thinking about your problem just at the level of vast and woolly generalisations about "individual interest", "personal meaning and understanding", etc. You can go round in circles for ever and ever doing that, redefining things, re-interpreting them this way and that to serve whatever purpose you want ... rather come down to earth & take a specific example of some minimal but real measure of prescription in some curriculum (and not just a "straw man" case!) and try to prove, if you can, in specific detail why it must, in itself and as such, inevitably fail to lead to ANY "individual learning" or finding of "personal meaning and understanding", — however you understand or define these. I think this might be rather difficult.

Robert de Villiers

Patricia asked:

How do I compile or write a philosophy?

What are the morals and ethics of humans interfering in natural evolution?

Oboy, you've really pressed one of my buttons here. Just what does "natural" mean? Anything non-human? Anything non-rational? Anything non-mechanical? Let's see... non-human. That would mean that absolutely anything a human being does, in any circumstance, is "unnatural". No, too extreme.

Ok... non-rational is "natural"? But then we'd have to say that some actions of the higher apes, at least, are "unnatural", since they can reason, to some extent. Also, it would mean that anything we do, think, say, etc., based at all on rational thought is "unnatural". That would pretty much eliminate everything we do, except when we're driven entirely by emotion, not really a very frequent occurrence, I'd say. Not that we're particularly rational, mind you... just that it does enter, a teeny bit, into virtually everything we do or think.

Mechanical? Well, then we'd have to eliminate lots of tool-using animals; not just apes, but creatures like ants, wasps, birds, etc., etc.

Now what? Well, how about this... when humans do something which alters an ecosystem, they're being unnatural. Well, I'm afraid that won't work either... there are innumerable examples of animals doing the same, from deer eating themselves into starvation, to predators exhausting the supply of prey and dying, to huge populations of buffalo turning prairies into dustbowls... and so forth.

Building cities? What about termite mounds, columns of driver ants (and their colonies), prairie dog colonies stretching for literally hundreds of miles (yes, before humans).

Ok... polluting the planet...? Sorry, but we breathe the oxygen which was originally generated by anaerobic bacteria, several hundred million years ago (or maybe as long as a billion, I can't remember), which turned the methane atmosphere of this planet into something like what we breathe today. Highly unnatural, those little critters.

Human beings cannot do anything unnatural. We are creatures evolved on this planet, like all the others. What we do is part of what has arisen from causes responsible for everything else. We can destroy the planet, just as any animal can destroy its environs, and as many have, or we can live in "harmony", i.e., in some kind of equilibrium with it, like some lucky animals... if we manage to figure out how before it's too late.

Now. Evolution. Tell me, just what does "evolution" mean? Roughly, adaptation because of random genetic changes making our phenotypes (the result of genetic read-out) more able to reproduce, for whatever reason. So let's see... Parasites living inside creatures are unnatural, since their hosts have "interfered" by providing an "unnatural" environment? Ants which keep aphids for the sugar they secrete are unnatural, then, because the ants have interfered with the aphids "natural" evolution?

Dogs? Do you have a pet dog or cat, or goldfish? Do I need to elaborate? What about bread... you like to eat bread, right? How do you think the wheat got so tasty, hardy, fast-growing, etc... yes, by selective breeding. Rice? Corn? Should I go on? We've "interfered" in the genetics, the "natural" evolution, of all those and many, many more. Did we consider the ecological effects, when we domesticated the horse? When we irrigate land to raise rice to eat, and destroy huge habitats, forcing adaptation of all sorts of creatures, including ourselves? Yes, of course we should consider the effects of breeding different plants, animals, etc... and we should have been for the last few hundred thousand years. But we haven't, have we. But then, neither did the ants when they domesticated the aphid.

So now everyone is talking about "genetic engineering". We now have yet another technique for doing what we've been doing all along. And it will let us do it more efficiently, and perhaps make more profound changes. Yes, indeed. We are entering the century of biological engineering, like it or not. I for one think it's wonderful... it can give us more control over our lives and our environment, it can feed the hungry, it can help make work easier. And we will learn things. Or it can destroy us... just as our overpopulation, our weapons, our diseases, can, just as... hey, you name it.

Whatever the ethics of "interfering" in evolution are, it's certainly not something we've just begun to do. I for one would prefer the comfort of a warm house in the winter rather than being huddled in a cave... but that implies massive interference in the environment in which I'm living, even if all I'm doing is living in a log cabin burning wood I've cut (not to mention that to have as little as an axe with a metal blade implies all sorts of technology... mining, smelting, etc., etc.). And that interference implies adaptation in that environment on the part of plants, animals... and other people.

No, I'm afraid that there is no boundary between any actions we take, especially now, and actions which "interfere". So the morality of interfering is just exactly the same as the morality of any actions at all.

Steven Ravett Brown

Mark asked:

This is about Thomas Nagel's essay "Moral Luck" (in his book Mortal Questions).

I am trying to find what are Nagel's reservations on Kant's statement that "the only thing that can called good without qualification is the good will."

Nagel objects to Kant's claim that the only thing of value is a good will. He objects on the basis that however good one's will may be, it is always subject to luck or circumstances. While you may have a good will with regard to a situation, it may be that circumstances make it the case that your action is not judged by others as morally "good". If you accidentally kill someone, the fact that you had a good will isn't going to absolve you from moral blame or the judgement that your action was bad. In raising the objection of "moral luck" Nagel's claim is that we judge people on what they do and if, as bad luck or circumstance would have it, you do wrong through no fault of your own, and with no bad intentions, the condition of your will doesn't the moral value of your action.

I don't think is a strong objection. Kant was talking about intrinsic value and Nagel is talking about moral judgements. What is of value in itself, regardless of what happens in the world, of luck or circumstances or whether there is blame for external action, is for Kant a good intention.

It is, for Nagel, a matter of luck what kind of person you are. If you happen to be especially sympathetic and kind natured, it is expected that you will be judged as more moral than a cold person, but even the latter can do his Kantian duty. I imagine that Kant would answer the former by saying this is not a matter of ethics but psychological relations. In the ethical moment it is necessary that the will act purely for the other. In the latter case, the cold person may well perform his duty, and here Nagel raises one of the main objections to Kantian ethics. But I wonder how the person Nagel describes as "greedy, envious, cowardly, cold, ungenerous etc" could really even momentarily possess what we understand to be the "good will". My own understanding of the good will is that it is a real but pure state, unadulterated by sentiment, but not emptily performing in accordance with duty.

Rachel Browne

VoF asked:

How do we determine what we believe to be true?

If we aren't able to coin a definite definition for what is truth then how is one to answer such a question as it would be based on mere speculation.

I hope you will pardon me for not regurgitating 5000 years worth of speculation on "what is truth?" and how one might frame its definition so as to have an unassailable position on it. Instead, what I want to suggest to you as a precept is this: It is part of the bargain engaged in by life forms — and I mean all life forms from bacteria upwards — that the rules of existence may be rewritten. In the material realm, truth is an easy concept: yeah or nay; there or not there etc. It is the clear-cut answer to an unambiguous question. It is only natural, I suppose, that we humans would wish for this kind of security, but it is purchased at a price — ultimately nothing less than giving up life for it. So the bargain of which I spoke is this: that we enjoy the flexibility, plasticity, adaptivity of multi-choice answers to all the question posed by the universe; and that we ask our questions in the same spirit. And this way we retain options for development, for evolution, for growth — in short, for all the wonderful things that make forms of life different from forms of nonlife; but this inevitably means that the concept of truth must change as we ascend the spiral towards greater spiritual and intellectual awareness. More knowledge means a greater range of truths; and if we continue to explore the realms of being in the same manner as we have done in the past, we will discover not just new facts, new sciences, but new truths as well.

In short, the whole notion of just one truth reflects (with apologies to many a great thinker) a view of life that is a bit simplistic. And I don't think this is either a limitation or an invitation for anyone to aver that 'therefore' we cannot distinguish truth from falsehood. We humans are complex beings; we can accommodate the idea of many truths, because in the end there is a term or concept which (as it were) does embrace them all, although obviously I would class it as a group concept: so let's call it Truthfulness. If you accept this, then you can see how it also has a single opposite, namely Falsehood. I won't go into this, but if you think a little about this opposition, you will then find that an answer of the kind you asked is implicit here: for although there are many truth and many ways of being truthful, there is only one way of being false.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Well, most of the time we don't determine anything by means of procedures that can be spelt out unless we are involved in science and experiment. In perceptual case, we check again. Sometimes we ask others.

The logical positivists, early in the century, thought that we could hold that something is true if we can verify it. This means that statements of value, those of ethics, aesthetics and many other evaluations cannot be true. On this view, only facts can be true. But facts change. A fact for the philosopher Hume was an impression, whereas a modern day fact might hold at the unobservable quantum level, and beyond that there may be phenomena that we cannot verify at all.

Some people, in particular, these days, Bernard Williams, believe that there is an absolute conception truth, aimed at by physicists, which is free from perspective and a relative truth which is relative to the capacities of a being and the latter is the most we can achieve. But this doesn't really capture what we mean by "true" when this is limited by our incapacity to know the absolute. For sure, the meaning of truth is not "mere speculation". It is only because that we "know" what it means that we can talk about it and use the concept to distinguish between absolute and relative truth. The concept might not be definite, but (the Wittgensteinian view) is that to know what a concept means is to be able to use it. Philosophers have tried to define it in terms of assertibility conditions, verification, correspondence to states of affairs, or conceptual coherence, but nothing has been particularly conclusive. Lack of determinacy is a problem with a lot of our concepts and I think it is too much to expect.

And it seems that truth might have different senses. When we talk of sentences being true we are looking at semantic truth and tend towards a theory of correspondence to facts because of the connection of sentences to logic through grammar, but the value problem arises, and a problem our beliefs about fictional sentences. When we look at scientific truth, we may be more concerned with coherence of a theory within our conceptual scheme.

We seek to justify beliefs in terms of reasons for holding them rather than their truth. But truth is that towards which we aim.

Rachel Browne

Relativists determine something to be true by reducing it to basic statements. Such a truth exists only in a specific system of thought.

Absolutists BELIEVE truth to be absolute. They attach the value TRUE to basic statements and further use the same logic methods as relativists. In their eyes there exists only one system. That comes close to your "definite definition". It is a point of view found in many religions. They all have their own commandments (basic statements), and in some cases followers are ready to die for it.

There is no big difference between relativists and absolutists, only the first ones realize that they DEFINED some things to be TRUE, and consequently that there are as many truths as definitions.

Henk Tuten

Neil asked:

In an article in a recent issue of Time magazine, Dr Sanjay Gupta discussed what would be the outcome "If Everyone Were on Prozac", in which he noted that some people/ psychiatrists "fear that a nation on Prozac would miss the inherent value of struggle and strife".

Do we have any logical grounds for believing that such a positive value is indeed inherent in struggle and strife? Would an idyllic Eden be an inappropriate goal to seek?

An interesting question: does pure pleasure have inherent value? Here are a couple of scenarios to consider: 1) We develop the ability to put an electrode into one's pleasure center (we can do this), and indefinitely support them (we're close) with IV drip, etc., while they do nothing, think nothing, and feel nothing but intense pleasure; 2) we turn the planet into a garden, with more than enough food growing everywhere, and no need to do anything to satisfy basic needs beyond picking it off the nearest bush... and the food is loaded with tranquilizers and euphoric drugs (well, possible in some future). Ok? You like these? Do you think one or the other of these is what humanity should aim for? If you leave the ability to think, you're going to have striving, at least by some... so you've got to turn it off, one way or another. But hey, why think, if you've got food, shelter, sex, and (minimal, since we don't think) entertainment? Bread and circuses, like the Romans, right?

You could ask what the difference is between humanity like that and no humanity at all, just blades of grass... I don't see one. I'm not going to present an ethical system with some other basis, although I easily could. You think of one. I could say that in order to make the scenarios above, or something like them, work, you'd have to change the basic nature of humanity... and then the question becomes: to what do you think it should be changed, and why?

But to give you two direct answers: yes, and yes. Here's one simple reason: we can't predict the future. If we have a world of contented cattle, they'll need keepers, right? Because something is bound to happen to the system, eventually. Well, who will be the keepers? Robots? Could you trust them a) to do a good job, in the long run... be flexible enough to cope with the unexpected, to not rust away, etc., and b) to not just abandon humanity?

Steven Ravett Brown

Prathamesh asked:

In the current changing scenario,what should be our approach to, and philosophy of education?

Masaryk, one time president of inter-war Chekoslovakia, once argued that the ills of the age could largely be attributed to the prevalence of what he called "semi-education" amongst those in positions of influence in public life (from the lowliest teachers to political leaders).

By "semi-education" he meant the the sort of education that furnished people with a facile ability to criticise the foundations of everything without providing any deeper ability or understanding with which to defend the foundations of anything.

Would you not agree that some commitment to redressing this imbalance should be expected of a philosophy of education in the current climate, in the "current changing scenario", as you put it?

Robert de Villiers

Colin asked:

What if anything is the difference between fact and opinion?

In one meaning of the word "fact" a fact is something that can be shown to be true by accepted methods. For instance, it is a fact that Mars is the fourth planet.

An opinion (or belief) is something that cannot be shown to be true by those who hold the opinion, by any accepted method, although it may be true, and it may become a fact when and if accepted methods are determined. For instance, it is an opinion, held by many people including some astronomers, that there is extraterrestrial life.

A "matter of opinion" is different. Something is a matter of opinion when it is not something that can be shown true or false, but is "subjective". For instance, whether vanilla ice cream tastes better than strawberry ice-cream is a matter of opinion that no one should quarrel about. Matters of opinion are not true or false, or something we very much care whether they are true or false. "Matter of opinion" is pretty much the same as "matter of taste".

"My opinion" or "only my opinion" (with emphasis on the "my") usually means a view or belief I happen to hold, but do not expect others to share. For instance, "I think that eating stewed prune ice-cream is disgusting, but that's only my opinion".

Ken Stern

A 'fact' is something that has actually happened or an action actually performed (the latter of course is just a special case of the former). For you to say, "the sky is blue and that's a fact" is therefore not strictly speaking a proper way of expressing it, although one would have to be an extreme pedant to ignore what's become pretty common language usage. At any rate, a fact (providing it is adequately testified) is once and for all time. Thus we accept that Julius Caesar was assassinated on the Ides of March, even though no one can prove it. The testimony, however, is reliable. An opinion, on the contrary, is a belief you hold, and there may be times when this is in contradiction to facts. So there is this difference to begin with. Further, many people change their opinion often; and accordingly opinions can fluctuate all the way from virtual certainty (expert opinion) to a mere whim. In philosophy you will often find the syllable "dox" (as in paradox, orthodox) attached to a word to denote that the matter in question is an opinion. Plato distinguished between "doxa" and "episteme", that is, between opinion and knowledge; but then Plato had a pretty rarefied notion of knowledge which in today's world might be difficult to insist on — I mean: there is a solid body of philosophical opinion that all knowledge is just opinion ...

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Sebastian asked:

I am working on an independent study on Heidegger and language. I have some really good books to work with but I am a little stuck on the paper. So far what I have is exegesis and I have little in the way of objections and replies. Can anyone recommend to me how to get started on this? The only objections I can find are in the way of "he is difficult to read" which isn't very helpful and a little ignorant as well. I am just grasping his thought, so it is difficult for me to come up with my own critical analysis of his work.

This isn't a question I'd normally answer, because I'm not really a Heidegger fan. But I just thought I'd throw something out, since no one else has... you can read Gelven, M. A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989, if you want a readable commentary... but it's written by a Heidegger enthusiast, to put it mildly... For a more critical and somewhat odder approach, try Tugendhat, E. Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination. Translated by P. Stern. Edited by T. McCarthy, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1986. The latter I think is more linguistically oriented. Now if you really want to get into Heidegger's linguistic issues, of course the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Being and Time has zillions (a technical philosophical term... haha) of comments on his use of German (and Greek, and...).

Steven Ravett Brown

Joesaliba asked:

How did the main events of Hellenistic thought that preceded and prepared the advent of Christ, mark the new testament?

Who could affirm that the events of the Hellenistic thought prepared the advent of Christ? This is only a hypothesis which implies the refusal of the existence of the historical Jesus. Well, nowadays nearly all historians accept that Jesus existed.

Some Hellenistic elements can be found in the New Testament, particularly in the Johannine writings. The Logos (which in ancient and modern Greek means "word" as well as "reason") is described as God from eternity who became incarnate in Jesus Christ. For trinitarian Christians (all Roman Catholics, all Eastern Orthodox and many Anglicans and Protestants) He is one of the hypostases of the Holy Trinity.

It seems that St John has been partly influenced by the same sources as Philo of Alexandria (c 20 B.C — c A.D 50), the great Hellenistic Jewish thinker. Yet it is to be noted that St John's identification of the Logos with the Messiah was quite new.

Jean Nakos

Tina asked:

What was Marcus Tullius Cicero's core philosophy? Because I don't really consider him to be anything but a political figure, not a philosopher

There is an unfortunate tendency (at least I think it's unfortunate) to elevate any prominent person with opinions to the status of philosopher. I heard a football coach being interviewed the other day; he too had a 'philosophy', and then there was a marketing expert touting his 'philosophy' about salesmanship, and so on. What this so-called philosophy boils down to is 'method'. The coach had a method of coaxing competitiveness out of players, the sales guy a method of psychology centred on ingratiation. In both cases, the use of the word 'philosophy' reflects, bluntly spoken, crass ignorance of the nature of philosophy, and it is used by people of this ilk for no other purpose than to convey some air of being smarter than people without a 'philosophy'. But there are plenty of respectable examples of misuse, too. Albert Einstein (a scientist), Leo Tolstoi (a novelist), Mao Tse Tung (a politician), Albert Schweitzer (a musician and humanist) can be found on philosophy shelves in bookshops and libraries with morsels of their 'wisdom', well why not Seinfeld? Indeed, why not that great classic Cicero?

You are right. Cicero was a lawyer, a politician and a great stylist of Latin prose. He also dabbled in philosophy. But to be frank, don't bother looking for a 'core philosophy'. No-one who's sincere about philosophy could possibly maintain that Cicero has any claim to this title of honour.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Faris asked:

Is a democracy based on reason possible? For Socrates, it seems that a single person will always know what is best, and yet his idea of reason seems to extend beyond knowledge to encompass the freedom of questioning. How might this allow for the justification of democracy?

I don't know about reason... human beings are neither sane nor rational. But there's a bit of hope; take a look at this study. Here's a quote:

"When red deer stand up and honeybees dance, they are not simply stretching their legs or indicating where the nectar is, according to a new study. As bizarre as it may seem, they are voting on whether to move to greener pastures or richer flowers.

"The process is unconscious, the researchers say. No deer counts votes or checks ballots; bees do not know the difference between a dimple and a chad. But no one deer or bee or buffalo decides when the group moves. If democracy means that actions are taken based not on a ruler's preference, but the preferences of a majority, then animals have democracy."

Paula asked:

Please can somebody send me all they know about Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations)?

Whew! A tall order. Do I detect a note of urgency?. Have you read either of the books, or bits of them, and do you have any specific questions about what you have read?

Liz asked:

Why should freedom not be sacrificed for happiness?

Why is it that children in our schools are not permitted to read the Bible and men in our prisons can?

Because our country (I'm referring here to the US, but the same arguments hold in Britain) is not a theocracy; there is separation of church and state (or so the Constitution says).

Because children are, by definition, not responsible adults and so cannot separate fact from superstition.

Because schools are not prisons.

Because if they were "permitted to read" (which actually means: "taught to believe", doesn't it?) one bible, why not all? The Christian bible, which I assume you are referring to, is only one of many. Why should we prefer that one?

Because, since this is primarily a Christian country, children would not merely "read" the Christian bible, they would be (and are) subjected to pressure to believe it. Why should they be Christians and not Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Taoists, Buddhists... etc., all religions with millions of followers just as zealous and certain of the correctness of their faiths as Christians? Not to mention the hundreds of faiths with less than, say, hundreds of millions of followers... in Utah, for example, they would be (and are) pressured to be Mormons, and to "read" (i.e., to believe) the Book of Mormon, their bible. Should they be "permitted" to do so in state-sponsored schools?

If you want your child to be schooled in one of the multitudes of faiths presently existing, send that child to the appropriate religious school; there are thousands of them. There they will learn that the particular set of beliefs taught in that school is the only correct one, and that all the rest of humanity, from the dawn of time to the present, is and has been utterly wrong and misguided in their beliefs, and is most likely burning in some version of hell. Am I exaggerating, even the smallest bit? No, I don't think so. Just tune in to any religious broadcast, any faith, and check it out.

Steven Ravett Brown

But they are so permitted. But not in our schools (or at any rate) not as truths.

Ken Stern

Claire asked:

Do I have free will? A Christian would say yes but if God is omniscient then how can we have free will when the idea of predestination exists? Are there any other arguments for or against the validity of such a question?

According to the apophatic theology, God is not omniscient nor non-omniscient. God is beyond omniscience which is merely a human concept. God is beyond concepts.

Predestination is also a mere concept.

It seems to me that the God of your hypothesis, as formulated in your question, is a rather anthropomorphic God.

Jean Nakos

David asked:

The way I understand Kant's transcendental foundations to epistemology is that he divided up existence into different 'worlds' — the phenomenal world, the world-in-itself, and the world or structure of language. Are there any other philosophers since Kant and completely independent of him who have started from scratch like this but divided things up in a truly different way?

If not, who are the philosophers that have taken this same starting point but proposed different relationships between these worlds?

I'm a bit puzzled by the way you've phrased your question. If you really understood that Kant "divided" the world, then you've misunderstood (consolation prize: you're not alone). There is only one world, but this one world is not accessible to us in its totality. The phenomenal world is the same world as the one which contains the Ding-an-sich (Thing-in-itself), but the latter is not knowable to us for various reasons, e.g. we lack the sensory (including scientific) apparatus to detect it. To put this issue into a nutshell, you could say that the divisions in Kant's "worlds" are aspects, and one relatively straightforward way of understanding this is by an everyday example such as what you can see of a boat. First, the side not facing you, second that portion of it on the inside and third, the portion submerged in the water — these are all aspects which you can inspect one at a time, but never all at once. Kant's idea is that the world, both the material and the noumenal, has aspects that elude our apprehension altogether. The only aspect to which we have direct access is the phenomenal. — The philosophers in the second part of your question are Descartes (Discourse on Method) and Popper (The Self and its Brain, cowritten with John Eccles).

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Angie asked:

I'm looking for information on where (specific people) Darwin developed his theory. I have discovered Malthus, and Darwin's father, but I'm sure there must be more?

Read this:

In The Power of Place, the second volume of Janet Browne's biography of Charles Darwin, A.S. Byatt discovers the role of the postal service in the formulation of evolutionary theory (Charles Darwin: The Power of Place by Janet Browne 656pp, Cape, 25)

Steven Ravett Brown

Davy asked:

Is it unethical to try change a persons morals?

Are all ethical theories relative, i.e. Kantian, Utilitarian etc. or is there only one true moral theory?

If you really object to someone's morals isn't it unethical NOT to try to change them? ... within the limits, no doubt, of certain civilised constraints, good manners, etc., or whatever is appropriate to the nature of the particular issues at stake and your relationship with the other person? Conversely, if you believe, or come to the conclusion, that it is never ethical to try to change anyone else's morals, then wherein, would you say, does the point of your own morals consist (whatever they may be)?

Rather than just trying to answer these questions at the level of abstract generalities and principles, can you think of a range of specific cases of your own, think your way through them... and see what conclusions you come to?

Robert de Villiers

How far should we be prepared to go in trying to 'change' the moral views of someone whose views differ from our own?

You will probably agree that murder is going too far, but anti-abortionists and animal rights protestors have in the past resorted to terrorism. At the end of the day, what matters is not that the other person has the objectionable moral views but rather the fact that they are prepared to act on those views. So if you can't win the argument, then consistency with your own firmly held moral beliefs demands that you take the next logical step and resort to violence.

Or?...

Geoffrey Klempner

Juan asked:

Are you there?

Although the principle of Ockham's razor (that the simpler answer is often better than a complicated one, provided it is not oversimplified) has been highly influential in the field of science, why has this approach not been so highly regarded in philosophy itself?

It is quite highly regarded. You can find references to it in every field of philosophy. However, it is, basically, just another assertion which must be backed up with argument in any particular case. To put it another way, although the sciences may employ it, they do not do so, as a rule, explicitly. That is, a physicist, faced with two explanations, will not choose the "simplest" one (assuming the physicist even has some clear criteria for making that judgment) merely for that reason. It must have data, etc., backing it up; and being supported more clearly by the data weighs much more heavily than simplicity. Now, once you've got two or more rivals for an explanation, all of which seem to do an equally good job, then you can fall back on Occam's Razor to make a tentative choice between them. But all the romanticism of "beauty", "simplicity", and so forth that everyone holds forth on so eloquently is very post hoc... if you look at the literature, you'll find that cutting-edge work in virtually any field is messy, difficult, and complex... and data-driven.

Steven Ravett Brown

The question is not what philosophers think of the use of Occam's razor in the empirical sciences, but rather its application to philosophical theories. Here is an extreme view:

If a sign is useless, it is meaningless. That is the point of Occam's maxim (L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 3.327).

Occam's maxim is, of course, not an arbitrary rule, nor one that is justified by its success in practice: its point is that unnecessary units in a sign-language mean nothing (ibid. 5.47321).

Taking Wittgenstein at his word, it is inconceivable that there could be two alternative philosophical theories, one of which was preferred to the other on the grounds of positing the fewest entities, or making the fewest assumptions. If we are faced with such a decision, all that can mean is that we haven't thought things through thoroughly enough. If we did, we would realize that one of the two alternatives must be meaningless.

My view? I think I can see why Wittgenstein says this. But I can't agree with it. There are many occasions when a philosophers sense of judgement is called for. Perhaps because 'thinking things through' to the bitter end is an impossible ideal. In practice, the philosopher makes the decision to go with one theory rather than an alternative theory on similar grounds to those which the scientist appeals to.

I am not saying (as some philosophers would like to say) that this shows that philosophy is just another species of theory making, alongside chemistry, physics etc.

Geoffrey Klempner

Eliza asked:

Could you please tell me a few things about "Zukunftsphilologie" of Wilamowitz, how and why he attacks Nietzsche's first philosophic work?

Wilamowitz was a German philologist of roughly the same era as Nietzsche. In the 19th century, Germans dominated this subject, especially classical philology, and Wilamowitz was one of its brightest stars. However, Nietzsche was trained in the same profession and had in fact begun teaching at Basel University a few years prior to the contretemps with Wilamowitz. It could be argued that if Nietzsche had not become a philosopher, he would probably have achieved equally great reknown as a philologist.

Yet in 1872, as a result of his friendship with the composer Richard Wagner, he wrote The Birth of Tragedy, which contained the first public exposition of his idea of the Apollonian and Dionysian elements in man. The philological and philosophical arguments he advanced in this book were a bit of hot potato in his day, because it was widely perceived that he had written an apologia for Wagner's "Zukunftsmusik", i.e. the music of the future, which in turn was the title of one of Wagner's own, very provocative pamphlets on the state of music in the Germany of his time. In one sentence, Wagner condemned all opera as mere amusement and claimed that his work would restitute the old Greek practice of "sacred" entertainment (Aeschylus). Hence the allusion in Wilamowitz' critique: all his readers would have understood even without reading the rest that the article about Nietzsche would be dealing with a highly questionable aesthetic (Wagner's) and condemning the pollution of philology by Nietzsche in becoming a slave of Wagnerian propaganda.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Randy asked:

Is truth in us or in others?

I'm supposed to write a philosophy of fitness, but I don't really know what to write about and I'm not sure about what I think of fitness so that's why I hope you can help!

Try starting with the phrase: "mens sana in corpore sano"; "a sound mind in a sound body". Take a look at the origins of the Olympics.

Steven Ravett Brown

Edwin asked:

What books can I read to learn how to analyze someone by asking a few questions or even looking at their bedroom?

Do you not think that your own single question perhaps reveals more about you than you will ever learn to see in someone else by consulting books on how to analyse someone by a few questions, etc.?

I am not saying that what you seem to after cannot be done but the book I would most strongly recommend is called "The Book of Life" — really jolly excellent — I can't off-hand remember the author or ISBN No. — if you are interested do drop me a line and I will try to dig up some of the details.

Robert de Villiers

Thankfully this is more to do with psychological interpretations of behaviour rather than philosophy. You need to find a psychology book about personality types and then go from there, right into the bedroom with your guidebook. But most psychology is generalisation and you will need to be personally attuned to minute details and possible contradictions. Good luck, and let me know what you find out about very untidy bedrooms.

Rachel Browne

David asked:

What is righteous anger and where does the term originate from?

The vast majority of people are right handed. Accordingly language, which (according to the great philosopher of language, Wilhelm von Humboldt) is a "sediment of experience", mirrors in numerous guises the "rightness" of rightness: rectilinear, rectify, director, upright, shipwright, legal rights, dexterity and so on. In German "Richter" (righter) means "judge". "Dexter" is occasionally used as a name. But when you fear the devil behind you, you look over your left shoulder.

So "righteous" anger (or anything else in that context) reflect a desire or need or determination to straighten the crooked, fix the foul, upbraid the false.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Elisa asked:

I am doing a project in philosophy, and I'm kinda stuck. My question is: Is humanity destroying itself? my thesis is: "If humanity continues on its path to 'un-ethical' activities, the order of the world will collapse upon itself in dismay."

Here's an idea for you... instead of attempting to decide what is "ethical" and what is not, and where "unethical activities", whatever those are, will lead... a project which is basically impossible; why don't you read some Malthus? He wrote some very prophetic stuff around the turn of the last century about population explosions.

Steven Ravett Brown

Felisha asked:

I'm looking for information on what constitutes morality and what role it plays or should play in sexual relations.

Contrary to the common belief 'the morality' does not exist. When the word is used without mentioning the rules on which it is based, then it has little meaning. But often in that case Christian morality is meant (to make things easy think of the 10 commandments).

The term "morality" is mostly used in two ways:

1. descriptively to refer to a code of conduct put forward by a society or,<
2. some other group, such as a religion, or
3. accepted by an individual for her own behaviour or
4. normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational persons.

Method 1 likely leads to some form of relativism.

Method 2 results in different kinds of moral theories (rational persons act differently).

I suppose you use the second definition. Though rational persons can act in many ways, there are similarities. And to make things easy often their chosen partner shares their view on life.

So I think of general notions like:

honesty
mutual respect
self-humour (i.e. being humble)
openness
respecting freedom

You mention sexual relations. These you have in two kinds: 1. the ones for recreation, 2. the ones for a long time relation and possibly having children. You know best what you search for in the first group of partners. But probably you mean the second. Often attraction plays some role. Don't deny it, it is one of the ways that developed in evolution for finding a mating partner.

So find your way of weighing attraction and the notions that you find important and using that mix you'll find a suitable partner.

Henk Tuten

Joana asked:

I do not have any specific philosophical question, but I'd ask for your help — you see, I am very interested in philosophy, but I have never ever studied it before since I'm 9th grade. Our teacher told us about a philosophy competition and I want to participate. In order to do that, I need to write an interesting and original essay...Would you mind giving me some good topics for this? It may be connected to music in some way or to basic problems like: What's real and unreal? Is there absolute truth?, etc.

Well, first, I hope that this competition is for 9th graders, or children around your age. Because if it isn't then you simply don't have the background, any more than you would in advanced physics or math, to write something "interesting and original". But assuming that it's for people your age, try this. Read Sophie's World, by Jostein Gaarder, and see what ideas you come up with. Or read through Alice in Wonderland, and think about issues from that. Or if you want music, read about Hildegard von Bingen and listen to some of her stuff.

Steven Ravett Brown

Stephen asked:

I'm interested in existentialism and am presently rereading Sartre Existentialism and Humanism. Whenever I study secondary material on the text, there always seems to be references to the numerous errors and weaknesses of Sartre's work but no one ever seems to spell out what these are. Could you possibly inform me of these difficulties, or tell me where I could find this information myself?

Let me state first that there were many good ideas in existentialism. Among students in my youth (I'm 49) this view on life was still debated heavily. Books of for instance Sartre were bestsellers. There were points in this view that were attractive, like free will. Much later came the first critical sounds, but to be fair by people who were looking back.

However there were a few serious flaws in the theory. It took digesting World War II to make these obvious. But these few negative points had been removable, they are in my view not essential.

Existentialism was at the same time highly theoretical and very strict. Existentialists preferred situations that allowed the greatest amount of personal choice, but recognized some compromises were necessary. When it came to ethics existentialists generally referred to a system, a formalized method of determining better and worse in any situation. Morals in existentialist view were events in some conforming community. In other words, in existential ethics 'moral' could be totally different from 'ethical' (using these words in a descriptive way, so connected to a society). A good point was that existentialism was an active philosophy. It was the pursuit of authenticity that mattered most. This was formed in talking and debate. If one had an opinion or thought, it had to be expressed. If a thought required action, then action should be taken. Faith offers an excellent example of existential action. If you held a belief, the existentialist view was that you should act accordingly.Was there an a common basis for the various values expressed by existentialists, so that you can pinpoint the flaws? Yes, I think so. Although existentialism was interpreted in different ways there were some general 'rules'.

Existentialism rested on the following simple set of truths: — Every existentialist is always looking for individual essence — All humans have free will; this has to be strongly protected. — All actions are the result of decision making — Decision making is individual and brings personal responsibility — Everything has a positive and negative side — Good decisions don't exist, only better or worse (no right or wrong) — The 'better' decision produces reduced freedom for lesser individuals (that's why some existentialists supported Hitler) — Importance is scope (using that rule Hitler made a lot of important decisions, influencing many others).

Obviously the last 2 points could be interpreted easily in dubious ways. The confusing thing was the protection of free will and the readiness to die for it, and at the same time accepting obviously wrong decisions because they fitted better in some grand scheme at that moment.

Henk Tuten

Michael asked:

If we, this planet located in space in such a way as to support life and life forms such as us, are truly, if this an acceptable word to use, the only planet that has the correct combination of events and elements to support life and life forms, then we must realize this vision collectively and create a world culture to support life and life forms. If it is not a world culture and remains alienated with itself then it will adjust itself to infinite chaos. What is your view?

Well, you know, perhaps you should go to this site:

Andy asked:

I am trying to get clear about Davidson's scheme/ content distinction as a generalisation of the analytic/ synthetic distinction. Is this anything like it?

The model:

The world (from Wittgenstein's Tractatus) consists of simple objects, these can be linked to form 'states of affairs', the obtaining of a state of affairs is a fact.

Mind: A representation of a state of affairs is a picture — a proposition is such a 'logical' picture. In the picture names go proxy for objects. Any proposition therefore must be analysable into names each of which stands for a simple object. Simple objects must exist to stop an infinite regress.

Analytic/ synthetic distinction. An analytic sentence is true by meaning, a synthetic one is true by data, to say a proposition is tautological is to say it is analytic, which is to say it contains two parts that 'mean the same thing', again which is to say it can be analysable into parts that represent the same simple objects? (this is the part I am particularly perplexed about, what do 'meanings' do? — connect the representations in virtue of projecting out into the world? how else could two representations mean the same thing?

Scheme/ content distinction. In 'immediate awareness' there exists 'the given' — names? These are synthesised into propositions, this synthesis is done according to a 'scheme', the appropriate rules for combining them (in analytic philosophy — the rules of logic implicit in language). The rules are 'in the mind', they are what the mind contributes, this is why analytic truths are indubitable.

First I'll forget your interpretation, because trying to understand it could influence mine. In "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" Davidson treats the idea that there could be differing conceptual schemes (i.e. in fact different 'truths', sometimes called conceptual relativism). By different conceptual schemes Davidson means basically different points of view on the same thing. He concludes that two people have different conceptual schemes if they speak languages that cannot be translated in one another. But because he considers translatability as a criterion of any language, he speaks about partial failure of translation.

First question: how could different conceptual schemes be possible, i.e. different truths exist? Two elements must be present:

1. The relation seen between objects is essentially different in the two 'compared' languages (if experiences of the speakers of those languages don't share the same logic or rationality).
2. Failure of translation (in fact result of 1)

This is a notion from mathematical logic. In Formal Languages such different schemes are treated. In my opinion general philosophy could speed up quite a bit by looking more at mathematical logic.

Davidson says: "Something is a language, and associated with a conceptual scheme, whether we can translate it or not, if it stands in a certain relation (predicting, organizing, facing, or fitting) to experience. Thus, the CHALLENGE is to say what the relation is and be clearer about the entities related."

The difference of two logic schemes that are essentially different is found in two ways of explaining. There is no real comparing, only trying to find out the different explanations for the same object or action. Something is said to be an acceptable conceptual scheme or theory if it fits sensory evidence. Thus in the case of failure of translatability there clearly are different sensory experiences, maybe incomparable senses. Here we have two different truths.

Just for the sake of being able of considering translatability as part of any language Davidson speaks about partial failure of translation. In fact two different truths means total failure of translation. Languages can only be translated into one another IF they share the same truth (or conceptual scheme). That is my own interpretation, but this statement seems difficult to really contradict.

Translating includes that there is a third language, being (at least) the sum of the two translated ones. Often not all statements can be translated from one language into another (their truths partly differ). That's why partial translatability comes in handy, but the essence behind it remains that the failure is caused by different truths. That means that translatability is NOT a trait of every pair of 2 languages (i.e. if you want to call any form of verbal communication language). Space travel could make us meet beings that we don't understand.

You have to distinguish interpretation and translation. Between two languages always interpretation is possible by means of a third language that contains both. To keep it simple: in language 1 a statement is "dogs bite cats" and possibly in 2 "sometimes 4 legged animals don't understand each other". Clearly in language 1 in this statement dog are unequal to cats or A=/=B, and A and B relate by biting. In language 2 in this statement A and B equal and relate by misunderstanding. So it's better too speak about interpretation instead of translation. For such an interpretation a third language is used. It contains both language 1 and 2. Between 1 and 2 there is total failure of translation. But language 3 offers space for interpretation.

In quantum-theory you have particles described by for instance 75% of time equal to A and 25% equal to B. What if in a third language B is understood in a third language C, but not A? This situation resembles schizophrenia were someone part of the time is in an unknown world. Then there is no translation or interpretation

Back to your questions:

So both languages can consist of analytic sentences (based on a kind of basic logic). Both too can have synthetic ones (Based on experience. In an acceptable scheme this fits basic logic too.)

In any language many sentences are similar (or tautological if they can be reduced to the same basic sentence).

Scheme / content distinction. The scheme consists of a couple of basic propositions. The content of any sentence in theory is reducible to such basic propositions, but because of tautologies they can become very complex.

The mind only USES schemes, so it only plays an active role as interpreter.

Henk Tuten

Steve asked:

We have come to find that matter is comprised of molecules, atoms, electrons, protons, nuclei, subatomic particles, nano thingys, etc. We have known of the existence of planets, moon and stars and galaxies for much longer.

If we assume we are 'middle of the road', speaking of size, intelligence, development, why are we finding more smaller things than larger things?

Does it really matter? Why is this issue important? How about this... we're finding smaller things right now because it's easier to find bigger things; you just look up into the sky and there they are, right? But for smaller you need to devise very expensive, complicated, instruments based on extremely complex physical theories.

Steven Ravett Brown

It appears that the Ancient Greek atomists wondered about this too.

Here are two tantalizing fragments quoted by Kirk, Raven and Schofield (The Presocratic Philosophers 2nd. edn. Cambridge University Press p. 416):

Leucippus posited an infinite number of elements in perpetual motion — the atoms — and held that the number of their shapes was infinite, on the ground that nothing is such rather than such (Simplicius, DK 67 A 8).

To this extent they (sc. Epicurus and Democritus) differed, that one supposed that all atoms were very small, and on that account imperceptible; the other, Democritus, that there are some atoms that are very large (Dionysius, DK 68 A 43).

Arguments that appeal to the idea that, nothing is such rather than such (i.e. in the absence of an adequate reason why alternative A should obtain rather than B) seem to have been very popular with the Presocratic philosophers. KRS comment wryly on the second quote, "No doubt he would have explained that very large atoms are to be found only in parts of space distant from our universe" (ibid. P. 416).

Why are contemporary cosmologists not tempted to make a similar claim? Because, unlike Leucippus and Democritus (and, later, Epicurus) who reasoned out their atomist philosophies their using logic alone, cosmologists today seek the best explanation of the available evidence.

Geoffrey Klempner

Reuben asked:

The cosmos is a brain. Electrochemical neurons hurtle through the bloodstream we call "space".

If the cosmos is a macro-organism; we being the tiny lifeforms akin to the nanoscopic life-forms in our own blood, is it possible to test this theory, given the incredible difference in comparative size? Also, if this is true, can the life-forms in our own blood become aware of 'us'? Trace their origins to a beating heart perhaps?

I'll tell you what; read "The Galaxy Primes" by the sci-fi author E.E. Smith. And then read "Macrolife" by Zebrowski (also sci-fi).

Steven Ravett Brown

Cody asked:

I'm a self-read philosophy student. Is relativism a legitimate philosophy, or is it too general a term? The way I see it, everything is relative, including absolute truths.

You put questions like this to a philosopher strictly at your own risk! You might find that it can be an issue apt to raise quite a blast of passion, and in fact debate on it (very passionate!) goes all the way back to the ancient Greeks. And truly I can't do better than to recommend some reading to you: Plato's Protagoras, quite a wonderful (and surprisingly humorous) dialogue that you can read in little more than an hour. Here Socrates, in debate with Protagoras (the man who uttered the famous words: "Man is the measure of all things") shows why relativism is not a sound position to hold; and then you might feel inspired to do a piece of your own trying to prove the contrary. That's important. After all, you might be accused of merely holding to an unsubstantial opinion.

On that score, let me give you my opinion, which is that for you or anyone to say "The way I see it, everything is relative" is not really enough; you need at least to add "relative TO . . ." and define a little better what you mean by "everything". And when you do, you may discover that this ubiquitous relativity is punctuated by a surprisingly high degree of hierarchical structure — among humans, in nature, in physics, indeed everywhere you look. What I mean is this: that "dependence on" is such a universal phenomenon that it is likely to cure you very quickly of the relativity position. Because once something depends, relativity ends within that relationship. — Anyway, happy hunting!

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

I don't know what a "legitimate" philosophy is. But relativism seems to be one. The first thing to ask about a relativist philosophy is "relative to what"? Moral relativism is the doctrine that all moral beliefs are relative to some particular society. The denial of relativism is not absolutism, but universalism. Universalism is the view that there are (in the case of moral truths) universal moral truths: That is to say, moral truths (maybe thou shalt not murder) true in all societies and cultures. According to the moral relativist, what morally true in one society or culture (e.g. cannibalism is wrong in Western Society) is false in other (cannibalistic) societies.

Ken Stern

As you suggest relativism can be used in a general way or with regards to specific issues. Used in a general way however I think it is wrong for the following reason.

The main problem I see with relativism is that if it is true that everything is relative, then the proposition that everything is relative is not an absolute truth but a relative truth. Now if truth is relative to the individual (or whatever) then the truth that everything is relative on analysis becomes:

Everything is relative for me.

But this cannot be an absolute truth so you get:

Everything is relative for me, for me.

Again this can't be absolute and so a vicious regress is generated. On the other hand if the proposition that everything is relative is an absolute truth then it makes itself false. The position then that everything is relative leads either to a vicious regress, or to self refutation, as such it can be seen to be a weak position.

On the other hand relativism when applied to other issues seems entirely plausible, for example whether or not Marmite is nice, Elvis is pleasing, or a picture is beautiful. Hope this helps.

Mike Lee

Look, I don't mean to be insulting, but you need some disciplined instruction in philosophy. You just can't ask a question like the first, and follow it with that second comment. They don't work together, and that you didn't see that indicates to me that you need to find some coursework, a mentor, etc., in this field. You can ask whether "relativism" is "legitimate"... after you've defined your terms. I could guess at what "relativism" means from various writings, but "legitimate"? What could that possibly mean? True? Consistent? Applicable to something (what?)? Employed by people? I don't have the slightest idea of what it could mean, and depending on that, an answer could be just about anything. Then you ask whether "it" is too general a term. What, "relativism"? "Legitimate"? "Philosophy"? They're all too general.

Then you follow with a contradiction. Why, just to be contentious? What purpose does that serve? If you're really serious, then you have extremely non-standard meanings for "relative" and "absolute" (assuming you've thought it through sufficiently to have reasonably well-defined meanings), and again, how can one answer a question when the terms in which it's put are undefined, and seem contradictory? You want absolute? Ok, try walking through the nearest wall. Whoops, now that's pretty absolute, isn't it.

So my take on the above is that you need, as I say, some criticism, and some discipline. You might try the program that Geoffrey K. runs from this site.

Steven Ravett Brown

Jenia asked:

Hello.
My name is Yevgenia. I am 17 and live in Kazakhstan. I would like to talk with people who think about world, life, future and happiness. Because I can't find such people here, in my town. I have wonderful parents. My dad all of his life wants to become philosopher, but can't find people understanding him. I don't know what I must do. All people around me think about food, love and so on. They only live — no they only exist. I want to be useful for world. When I look in people's eyes I see emptiness. They look like robots. I feel pain. I think that anybody would be absolutely happy only then when all will be happy. I mean each man, each animal and finally each particle. And I hope people will do that, but in the future. We must only help them: don't kill, be good, love all around us. That idea of my dad. He told me and I understood. But I can't find anybody who thinks so too. I'm young and I must do something. I don't know what? Maybe you can help me. I want to do all possible in order to be good. Please I need to know — What are you thinking about? Tell me your ideas. I hope you help me with your words.

P.S. I don't know English very well. And it's difficult explain my thinking in my language (Russian), all the more in English. And I'm sorry for my mistakes.

Goodbye. I wait for your letter.

Hello, Yevgenia! Thank you for your wonderful question. (And your English, I think, is quite good. It is certainly better than my Russian, which is nonexistent! :-) ) It sounds as though you and your father would like to have meaningful conversations with people, but find that the people around you are not willing. How frustrating! Some people, for whatever reason, are simply trying to make it through the day. They don't have the energy left over to think about much. Other people seem to be afraid to think. They're afraid that if they try to think, they'll fail and be forced to think of themselves as stupid. They're afraid that if they ask "What is the meaning to life?" they won't like the answer they come up with. These people are like little children who are worry that a monster lives under the bed, but are too afraid to look. I'm glad that you are not one of those people! I know, though, that it can be lonely, if you don't have someone to talk to about things that are important and meaningful. First, I'll give you some ideas I have about that. Then, I'll talk a little about being happy and good. Okay?

You've already done one important thing to find a philosophical community — you've looked on the World Wide Web! There are lots of good discussion groups online. Also, there might be more people in your area who want to talk about ideas than you suspect. People around the world are starting philosophy cafes — also called "Socrates Cafes" — in local bookstores or coffee houses. If you know of a place that might be willing to have a group of people gather to chat, you could ask to put up a notice, announcing the time and day of the first meeting. You could also advertise around town. I'll bet that a number of people would show up, very happy to have a chance to think and talk about meaningful things! Your father might be willing to help you, too.

Now, about happiness. You wrote that nobody can be absolutely happy until everyone else is happy. I don't think that is right. Think about it this way. Suppose that there are only three people in the universe — Ann, Bob, and Carol. Further, suppose that they are not completely happy. And finally, suppose that none of them can be happy until the other two are. Now, how can any one of them, say Ann, become happy? There are two facts here, as the situation is described. 1) Because Ann can't be happy unless the other two are, Ann can't be happy until both Bob and Carol are happy. 2) But because neither Bob nor Carol can be happy until everyone else is happy, neither one can be happy until Ann is happy. But do you see what this means? Putting ideas 1 and 2 together, we get the fact that Ann can't be happy until Ann is happy! Ann needs to get happy before she gets happy! =:-O This is a paradox, so something must be wrong with the situation as described. In particular, I submit that people can be happy even though not everyone else is. I do think that you need to be a good person in order to be happy — you need to treat yourself and other people well, you need to extend wisdom and compassion to everything, no matter how unhappy or dead inside that thing seems to be — but you don't need everyone around you to be happy. Ultimately, your own happiness may very well be one of the things that makes those around you happy!

There's a saying where I live: "Never cut down a tree in winter." That's because, where I live, trees loose their leaves in the winter and so you can't tell the dead trees from the living ones. What you need to do is care for all of the trees, because only in the spring, when they bloom, will you know which ones are alive. People are a lot like that, I think. Sometimes they seem dried up and dead, cruel, or mean, or only interested in unimportant things. But you should always remember that it might be winter for that particular person, and sometimes winter lasts a long, long time. Sometimes people are afraid, or busy, or beaten down for decades. Water them anyway. Let your happiness be in the watering, not in the blooming, and when spring eventually comes, there will be more blossoms than you can imagine. At least I think so. That's always been the way it worked for me.

Dona Warren
Department of Philosophy
University of Wisconsin — Stevens Point

Shaif asked:

My question is philosophical anthropology: what is the human essence? what property defines us all as human and distinguishes us from other types of living beings?

Behold man, who strikes coins with the same die and gets coins all alike; but behold the King of kings, the Holy-Blessed-Be-He, who strikes all men with the die of Adam and not one is the same as another.

Babylonian Talmud

To be a human means to live as if one were not a being among beings. As if, through human spirituality, the categories of being inverted into an 'otherwise than being'.

Emmanuel Levinas

What makes humans special from rocks, trees, trout, dogs, in fact everything is that we are unique, individual, we can't be lumped together under a heading, or at the most such headings and categories are incidental and does not identify what makes us special — as the quote from the Talmud recognises. What makes us unique is threefold; 1) that we are able to transcend our own particular place in the world and to identify other times and places, nothing else experiences time and space as we do, 2) that we recognise our own self, we are self aware, 3) that we recognise Others as Others that is others in their own special uniqueness. No other living thing can respond to an other of its kind, or any other living thing and say 'wow look at that it's completely unique and individual'. All cows are the same. All humans are different.

Put these things together and you get something like what Levinas is describing an 'otherwise than being' (this is not to be understood as not-being, nothingness or death. (Heidegger thought that our experience of nothingness was what distinguished us, the awareness of our own death made us unique, but there are problems with this view, plus the fact of our own death can I think be analysed in terms of the three conditions I listed above especially self awareness and time awareness).

Cows are part of being, they exist from moment to moment with only a fleeting awareness of the flies buzzing around the smell fresh grass, the calls of the bull. Humans are a part of being too (note Levinas says as if one were not a being among beings), we have material bodies that need to eat and sleep, but we can make the move from merely participating in being to moving beyond being to something better, we can care for and look after one another. We don't need to be defined by what we are, that we exist, but by how we are, the way we exist.

Brian Tee

Bernard Lonergan draws the distinction that other living beings are pre-programmed and to act by instinct, while humans alone perform intentional acts. The species Homo was initially pre-programmed, but humans also had the capacity to develop. In Lonergan's view, expressed in his A Second Collection (1974 Westminster Press, Philadelphia) modern humans "apart from times of dreamless sleep, are performing intentional acts. They are experiencing, imagining, desiring, fearing; they wonder, come to understand, conceive; they reflect, weigh the evidence, judge; they deliberate, decide, act. If dreamless sleep may be compared to death, human living is being awake; it is a matter of performing intentional acts; in short, such acts informed by meaning are precisely what gives significance to human living" (1974, 3-4).

In the same work Lonergan identifies three levels of human investigation of reality and of human intellectual development. There is the first level of experiencing, imagining and saying, the second level of inquiry, understanding, defining and conceiving and the third level of reflecting, weighing the evidence and judging (1974, 35).

It is the progress into this third level that has made Western culture dominant. The process of the acquisition of information is intentional, and "our intending intends, not incomplete, but complete intelligibility" (1974, 41). He dismisses Kant's limited understanding of "object",which asserts that the one way our cognitional activities are related to objects immediately is by intuition, and he proposes that "objects are what are intended in questioning and what becomes better known as our answers to questions become fuller and more accurate" (1974, 122-3).

David asked:

I am trying to find a answer to the question, "What does that person really think of me?". I've applied the knowledge I have of the thought process. My question to you would be, "What philosophers have covered this topic?" The rest of this email is what I have been able to put together on my understanding of what makes a person likable to others.

An individual's subconscious (or lower order thoughts) assigns a feeling/ emotion to each person who that individual interacts with. Along with that feeling/ emotion, a representation is also assigned to that person.

Some examples of the feeling/ emotion assigned are love, hatred, pleasant, or tolerance.

Examples of the representation assigned are troublemaker, provider, companion, enemy, etc.

More then one representation can be assigned, such as a companion/ provider, or a troublemaker/ instigator. This all takes place subconsciously and we are unaware that our brain is subconsciously categorizing each person we meet.

These emotions combine with the representation creating a mental state. This mental state dictates how we interact with that person.

If you were at home bored, looking for someone to call, it would reasonable to assume that you would call someone that your subconscious has given a pleasant feeling and companion representation to.

If you were at home trying to get your computer to work properly, and in need of help, you would call a person you have given a provider representation to so they could provide you with the information and help that you need. This person could possibly have a tolerance emotion associated with them. Or you could call someone with a pleasant emotion associated, that has a companion/ provider representation.

The person/ people you decide to interact with is decided by what you need at that present time. Humans are selfish by nature; whether you need companionship (someone to watch the game with you) or a service (someone to install your satellite dish so you can watch the game). Our mental state (derived from emotion/ feeling and representation) is subject to constant change depending on our needs at that time.

When you meet new people, a feeling/ emotion and representation is still assigned upon first contact. This is a first impression. These initial feeling and representations are subject to change. Only after repeated contact with a person do you have a set feeling/ emotion and representation assigned to them.

Our subconscious also applies these emotions and representations to animals. We might have a fearful emotion with a predator representation for a lion, but a compassionate emotion with a helpless/ needy representation for a stray puppy. Once again, these emotions and representations combine to form a mental state. This mental state would cause us to run from a lion. On the other hand, the mental state created by seeing a stray, hungry puppy would prompt us to help the stray puppy.

When a person asks you, What do you think of me?, that person is essentially asking you two questions, What emotion or feeling do you associate with me? and What representations have you assigned me?

We do have limited control over the representation and feeling/ emotion a person assigns us. The emotion that we are assigned come from the general feeling or vibe that person gets from us. We have almost no control over this because the feeling is drawn from the other persons past experiences and how we parallel those experiences. An agreeable attitude and a smile would give us a friendly emotion association, whereas a frown and restlessness would give us that person a suspicious feeling about us.

We do have a lot of control concerning the representation assigned to us. We can mediate our action (verbal and physical) to mimic the representation we would like to have. Such as constantly helping out would put us in the provider category. If we seemed to know the answer to that person's problems, then we would be given a wise man representation.

Our actions dictate how the other person will view, perceive, and classify us. Although emotions are more primal and people tend to go with those, by having control of the representation aspect, we can somewhat direct their mental state towards us.

It must've been hard work to organize your ideas about the thoughts and feelings we have for others. It's all pretty clear and coherent. But although what you argue makes sense to me, it sounds more like a way of looking at things, a model, rather than an explanation.

It is impossible to be rigorous and scientific when discussing emotions, and this leads many philosophers to dismiss such discussions as not really philosophy at all. Emotions are easier to express or evoke, rather than pin down with descriptions; hence much poetry, music and art.

Nevertheless, here is a question that people really want to know the answer to — what do other people think of them; and equally, what do they think of other people.

"What does that person really think of me?" has implicit in the question the understanding that another person may be lying or otherwise concealing what they really think. People aren't always honest. What do we really want — to read their mind and discover their most secret private thoughts?

It's not socially acceptable to march nosily up to someone and baldly ask "What do you think of me?" If you did it, you'd be likely to provoke a lying, or at least not completely truthful, response, perhaps for the sake of politeness. Total honesty can be terribly rude — we call it tactlessness. Maybe it is better that we don't know how people think about us in their private, secret thoughts. It might be shocking.

In finding out what a person thinks of us, we can only go by what they say and what they do. There's nothing else we can get at. I suppose people's actions are less likely to be deceptive than their words. It's easy enough to say nice things about someone you don't like that much, but you would be less likely to bother to invite them round for dinner, say. What about those people who swap addresses with you and passionately declare that you must keep in touch, then never or hardly ever contact you again? You might've thought they must like you, if they want to swap addresses, but this is merely a convention which for some reason is considered polite. If they never actually write, they obviously didn't like you that much — their actions give them away.

So here are two ways of getting a better idea of what a person really thinks of you: you either need some reason to feel sure they are telling you the truth (perhaps there is simply nothing to be gained by lying; or they have said they will do something for you and then actually carried it out several times in the past). Or, you need to pay attention to what they do rather than what they say. (Do they keep in touch? Do they speak/ write formally or informally to you? Do they make time to meet up with you?)

The other aspect of the question "What does that person really think of me?" I find equally interesting — "What do I really think of that person? (and why?)" I have thought about this quite a lot. I tried making a list of characteristics that several people I found attractive seemed to me to possess (e.g. casualness of appearance, sensitivity, interesting ideas, humour). But this is an analysis trying to make sense of a feeling that's already happened. The feeling seems to arise without thought — I don't decide what to feel about somebody, whether to like them or not. What is that feeling of attraction or aversion? We struggle to put it into words. Maybe it's some kind of animal instinct — we have the ability to quickly decide who is our friend or our enemy, who is likely to help us or fight us. If so, evolutionary biology, psychology, anthropology might all be able to help us understand.

A couple of comments: you make the assumption that "Humans are selfish by nature", but not everyone agrees with this. How is it that a person might decide to phone an acquaintance they thought would need comfort after the death of a close relative, for example? It is hard to explain this convincingly in terms of selfishness.

Our 'verbal and physical actions' are not the only things other people observe about us that we can control. We choose what clothes to wear, what hair style to have, perhaps also our hair colour, whether to use cosmetics, what objects to buy and be seen with. These things all influence other people's opinion of us — indeed, some people choose these things according to what they believe other people will like and approve of, rather than what they themselves like.

The following philosophy writings all have discussions of affection and/ or aversion:

Sartre: Being and Nothingness
Plato: Symposium
Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Bk VIII "Friendship"
Montaigne: Essays, esp. "De l'amitie" ('On Friendship', or 'On Affectionate Relationships')
Hume: Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals
Hume Treatise of Human Nature, Bks II and III
Hume Essays, esp. "Of the Dignity and Meanness of Human Nature"
E.R. Emmet: Learning to Philosophize, Ch.5 "Value Judgements"

Katherine Hunt

Jennifer asked:

I have a project for my high school philosophy class due in a month on Nietzsche. The problem is that when I start to read some of his works, I just get confused. I mean, I feel like I think I might understand, but his wording is just baffling to me, at least partially due to differing translations I know, but also because my education in the Bible is limited and when it comes to Greek mythology, I have utterly Americanized versions that I only vaguely remember. I was wondering if you could help find any sources (preferably internet) that are informative AND understandable. Especially considering that I have to do an analysis of one of his major works.

and Casey asked:

I have been learning about Friedrich Nietzsche in school, and I was wondering if someone could explain his philosophy to me, because I am having trouble understanding it. What does it mean that he separates everyone into ascending and descending? What is the sign of affects?

In a nutshell: Nietzsche is a troublesome thinker, because the unsystematic manner of his work invites the most diverse and conflicting opinions on what his real message is. More than most philosophers he had his readers importing their own opinions into his writings and therefore reading them as confirmation of whatever views they held. In consequence he's been accused of being a mere essayist (i.e. not a full quid as a philosopher) and variously blamed for Nazism and other forms of disreputable politics, not to mention sundry other evils of society, for which he is supposed to have furnished an ideology. In truth, however, he was a culture critic and moralist, who saw his task as the diagnosis of western civilisation, which seemed to him corrupt to the bone.

The consequence he drew from this diagnosis was, that the rot had set in such an extent that it was irremediable: The type of man representative of western civilisation was malformed (spiritually & culturally) by a 1000-year hegemony of Christian morals with their enmity for and disgust with life, which in turn inevitably fostered false ideals and counterfeit values. Not seeing a cure, he preached the overcoming of this type of man, the revaluation of all values and an affirmative attitude to the sacrifice inevitably demanded by these goals. This is the core of his philosophy.

Let me add that Nietzsche was a passionate philosopher, as none before him; and that philosophy was for him quite literally a matter of life and death. One needs to know this in reading him — which is to say, in the study of his works, the microscope reveals too little too close up. In Nietzsche, the larger context is everything. Although they comprise mostly aphorisms, these add up to the meaning of a whole book. This is what readers miss out on who content themselves with selections.

Nietzsche is nowadays becoming increasingly recognised as primarily a moralist and attention is gradually shifting away from the poetic/ prophetic masterpiece Thus Spake Zarathustra to the more strictly philosophical Genealogy of Morals. If you need to study a principal work, this would be my recommendation; and there is available an excellent book to help you along, Nietzsche on Morals, published in the Routledge Philosophy Guides, which gives you a chapter by chapter analysis as you read.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

Clinton asked:

Question on Japanese philosophy:

This question is more practical than anything else. I'm searching for an institute/faculty where I can do a PhD. in Japanese philosophy. Does anybody have a good suggestion for me?

I studied philosophy (3 years) and Japanese studies (5 years) and I'm currently doing a master in Osaka, where I am working on a thesis on the philosophy of Inoue Enr.

Why you don't ask the East Asia Institute, Faculty of Oriental Studies at Cambridge University:

Chris asked:

It seems to me that if the human race continues to go in the direction that it is going that we will be doomed to live in a world of total control that will put free will and thought at a minimum or a stop. I am interested in learning your thoughts and opinions on this subject.

The idea that you pose, has been the subject of many philosophers. The first ones that made this observation were members of so called Critical Theory in the early 20th century. The founder of this group was Herbert Marcuse. Much later (outside Critical Theory) he wrote a bestseller about it: One-Dimensional Man.

Marcuse was the philosopher behind Flower Power. This was a movement that started as a student revolution in Paris in 1968. Often this movement is considered as in the meantime off the wall. It stressed too much one-sided feeling, and that was not considered as serious in a rational world. But the central idea that Marcuse stressed in his book is still valid: western society has become dependent on economy and on politics, resulting in lack of freedom of mind. Already half a century ago he made that observation, and things haven't gotten any better.

Marcuse measured capitalism by the unsatisfied needs of the population. That approach lost part of it's attraction as soon as capitalism proved itself capable of delivering the goods. Still there are the mental needs but the established system seems on the right way.

Marcuse once wrote, "obstinacy [is] a genuine quality of philosophical thought". With that thought in mind Marcuse keeps stubbornly attacking the limits of capitalism, because:

(1) There are still wars, hunger plagues and ecological catastrophes.
(2) The contradiction between daily ugliness of society and art (the greyness of life versus colorful art)
(3) Massive manipulation of consciousness (especially through TV in all it's forms)
(4) No fulfilling work and security of life for the vast majority
(5) Signs of deep dissatisfaction beneath the surface of success (the general search for something more).

These reasons make sense. This society, Marcuse optimistically argues, has the potential to be "sound" but artificially maintains competition and violence as the basis for domination and inequality.

Back to your question:
At the moment you see that world leaders live in a rational and economic world. Don't expect solutions from that side. At the same time voting percentages have never been so low. That means that there developed a 'canyon of difference in views' between the top layer of society and 'the masses'. Right now this is developing in a crisis. Who knows what'll happen

Please don't think in terms of "be doomed". That is fatalism, and what we need is action.

Henk Tuten

Stephen asked:

Suppose a scientist could create a machine which is able to create an exact duplicate, or clone, of an adult human being (assuming the materialist view that humans are 'physically duplicatable' as living, conscious beings).

Now suppose this scientist puts Fred in his machine in his lab, and creates an exact clone of him. Both Freds have the exact physical form and identical memories (and so the clone cannot tell that he is not the original, and he is never told or able to find out otherwise).

Now, seconds after the clone and original are both conscious, the scientist kills the original Fred. The clone is then allowed to go back to Fred's everyday life, believing himself to be the original.

The question is: Is anything lost in this process? And if so, what, exactly, is it? (A 'soul'?)

It appears that, once the clone and Fred are both alive (and conscious), they are separate (sentient) beings. And so, for the Fred who entered the lab, his life ended there.

My Dad, however, argues that a person's individuality is defined by his memory, and so, since all of Fred's memories would still be intact in the living clone, Fred would still be alive (and therefore, nothing would be lost).

Which of these views is most likely to be correct? If the first view could be correct, does this pose a problem for (strict) materialism?

Why do I get such a strong feeling that Fred's life 'for him' must end in the lab, even though, to every one else around him, it would appear that Fred is still alive? To illustrate more bluntly: Knowing that the cloning had a 100% success rate, would YOU volunteer to go through the same treatment as Fred? If not, why not?

The crucial word in your question is "assuming". You see: there is no legitimate warrant for assuming that in the real world such things are possible, even in principle. Of course I'm aware, as you are, that a colossal amount of industry (though mostly entertainment) is devoted to it: but fundamentally the answer has to be "no". This is because human life (indeed any life form) is not willy-nilly reduplicable; the notion of living things as "material" entities is only true insofar as that is what they are made from. But the way these material constituents hang together is a dynamic equilibrium; and part of this transformation entails that they no longer behave in a normative chemical manner and cannot be handled as chemical systems qua chemical systems. Ergo: chemistry = dead matter, manipulable; biochemistry = living matter, cells, self-assembling.

One way of appreciating this fundamental discrepancy is to take note of what "cloning" is, namely, not (as in your assumption) some kind of mechanical copying, but rather the initiation of the biochemical process of self-assembly which culminates in the generation of a new life (and, by the way, the same applies to "genetic engineering", which is nothing like engineering, but again the outcome of a scientist disturbing in a targeted way a genetic strand and waiting for it to repair and re-assemble itself).

The last point is this: that a body could (in principle) be duplicated if particular conditions prevail. I hope from the foregoing you know what that "special condition" must be. In a word: death. When a body is dead, the dynamic equilibrium collapses and the material bits and pieces return to their normal chemical functionality. Hope this answers something. Not much philosophy in it, but I suspect that the completely fictitious dilemmas of your question would not arise if philosophy were to play a more pronounced role in scientific developments.

Jürgen Lawrenz
Sydney

This issue is addressed by many sci-f