When referring to an answer on this page, please quote the page number followed by the answer number. The first answer on this page is 16/1.
(5) Christina asked:
Last year I had a nervous breakdown and I was diagnosed with major depression after the loss of a child. I'm not quite sure when I began to lose sight of reality, but during the negative experience I enrolled and withdrew erratically and brought my GPA down from a 3.6 to a .99 over the past year. I have always aspired to be a scholar. I feel I have just ruined my life. I have an idea that I could get away with not including the transcript when applying to other graduate programs. I know this is wrong. Yet, I don't know what else to do to gain my peace and happiness again. Please, if you have any advice, I would greatly appreciate it. School has been my life. I am so sad now. I wanted to get a ph.d. but this loss of personal control over my life has nearly ruined me. I feel so guilty for even thinking that omitting a transcript record is an option. I know I can get away with it, but part of being a scholar is having integrity. I hope you can help.
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You haven't ruined your life. It hasn't been your fault and things look like they will improve.
It is always best at least less worrying! to tell the truth. Perhaps a doctor could send a covering letter with the transcript with an explanation?
You shouldn't feel guilty about just 'thinking' about omitting the transcript.
Even if you actually DO it I wouldn't believe that it was terribly wrong, though most others would. You have been ill and have passed through a time when integrity wouldn't have even entered your mind or have been a matter of concern. You were just trying to get through. Maybe you still don't feel up to integrity, but you show the will to survive and recognition of the value of integrity, so you'll get there.
I'm sorry about the loss of your child. I know that after something like that you might have to act desperately, although desperate action isn't good action by definition: You are not in a state to bring all considerations to bear. However, I think your thought actually shows a good survival instinct. The thought about hiding facts because there is something you need, and something you want to achieve, is really positive in a way. You have motivation back.
For myself, I think that how you get to college doesn't matter as much as how well you work when you get there.
But what do you mean by you 'always aspired to be a scholar'? Are you just after an end? I'm hoping that your thought is that if you get on a PhD course and are just able to study you will feel mentally happier and will work well.
Ethically, honesty is the way. It is also best psychologically. If you feel guilty about the thought, how will you feel about the deed?
You have actually expressed the thought on a web-site. How anxious will that make you?
Rachel Browne
(7) Kyle asked:
I believe it is wrong, but this is a philosophical question, is eating people wrong? Mammals eat mammals, we eat mammals, we are considered mammals, so why is it wrong for us to eat us. Kant says it is immoral to treat someone as a food. Cannibals eat someone when they die out of respect of them, so that they are now considered to be a part of that person, that is not treating them as a food. If you are stuck on a desert island and someone that is with you dies, is it moral to eat them? What's the difference in doing that and donating your organs?
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When you eat something you are ALWAYS treating it as food. This is what it is to eat something. Cannibals may have a belief that it is respect, but they are still eating another person, so treating that person as food.
Is it moral to 'eat someone'? You are on a desert island where there are likely to be other things to eat and, while you decide on the moral nature of the option and the digestibility factor, the body is rotting and beginning to stink?
This is a question about what it is right to do when you are desperate, which is the philosophical test case of what is moral, not the normal context of moral decision-making. I think that when you are dying and desperate and there are only two people and one is dead, the only judgement we can make is not moral because morality is about considerations to do with others who are conscious rather than dead.
Donating your organs is to help others to live. To help yourself to continue to live on a desert island when there is only ONE source of something that you are willing to treat as food, is different. It is purely self-serving (although there might family wanting you to return home) but it isn't particularly practical. How long are you going to last after you have eaten the other person?
Rachel Browne
(8) Ray asked:
Why (if indeed it is) that the statement "All the books in my room are on philosophy if there are no books in my room" true?
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This is a statement which has the logical form of a conditional, which is 'if . . then'. A conditional is true, according to formal logic, if the consequent is true. When a statement is put in the formal notation of logic, where you simply have a symbol, you cannot make inferences according to the content, because there isn't any.
In the logical notation of conditional form, the assumption is that A entails B, so that if B is false then A is too, because B SHOULD have followed from A and if it didn't, then A wasn't true.
Your statement is more clearly put as 'If all the books in my room are on philosophy, then there are no books in my room' or 'if there are no books in my room, then all the books in my room are on philosophy' and neither makes sense in terms of content.
In ordinary language we expect there to be a conceptual connection between the antecedent and consequent of a conditional if it is to make sense. The antecedent should at lest IMPLY the consequent. Your book case doesn't do this. If you don't have any books there is no implication that they should have a subject matter. In ordinary we wouldn't even say this is false, just that it is nonsense.
While in ordinary language there is implication, in logic there is entailment. Entailment, as above, means that it is impossible for A to be true without B being true. So an example would be 'if something is square then it has four sides' because it is logically and conceptually impossible for this to be false. In ordinary language there aren't many conditionals of this type.
Implication is looser than entailment. It is not tied to impossibility and you could use the term 'therefore' quite sensibly, which is to make an inference. You might say 'if the streets are wet it must have been raining' or 'the streets are wet therefore it has been raining. But this doesn't meet the demands of an entailment relation because it could be the case that the streets have been cleaned with water.
Logical form doesn't reflect ordinary language. Logical form is supposed to embody the essential logical nature of a statement, but logical notation is totally based around the function of the connective rather the content.
But you question whether your statement about books actually IS a statement and Grice has said that a statement should be assertable and what you say. You can't use the statement to convey anything meaningful nor can use it to express anything that makes sense in ordinary language.
Rachel Browne
(15) Samantha asked:
Religious Language. Is religious language about factual assertions? So far, for the debate on religious language I have found many philosophers and theologians who give opinions and doctrines however I can?t determine which are most beneficial to answering positive towards this question, I have been able from research to find many which would disagree but none which would agree. The verification principle and falsification principle would argue for neither as they believe that as religious asserts are not empirically verified. They are meaningless therefore can not be a factual assertion nor is it a non-cognitive view point, unlike Braithwaite who takes a non-cognitive stand point and considers religious language to be meaningful as it plays other roles in our language; for example a guideline of morals, but again would disagree with religious language being factual as religious language cannot be used to assert or deny the existence of God. John Wisdom (parable of the gardener), Hick (the parable in which two men walk towards the city)and even Swinburne (the parable of the toys coming alive) would all argue that religious language does not have to be factual to have meaning to a believer. David Hume stated that religious language was ?nothing but sophistry and illusion? so again is not beneficiary to me in agreeing with the before question. I considered Ramsey's theory of models and qualifiers, can it be used to suggest we can make factual assertions, I'm not sure as I don?t feel the argument would be strong as he doesn?t state anything from my knowledge that the models drawn from the observed world must be factual. I do feel Wittgenstein could be beneficial as he describe religious language as a game in which only the players can understand the rules so therefore the statements made in religious talk are factual to those who understand and believe in them. I would greatly appreciate some advise as to who would say religious language is about factual asserts or even philosophers who suggest that it?s possible to make factual statements when talking about God would be a great help. Thank You.
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In answer to your question: of course religious language is about factual assertions; religious language makes assertions about the person making religious claims: that person has certain beliefs, etc. The question you seem to want to ask, however, is what we can employ to help decide whether religious assertions are true or not; I'm not sure what the difference is between that and asking whether "religious language is about factual assertions".
You might take a look at these:
Alper, M. 2001. The "God" part of the brain: a scientific interpretation of human spirituality and god. Brooklyn, NY: Rogue Press.
Azari, N.P., J. Nickel, G. Wunderlich, M. Niedeggen, H. Hefter, L. Tellmann, H. Herzog, P. Stoerig, D. Birnbacher, and R.J. Seitz. 2001. Neural correlates of religious experience. European Journal of Neuroscience 13:1649-1652.
Barrett, J.L., R.A. Richert, and A. Driesenga. 2001. God's Beliefs versus Mother's: The Development of Nonhuman Agent Concepts. Child Development 72 (1):50-56.
Boyer, P. 2000. Natural epistemology or evolved metaphysics? Developmental evidence for early-developed, intuitive, category-specific, incomplete, and stubborn metaphysical presumptions. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):277-297.
Dupre, L. 1998. Religious mystery and rational reflection: excursions in the phenomenology and philosophy of religion. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.
Eliade, M. 1961. The sacred and the profane. Translated by W. R. Trask, The Cloister Library. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Giovannoli, J. 2000. The Biology of belief: how our biology biases our beliefs and perceptions: Rosetta Press, Inc.
James, W. 1968. The varieties of religious experience: a study in human nature. New York: Collier Books.
Langdon, R., and M. Coltheart. 2000. The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions. Mind & Language 15 (1):184-218.
Laski, M. 1990. Ecstasy in secular and religious experiences. Los Angeles, CA: Jeremy P. Tarcher, Inc. Original edition, 1961.
Lawson, E.T., and R.N. McCauley. 1993. Rethinking religion: connecting cognition and culture. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Russell, B. 1981. Mysticism and logic and other essays. Totowa, JN: Barnes & Noble Books. Original edition, 1917.
Sagan, C. 1996. The demon-haunted world: science as a candle in the dark. New York, NY: Random House, Inc.
Steven Ravett Brown
(16) Ashley asked:
I am an atheist with a question I can't answer. Why do people believe in God? I have thought about this for years and years now, but cannot find a reasonable response to it. I'm talking mainly about Christianity, but also other world religions too, although I don't know as much about these. My main problem with it is my judgement that God created humans so that they could worship Him: Humans have no choice over whether they're born or not, yet when they are, if they don't dedicate they're lives to God, they don't get entry to the Kingdom of Heaven. This leaves me with the impression that God is arrogant. This is not to say that people shouldn't be thankful for their lives. I could understand worshipping God if we had ASKED to be created, but we had no choice. He, 'who creates all things', created us. I'm also particularly interested in the problem of suffering. Most Christians can answer suffering with the 'free will' and 'original sin' arguments, but I'm yet to find an answer from anyone to the question 'Why does God allow miscarriage?' as neither the baby nor the mother has free will over the event. Your help with these (rather long and ranted) questions would be much appreciated as they have bothered me for a long time. Thankyou.
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Some of these might be helpful:
Alper, M. 2001. The "God" part of the brain: a scientific interpretation of human spirituality and god. Brooklyn, NY: Rogue Press.
Azari, N.P., J. Nickel, G. Wunderlich, M. Niedeggen, H. Hefter, L. Tellmann, H. Herzog, P. Stoerig, D. Birnbacher, and R.J. Seitz. 2001. Neural correlates of religious experience. European Journal of Neuroscience 13:1649-1652.
Barrett, J.L., R.A. Richert, and A. Driesenga. 2001. God's Beliefs versus Mother's: The Development of Nonhuman Agent Concepts. Child Development 72 (1):50-56.
Boyer, P. 2000. Natural epistemology or evolved metaphysics? Developmental evidence for early-developed, intuitive, category-specific, incomplete, and stubborn metaphysical presumptions. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):277-297.
Dupre, L. 1998. Religious mystery and rational reflection: excursions in the phenomenology and philosophy of religion. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.
Eliade, M. 1961. The sacred and the profane. Translated by W. R. Trask, The Cloister Library. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Giovannoli, J. 2000. The Biology of belief: how our biology biases our beliefs and perceptions: Rosetta Press, Inc.
James, W. 1968. The varieties of religious experience: a study in human nature. New York: Collier Books.
Langdon, R., and M. Coltheart. 2000. The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions. Mind & Language 15 (1):184-218.
Laski, M. 1990. Ecstasy in secular and religious experiences. Los Angeles, CA: Jeremy P. Tarcher, Inc. Original edition, 1961.
Lawson, E.T., and R.N. McCauley. 1993. Rethinking religion: connecting cognition and culture. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Russell, B. 1981. Mysticism and logic and other essays. Totowa, JN: Barnes & Noble Books. Original edition, 1917.
Sagan, C. 1996. The demon-haunted world: science as a candle in the dark. New York, NY: Random House, Inc.
Blanke, O., T. Landis, L. Spinelli, and M. Seeck. 2004. Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin. Brain 127:1-16.
Gregory, R. 1980. Perceptions as hypotheses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B, Biological Sciences 290:181-197.
Piaget, J. 1971. Insights and illusions of philosophy. Translated by W. Mays. New York, NY: The World Publishing Co.
Piattelli-Palmarini, M. 1994. Inevitable illusions: how mistakes of reason rule our minds. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Steven Ravett Brown
(17) Jean Maria asked:
As scholars do we have an ethical obligation to attempt genuine communication with those whose moral positions we oppose (in print), if our opponents are in positions of potential wrongdoing? Or is it sufficient to run our own arguments to justify our positions, without regard to the worldviews or situations of our opponents? Perhaps someone can help me frame the question in philosophical terms. The question arises because my "Utilitarian Argument against Torture Interrogation of Terrorists" [Science and Engineering Ethics, 10(3), 543-572] has been criticized by some non-utilitarian philosophers for flawed methodology. As a social scientist, I sought empirical data to assess whether torture interrogation of terrorist suspects has produced, or can likely produce, the positive results promised by advocates. The critique of my method goes that if my assessment had favored torture, then I would be in the position of advocating torture. I respond that, although I am opposed to torture on other grounds, in order to communicate with military professionals and others working in institutions that require utilitarian rationales, it behooves me to run a utilitarian argument. If my research had upheld the positive results promised by advocates of torture interrogation of terrorists, I suppose I could have had a tough problem on my hands. But my oral histories of some military professionals who had been involved in coercive interrogation made that possibility remote in my mind. I am not trying to raise the issue of torture interrogation again here but only to illustrate the possible urgency in truly communicating with one's opponent on a moral issue. Thanks again to all philosophers who responded to my query in Answers 18 concerning torture interrogation. I acknowledged their help by name in my paper.
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You might look here, at p. 154, re how one progresses to different moral stages:
Dawson, T.L. 2002. New tools, new insights: Kohlberg's moral judgement stages revisited. International Journal of Behavioral Development 26 (2):154-166.
Please do not use my name in a paper. Thank you.
Steven Ravett Brown
(21) Jean Maria asked:
As scholars do we have an ethical obligation to attempt genuine communication with those whose moral positions we oppose (in print), if our opponents are in positions of potential wrongdoing? Or is it sufficient to run our own arguments to justify our positions, without regard to the worldviews or situations of our opponents? Perhaps someone can help me frame the question in philosophical terms. The question arises because my "Utilitarian Argument against Torture Interrogation of Terrorists" [Science and Engineering Ethics, 10(3), 543-572] has been criticized by some non-utilitarian philosophers for flawed methodology. As a social scientist, I sought empirical data to assess whether torture interrogation of terrorist suspects has produced, or can likely produce, the positive results promised by advocates. The critique of my method goes that if my assessment had favored torture, then I would be in the position of advocating torture. I respond that, although I am opposed to torture on other grounds, in order to communicate with military professionals and others working in institutions that require utilitarian rationales, it behooves me to run a utilitarian argument. If my research had upheld the positive results promised by advocates of torture interrogation of terrorists, I suppose I could have had a tough problem on my hands. But my oral histories of some military professionals who had been involved in coercive interrogation made that possibility remote in my mind. I am not trying to raise the issue of torture interrogation again here but only to illustrate the possible urgency in truly communicating with one's opponent on a moral issue. Thanks again to all philosophers who responded to my query in Answers 18 concerning torture interrogation. I acknowledged their help by name in my paper.
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About the wider context to your question, terrorists and torture and utilitarianism, I have nothing to say here. But your first question interests me, although I'm a little taken aback by the fact that you ask it:
As scholars do we have an ethical obligation to attempt genuine communication with those whose moral positions we oppose (in print), if our opponents are in positions of potential wrongdoing? Or is it sufficient to run our own arguments to justify our positions, without regard to the worldviews or situations of our opponents?
What seems obvious to me is that if we do not have regard to the worldviews of our opponents in "our own arguments", then our 'arguments' are unworthy of the name. The kind of 'regard' that we should have? Well, it is axiomatic that in defending our position (in philosophy as opposed to a street fight) we are claiming that our position is superior to the opposing one. What credibility can such a claim possibly have if the claimant fails to make diligent efforts to understand the opposing position? I do not mean that one must understand exactly why each and every opposing person is variously and separately motivated to hold their view for this would set the standard impossibly high and make all passionately held opinions undebatable ('you wouldn't see it like that if you were where I'm standing' etc etc). Rather, I mean that one must understand the view that they hold: ask the right questions about the details of the picture, it's internal structure and so on. If both parties do this, argument is possible. IE, it is possible for each to talk about why they hold their views and, in the process, even possible for them to discover that they do not understand why they hold their view as opposed to the other which would be an important revelation ('the unexamined life is not worth living', and a life worth living in knowledge begins by becoming capable of realizing our own ignorance). None of this is possible unless we "attempt genuine communication with those whose moral positions we oppose".
David Robjant
(22) Olivia asked:
If metaphysics does not involve empiricism then how can it claim to produce truth; surely it's totally unjustified in doing this?
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It is a Kantian lie (or act of tendentious persuasive definition) that metaphysics is a separate area of work from describing experience, and it is really this Kantian lie which through the work of Kantians like Wittgenstein has all but succeeded in killing off the metaphysics Kant so willfully redefined. Schopenhauer ably challenged this lie, but because Kant has had such a formative influence on so many, not enough attention has been paid to Schopenhauer's direct hit on this point. So 'thank you' for the opportunity to direct your attention to an important part of World as Will and Representation. Schopenhauer goes on at length, and while there is important detail in his exegesis of Kant and also some righteous joy to be derived from the intelligent abuse he heaps on Kant, an extended quote may detain. So as the key point and taster:
"the task of metaphysics is not to pass beyond the experience in which the world exists, but to understand it" [Schopenhauer: World as Will and Representation, supplement to Book 1 Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy This translation is Iris Murdoch's. Compare pages 427-8 of World as Will and Representation volume 1, Translated by E.F.J. Payne, published Dover ISBN 0486217612.
Importantly, the idea of experience plays contradictory roles in these two rival versions of metaphysics to such an extent that if Kantian Metaphysics is Metaphysics then Schopenhauerian Metaphysics cant be, and vice versa. In Kantian Metaphysics, we are supposed to set aside sense experience and critique something called pure reason (for which one may nowadays read 'pure grammar'). In the new, modern but also Pre-kantian and acceptable to Plato [from Iris Murdoch 'Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals'] Schopenhauerian idea of Metaphysics favored by Iris Murdoch, the job at hand is to describe experience and attempt to picture it adequately, to 'understand' it aright, and start our imaginings on that platform. Murdoch thinks that this is exactly what Plato attempts (one may cite the argument from flux in the theory of forms, the manner of investigating the good, and so on). In my forthright opinion, she is completely right about this: Plato was a Schopenhauerian Metaphysician and not a Kantian Metaphysician. Therefore, if Kant is right that Metaphysics is the study of pure reason excluding the sensory, it follows that Plato wasn't a Metaphysician. But Plato was a metaphysician. And Kant has a very great deal to answer for.
David Robjant
(39) Hank asked:
In a discussion, I made the point "Truth (Correspondence with reality) is not subjective, but objective. It is independent of opinion. If I say that I am 6"4? tall, either that statement is true, or it is not. It does not matter whether anyone agrees with the statement, or whether a majority support the claim, or whether a person even knows if the claim is true: either I?m that tall, or I?m not." Someone responded "But the definition of your height has been defined by people. This truth is objective, because it depends on the truth of the measurement system, which is never ultimately true because it can be changed by man whenever we want. An inch is only an inch in our scope of reality." My response: "The truth of my height isn't determined by what measurement system we use. If we convert that to metric, or to some other system, then the expression of my height would change: my height remains the same, and either the expression of it is true, or it is not. If you change the measure, then claim my statement is untrue, then you are engaging in the logical fallacy of Equivocation." Now, it has been pointed out that my last statement is incorrect: the problem is not Equivocation. But I'm having trouble putting a name to the problem. The lady is interested in my point, but I'm having trouble explaining the flaw in her rebuttal.
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In essence, I agree with you. You are 6' 4" tall, or whatever that converts to in whatever measuring system you want to use. But the problem isn't "equivocation", which means, roughly, "hesitate", or perhaps better, "be ambivalent". There are lots of ways to criticize the correspondence theory of truth, but that isn't one of them. One can, for example, speak of the uncertainty of measurement, and question what it is to a) measure, and b) make a definite statement such as "you are 6'4" tall"... and require that you say something like, "given uncertainty in measurement, given human error, at this particular time, in this context.... blah, blah... you are 6'4" tall". Ok, fine. But I don't take that as a refutation of the correspondence theory of truth, but as a caution on how one legitimizes particular results. One can more profoundly criticize it, perhaps, on more fundamental grounds derived from something like a Kantian perspective, where one admits that our conceptions of, and perceptions of, the most basic aspects of reality are at the very least highly influenced by innate mental constraints. Thus, one could claim that the very notion of space, from which we get the idea of measuring feet, is something that we humans have created, and that "out there", there's no such thing. Well, fine... but I have problems with that, myself, from a very pragmatic viewpoint, i.e., that if we walk off what seems to be a cliff, by gosh we end up falling off something. One can also criticize it on the basis of induction, saying something like, "well that's fine, you just measured your height as 6'4", but how do you know that's what it is now?" And that's either, to my mind, an absurd degree of skepticism, or a rather profound comment on the nature of induction and the necessity for something like Bayesian statistics.
So if you take all that into account, first, then the problem with the critic as far as I know isn't anything capitalized, any formally named fallacy, it's just ignorance of what different measurement systems are and how they relate to each other, viz., not as different kinds of actions, but merely as different types within a kind, i.e., measurement. To say that one can change types is not to say that one is doing anything intrinsically different within that kind of praxis (action, practice, activity...). Now, given uncertainty of measurement, human error, etc., I wouldn't go so far as to say that "either the statement is true or it is not". That's a misconception of science and similar activities which has led to things like Darwinian evolution being criticized because scientists, accurately, term it a "theory". Really, any such statement, ultimately, is untrue, if only because there is always going to be quantum uncertainty in the length of our rulers. But that doesn't mean it's "untrue"... in the profound sense that we can't meaningfully make measurements; certainly it's just fine in most contexts, and as true as it needs to be, that your height is 6'4", where "needs to be" relates to whatever use you're going to make of the measurement. To put it another way, saying that the result of a measurement is " 6'4" " is precisely to take uncertainty of measurement into account, if you know anything about science, and it implies that "measurement" does not give us truth in any absolute sense. And so what? Again, we may not know exactly what the "cliff" is that we don't want to walk off, but we do know that we'll rather definitely fall off something if we do.
If you really want to get into this, take a look at this book:
Kitcher, P. 1993. The advancement of science; science without legend, objectivity without illusions. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Steven Ravett Brown